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Abstract
On the assumption that the Bill of Rights in the Malawi Constitution has
brought change in the enjoyment of rights by women married under custom-
ary family laws, this research study examines its impact on African custom-
ary family laws that are discriminatory against women in Malawi. The main
focus is on customary family laws governing marriage, divorce, children after
divorce, and inheritance in both patrilineal and matrilineal systems of mar-
riages. The extent to which this has been reflected in practice is assessed
in the light of women’s rights law reforms and courts’ adjudication of cus-
tomary family law issues. The central argument that has been advanced is
that, in reconciling customary family laws with women’s rights, courts and
law reformers need to look closely at customary family laws that are dis-
criminatory against women, and develop them so that they are compatible
with the constitutional principles of equality. In ignoring the application of
customary family laws in favour of a constitutional provision that is aimed at
the protection of women’s rights, courts and law reformers are failing to ad-
equately protect the rights of women married under customary family laws.
xiii
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, it has been argued that ignoring the application of customary
family laws not only fails to represent an adequate response to women who
wish to live by their cultural rights; it also lacks the constitutional justifi-
cation that makes it a good part of a well designed constitutional approach
that has taken into account the fact that the majority of Malawian women
live according to customary family laws.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and overview of
the study
1.1 Problem statement
In 1994, the Republic of Malawi adopted a new constitution, the Republic of
Malawi Constitution of 1994, hereinafter called the ‘Malawi Constitution’.1
The Malawi Constitution is responsible for revolutionary changes in the ap-
plication of customary family laws in Malawi. Probably one of the most
important changes is the enactment of an entrenched Bill of Rights that
1The Republic of Malawi (Constitution) Act No. 20 of 1994, came provisionally into
force on 18 May 1994, and was fully in force on 18 May 1995, as Act No. 7 of 1995.
1
 
 
 
 
recognises a range of rights, including the right to culture.2 Section 26 of
the Malawi Constitution provides that ‘every person shall have the right to
use the language and to participate in the cultural life of his or her choice’.
On the basis of this section, an argument can be made that the State is
obliged to recognise and apply customary laws in its courts.3 This argument
is strengthened by Section 2004 of the Malawi Constitution which states,
among others, that ‘customary law in force on the appointed day shall con-
tinue to have force of law’.5 At the same time, there are provisions relating
to family law and women’s rights. For example, Section 22 (1) of the Malawi
Constitution provides that ‘the family is the natural and fundamental group
unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State’.6 In
2Arguably, Malawi draws its inspiration for constitutionally protecting cultural rights
from international instruments, for example, Art. 18 (1) and (2) of the ACHPR and Art. 27
of the CCPR.
3A similar argument was also made by Bennett TW Human Rights and African Cus-
tomary Law under the South African Constitution (1995) 23 in respect of the Constitution
of the Republic of South Africa, 1993.
4Section 200 of the Malawi Constitution provides: ‘Except in so far as they are incon-
sistent with this Constitution, all Acts of Parliament, common law and customary law
in force on the appointed day shall continue to have force of law, as if they had been
made in accordance with and in pursuance of this Constitution: Provided that any laws
currently in force may be amended or repealed by an Act of Parliament or be declared
unconstitutional by a competent court’.
5According to Section 212 (1) of the Malawi Constitution, 18 May 1994 is the appointed
day when the Malawi Constitution, as earlier mentioned, came provisionally into force.
6This provision, it is argued, draws its inspiration from international instruments, for
example, Art. 18 (1) of the ACHPR which calls for the recognition and protection of the
2
 
 
 
 
addition, Section 24 (1) of the Malawi Constitution states that ‘women have
the right to full and equal protection by the law, and have the right not to
be discriminated against on the basis of their gender or marital status · · ·’.
The values encoded in customary family laws, on the one hand, and the
Malawi Constitution and the international standards on the protection of
women’s rights on the other, frequently contradict one another.7 This prob-
lem is further complicated by the fact that the Malawi Bill of Rights has
accommodated culture without providing guidelines for the resolution of con-
flicts should a right to culture clash with another right, that both fall within
the Bill of Rights. The challenge, therefore, is how customary family laws
can be applied in a constitutional framework whilst at the same time en-
suring that harmful practices are not protected under the guise of cultural
propriety.8
The difficulties inherent in the application of the universal human rights
norms in culturally diverse societies, such as Malawi, are envisaged in the Vi-
family. Art. 18 (1) of the ACHPR provides that ‘the family shall be the natural unit and
basis of society. It shall be protected by the state which shall take care of its physical and
moral health’.
7See Bennett TW Customary Law in South Africa (2004) 76-100; and Nhlapo RT ‘The
African Family and Women’s Rights: Friends or Foes’ (1991) Acta Juridica 135 at 137-145
who, among others, have also discussed at length the contradictions.
8Kaime T ‘The Convention on the Rights of the Child and cultural legitimacy of chil-
dren’s rights in Africa: Some reflections’ (2005) African Human Rights Law Journal 221
at 223.
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enna Declaration,9 which, even while affirming the ultimate goal of universal
protection, makes clear that:
‘· · · while the significance of national and regional particularities
and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must
be borne in mind, it is the duty of the state, regardless of their
political, economic and cultural systems to promote and protect
all human rights and fundamental freedoms’.
The inclusion of culture as a right within the Bill of Rights, as well as
the protection of women’s rights, have thus created a new dimension to the
whole question of the application of customary family laws. It is against
this constitutional dilemma that this thesis examines the impact of the Bill
of Rights on African customary family laws focusing on women’s rights in
Malawi.10
9Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 12 July, 1993, para 5 as cited by
Grant E ‘Human Rights, Cultural Diversity and Customary Law in South Africa’ (2006)
Journal of African Law 2 at 3.
10The arena of women’s rights provides an ideal laboratory for examining the way the
HC, as an interpreter of the fundamental law of the land, both initiates and responds to
social change. Cases decided by the HC also provide a stage on which abstract constitu-
tional terms, such as equality, take on concrete meaning as they are seen applied to live
controversies of topical interest.
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1.2 Significance and objectives of the study
1.2.1 Significance
Identifying the proper ways of applying customary family laws in a consti-
tutional system engages an on-going controversial debate. The legitimacy
of customary family laws and the case of women’s rights inform the whole
debate around the issue. This controversy has gained momentum in Malawi
where, among others, a unified form of marriage system is proposed.11 Ad-
ditionally, the debate has led to a proposition among adjudicating officers of
the court and other stakeholders to resolve the problem of conflicts between
customary family laws and constitutional rights by applying common law12
instead of customary laws where the application of customary law would vi-
olate women’s rights. The significance of this study is, thus, to contribute
to this academic debate. But, it should be noted that the issue of protect-
ing women’s rights within customary family laws entails an implication way
beyond the academic debate as it has practical consequences. Determining
when to apply customary family laws and how to prove them in court has
11The Malawi Law Commission recommends a unified law in Malawi that consolidates
statutory and customary laws on marriage and divorce. However, this unified law, as it will
be discussed later in Chapter 6, seem to negate the precise content of what a customary
marriage is. Arguably, one sees it as an imposition of a common law marriage onto a
customary system.
12This is according to responses from some judicial officers that were interviewed.
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important implications in evaluating the level and effectiveness of protec-
tion provided for the human rights of those women married under customary
family laws. Therefore, from an access to justice perspective, the impact of
the Bill of Rights on customary family laws relating to women can have an
extremely wide reaching effect on the justice system as a whole.
However, from a practical approach, the target groups that this research
will affect are quite specific. Firstly, African customary family laws applies
to the majority of the population in Malawi.13 There has been concerns
in African customary family laws and the rights of women. This study will
therefore highlight areas of concern and how they can be addressed. Secondly,
there is no literature on the Malawi Bill of Rights and how courts have
been interpreting these provisions. This study will therefore provide some
literature on how courts have been interpreting the Bill of Rights. Thirdly,
Malawi cases are, in most cases, not reported, which makes it difficult for
legal practitioners and other stakeholders to know what effect the Bill of
13According to quantitative data derived from a household survey by Ngwira N et al
Women’s Property and Inheritance Rights in Malawi (2002), as cited by the Malawi Law
Commission Report on the Review of the Law on Marriage and Divorce (2005) 10-11,
almost 77 percent of respondents opt for chinkhoswe or customary officiation of their
marriage while 23 percent or so opt for church officiation under the African Marriage
(Christian Rites) Registration Act. This Act merely makes provision for the celebration
of African marriages in accordance with Christian rites. All a church does under the Act
is to register the marriage but the marriage remains a customary one in every respect.
It is for this reason that customary laws prevail and the marriages celebrated under the
African Marriage (Christian Rites) Registration Act remain potentially polygamous.
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Rights has on African customary family laws. Fourthly, magistrates and
judges, in so far as they are obliged by the Constitution to apply customary
family laws, will also be affected by this study. Although the standards will
be specific to formal justice courts, the informal justice delivery systems will
also benefit in so far as they will be applying customary family laws in a new
constitutional order.
1.2.2 Objectives
The main objective of this research study is to examine and analyse critically
the impact of the Malawi Bill of Rights on African customary family laws in
Malawi, focusing on women’s rights. The main focus is on customary family
laws governing marriage, divorce, children after divorce, and inheritance in
both patrilineal and matrilineal communities.14
The specific aims and scope of this thesis are as follows:
1. It will explore the meaning and the nature of African customary family
laws in the Malawian context and show how they conflict with the Bill
of Rights.
2. It will look at the constitutional protection of fundamental rights in
the Bill of Rights. Here, a determination of whether the inclusion of
14Malawi is composed of both matrilineal and patrilineal customary systems of marriage.
A discussion of these systems will be done in Chapter 4.
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cultural rights in the Bill of Rights supersedes other rights as contained
in the Bill of Rights will be made. Of particular importance in this
thesis is whether the protection of cultural rights in the Bill of Rights
constitutes a justifiable reason for differential treatment of women and
men.
3. It will discuss the application of the Bill of Rights to African customary
family laws. The main focus will be on how its application can change
rules of African customary family laws governing customary marriages
which, ultimately, would be to the benefit of women in their enjoyment
of their human rights.
4. It will identify specific problems related to the application of African
customary family laws. The main focus here will be upon technical
problems of application such as conflicts between different customary
family laws and conflicts between different customary family laws and
the Bill of Rights.
5. In addition, there will be a determination of specific socio-economic
problems related to the application of the Bill of Rights to customary
family laws in Malawi.
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1.3 Methodology
In examining what impact the Bill of Rights has on African customary family
laws in Malawi, reference will be made to relevant provisions of the Malawi
Constitution, SC cases15 and HC decisions.16 Reference is also made to
relevant legislative reforms that are taking place in the field of customary
family laws governing marriages in Malawi.17 In addition to the above, some
reference is also made to decisions from South Africa.18 Finally, reference
to international best practice and theoretical material has not been ignored
particularly as reform of customary family laws continue to be influenced by
the prevailing international standards.
In the following discussion, a description of the methodologies is presented.
15SC cases will be examined primarily because most customary marriage disputes are
adjudicated in these courts.
16According to Section 108 of the Malawi Constitution, the HC is an interpreter of the
Constitution.
17These reforms are facilitated by the Malawi Law Commission. According to Section
132 of the Malawi Constitution, the Malawi Law Commission is empowered to ‘review
and make recommendations relating to the repeal and amendment of laws and which shall
have such powers and functions as are conferred on it by the Constitution and any other
Act of Parliament’.
18South Africa has been chosen because it has a CC where issues of women’s rights are
finally settled. Secondly, issues of African customary family laws have been well researched
and documented in that country. It has also been chosen because of financial reasons. I
am currently in South Africa.
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1.3.1 Literature review/ interviews/ observations
This thesis puts emphasis on analysis of the relevant available literature on
the subject. It also relies much on the practical sources of the research.
The data for this thesis is primarily aimed at qualitative, as opposed to
quantitative, analysis. With regard to literature research, the study relies on
primary sources. This includes international law instruments, constitutions,
reports of law reform bodies, women’s legislation, children’s legislation,19
case law, resolutions, declarations, general comments, state reports under
the various international and regional human rights instruments (particularly
CEDAW), and concluding observations (mainly of the CEDAW Committee).
The study also places considerable reliance on secondary sources. These are
background papers, books and academic articles. Various internet sites have
been consulted for relevant data and information.
At a practical level, the thesis is the culmination of a study that I conducted
in Malawi, looking at the impact of the Bill of Rights on African customary
family laws. On the assumption that the Bill of Rights has brought change in
19Therefore, concurring with Armstrong A et al ‘Toward a Cultural Understanding
of Inter-play between Children’s and Women’s Rights: An Eastern and Southern African
Perspective’ (1995) International Journal of Children’s Rights 333 at 333 that in discussing
women’s rights, it is inevitable that children will also be discussed. The connection between
women’s and children’s rights is usually based on the assumption that mothers are the
primary caretakers of children. Furthermore, customary family laws that affect women
are likely to have an impact on the children’s welfare.
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the enjoyment of human rights for women married under customary family
laws, the study was conducted in three major cities of the country.20 Struc-
tured interviews, observations and court records21 were used to determine
the judgments made in relation to the awarding of property ownership after
divorce or death, and guardianship of children after divorce. In this regard,
the study also relies on information obtained from government departments,22
and other stakeholders23 in the field of women’s rights and customary family
laws.
The people interviewed were magistrates and judges who were adjudicating
over cases involving customary family laws. One open ended questionnaire
was prepared for use with magistrates and judges responses.24 The questions
20These cities were chosen for a number of reasons. First, they represent different types
of customary marriages. Mzuzu which is in the northern part, represents the patrilineal
system, Lilongwe represents both the patrilineal and matrilineal systems, and Blantyre
represents the matrilineal system. Secondly, the three cities represent the three regions of
the country. Thirdly, each of these cities has a HC that is mandated to review any law
that is inconsistent with the Constitution. Fourthly, all appeals from the MC on matters
of customary family laws are channeled to them.
21This is the largest documentary source of the research. The court cases looked at
consisted of all cases on customary family laws after 1994 that could physically be located.
For a comparative analysis, cases pre-1994 were also looked at. I also looked at cases that
were decided by the NTAC. These cases had been compiled by Dr Boyce Wanda during
the period 1978-1987.
22More especially the Ministry of Gender and Youth.
23These are NGOs that deal with women’s issues.
24See Appendix 2.
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sought information relating to knowledge of the relationship between custom-
ary family laws and human rights, application of human rights to customary
family law rules, and the development of customary marriage rules in view
of the Bill of Rights. They were also asked about their general knowledge
of customary marriage laws with regard to property relations of a married
couple, and devolution of an estate, either on divorce or death of a husband
according to customary family laws. Additionally, they were asked how they
resolve the conflict between customary family laws and the Bill of Rights.
1.3.2 Use of materials researched
This subsection gives an indication of the main use of the information re-
searched for this study. The literature is used to acquire a broad under-
standing of issues concerned with legal developments affecting customary
family laws in Malawi and other African countries, especially South Africa.
The case records are used as a source of information about customary
family law rules, as well as for an evaluation of the role of the courts in
the development of the customary family laws. Both the court cases, MC
and HC, and the interviews are used to understand the impact of the Bill of
Rights on African customary family laws in practice and its application by
both levels of court. Interviews, especially with magistrates and judges, are
used to analyse issues of implementation of laws in society. NGO reports are
used to assess public opinion and attitudes toward the issues concerned.
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In light of the use made of this data, I will, in most cases, present court
decisions and statements of interviewees in detail. The aim is to maintain the
sources’ originality. In order to protect the identity of the people interviewed,
their names have been abbreviated.
1.3.3 Limitations of study
The difficulties inherent in the generalized reference to ‘the impact of the Bill
of Rights on African customary family laws in Malawi,’ are not overlooked.
The study is directed toward a view of the main currents running through,
and characteristics identifiable in, African customary family laws applicable
in Malawi. A general report on matrilineal and patrilineal customary mar-
riage law issues pertaining to the human rights of women can account for
individual differences.25 The thesis will refer to individual examples, but
does not endeavour to give an overview of the impact of the Bill of Rights
on each and every customary marriage rule of every tribe in Malawi. The
same applies to court judgments, journals consulted, interviews conducted
and courts visited. These sources had to be selected, sometimes in a haphaz-
ard way. This study accepts the premise that conclusions and generalizations
can, in any event, never be based on a totality of comprehensive data.
This study also acknowledges the fact that it will become outdated soon.
25Considering the fact that, within matrilineal and patrilineal societies, there are differ-
ent tribes.
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Obviously, the status of customary family laws that are not in conformity
with the human rights of women may be changed. New laws governing
the status of women married under customary family laws are likely to be
passed.26 Considering the fact that culture in general is dynamic, cultural
practices relating to marriage, that are discriminatory toward women, may
evolve into practices that are not discriminatory. But one need not despair
at these thoughts.27 This study is a work in progress, embedded in the much
greater and more fluctuating context of the project to realize the enjoyment
of human rights28 by women married under customary family laws, which is
itself very much a work in progress.
26An indication of this is already seen in the procedure that has been adopted by the
Malawi Law Commission in reviewing marriage and divorce laws. However, changing
laws does not directly translate into changing perceptions of how a society will look at a
particular practice.
27Viljoen FJ The realisation of human rights in Africa through inter-governmental in-
stitutions Unpublished LLD thesis (1997) University of Pretoria, 43.
28As above.
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1.3.4 Description of research areas and work done
Blantyre
Blantyre city, situated in the southern region of Malawi, is the second largest
city of Malawi. It covers an area of 220 square kilometres.29 The city has
a total population of 502,053 (239,938 females and 262,815 males).30 The
population is quite diverse. It includes a considerable number of tribes from
within Malawi, as well as Asians and other foreigners.
Blantyre is also the government administrative center. The SCA and Prin-
cipal HC Registries are also situated there. Apart from hearing cases from
the Blantyre district, the HC also hears cases from other districts of the coun-
try which do not as yet have a HC.31 The SCA hears cases from the whole
country. There are also MC courts situated in Blantyre. There is, for exam-
ple, the Blantyre District MC. This court is responsible for handling a large
number of matrimonial cases as a court of first instance. The examination
of cases was done at this MC, as well as at the HC and SCA.
29This is according to the NSO projected population for 2008 based on the 1998 Malawi
Population and Housing Census.
30See 1998 Malawi Population and Housing Census by the NSO accessed at
www.nso.malawi.net on 12/10/2006.
31Among the districts that channel their appeal cases to this HC are Nsanje, Chikwawa,
Mulanje and Thyolo.
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Lilongwe
Lilongwe is the capital city of Malawi. It covers an area of 328 square kilo-
metres.32 It is situated in the central region and has an estimated total
population of 440,471 (208,955 females and 231,516 males).33 The main eth-
nic group is Chewa, who are matrilineal by descent. Smaller numbers from
other ethnic groups, as well as foreigners, are also settled in Lilongwe.
Lilongwe has a HC which serves all the districts that are in the central
region. Within Lilongwe city, there is a Lilongwe district MC. I conducted
research at this MC as well as Lilongwe HC.
Mzuzu
Mzuzu is situated in the northern region of the country. It is also one of the
three major cities of the country. It has a total population of 86,980 (42,132
females and 44,848 males).34
Mzuzu city is the main urban center in the northern region. It has a HC
which serves six districts of the region. There is also a magistrate court that
serves the whole city. Appeals from this MC and other MCs in the region,
therefore, go to Mzuzu HC. This area is mostly occupied by the patrilineal
32See n 29 above.
33See n 30 above.
34See n 30 above.
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ethnic groups. Considering that Mzuzu is a city, it is not completely ruled
out that other tribes, from the matrilineal ethnic groups, could also be among
its inhabitants. It was, therefore, not surprising to see that a MC was han-
dling a matrimonial case whose parties were married according to matrilineal
customary law marriages. However, the main focus of the study in this area
was on those marriages contracted under the patrilineal customary laws.
During my field research I examined court cases in both the magistrate
court and the HC within the city.
1.3.5 Overview of chapters
In accordance with the general aims of the study as set out above, the discus-
sion will proceed as follows: First, this chapter (Chapter 1) introduces the
study, its aims, approach and scope. Thereafter follows a historical overview
of the court system and the recognition of African customary family laws
in Malawi, with particular emphasis on the period after 1994, in Chapter
2. Chapter 3 examines theoretical debates on the relationship between UN
human rights instruments and their effect on customary family laws and
women’s rights. The aim is to discuss theoretical debates underpinning hu-
man rights. The most extensive and detailed part of this study is presented
in Chapter 4 and is concerned with outlining African customary family laws
and showing how they are incompatible with the Bill of Rights in Malawi.
The African customary family laws that are incompatible with the Bill of
17
 
 
 
 
Rights will form a benchmark by reference to which the impact of the Bill of
Rights will be evaluated when examining what courts and law reformers are
doing in order to reconcile African customary family laws and women’s rights
in Malawi. Chapter 5 examines the Bill of Rights in Malawi and its applica-
tion to African customary family laws. The aim is to show the possible effect
that the application of the Bill of Rights has on African customary family
laws governing the customary marriage laws. This Chapter also makes an
examination of the socio-economic problems of the application of the Bill of
Rights in Malawi. The aim is to discuss factors that limit the application of
the Bill of Rights to African customary family laws which ultimately may af-
fect the enjoyment of women’s rights. In Chapter 6, an examination of how
law reformers are reconciling African customary family laws and women’s
rights will be undertaken. This is followed by an examination of the courts’
application of customary family laws after 1994, in Chapter 7. Finally, it re-
mains to draw the necessary conclusions from the preceding discussion. This
will be based on the findings of the study.
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Chapter 2
Historical arguments: Overview
of Malawi’s court systems and
recognition of African
customary family laws
2.1 Introduction
In order for us to fully appreciate the impact of the Bill of Rights on African
customary family laws affecting women’s rights, it is important to look at
the historical environment in which customary family laws have operated in
Malawi. In view of this, this Chapter presents a brief description of Malawi,
19
 
 
 
 
as well as a historical overview of African customary family laws and the
jurisdictions of the court system from the pre-colonial period to 1994 in
Malawi, in an attempt to provide an overview of trends in the recognition
and application of customary laws since pre-colonial times.
The Chapter is divided into three sections. The first part presents a brief
description of Malawi. In the second part, the Chapter presents a historical
overview of the court systems. Given the wide range of both materials and
problems, the general theme will have to be limited. In the analysis of the
history of the court systems in Malawi, therefore, the following points will
receive special emphasis: the development of the institutional structure of
the Malawi legal system; and the the recognition of African customary family
laws. These will form the points of departure for understanding the impact
that the Bill of Rights has had on African customary family laws because,
among other reasons, the different courts and their judges were, and still are
today, of crucial importance in the area of African customary family laws.1
Lastly, some tentative conclusions are drawn about the recognition and ap-
plication of customary laws in the court systems in Malawi that may indicate
the impact that the Bill of Rights has had on African customary family laws
affecting women’s rights.
1Von Benda-Beckmann F Legal Pluralism in Malawi: Historical development 1858-1970
and emerging issues (2007) 29.
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2.2 Brief description of Malawi
The Republic of Malawi is a small landlocked country in Africa, south of the
equator between latitude 9 degrees 45’ and 17 degrees 16’ south and between
longitudes 33 degrees and 35’ east.2 It is 900 kilometres long, varying in
width from 80 kilometres to 160 kilometres, and covering an area of 118,484
square kilometres. 53, 070 square kilometers of this land is considered suit-
able for cultivation. With more than 105 persons per square kilometer of
arable land, Malawi has one of the highest population densities in Africa.3
The overall life expectancy for the country is low, and is estimated at 39.8
years.4 The national literacy level is estimated at 64.1 percent.5 Malawi is
classified amongst the 10 poorest countries in the world with over 65 per-
cent of the population living below poverty line and women are in majority.6
The 2004/2005 Integrated Household Survey show that 52 percent of the
population live below poverty line.7
The country is bordered by the Republic of Tanzania to the north and
north-east, by the Republic of Mozambique to the east, south and south-
2Mutharika P ‘Malawi’ (2000) Journal of African Law 949 at 949.
3MNLP (2002) accessed at www.malawi.gov.mw/Lands% 20and%20Housing/Home
%20Lands.htm, on 20/10/07.
4UNDP Malawi in Human Development Report (2006).
5As above.
6UN Human Development Report (2000).
7MGDS (2007) 7.
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west, and by the Republic of Zambia to the west and north-west8 (See map
of Malawi in Appendix 1. The major topographic feature is the rift valley,
in which lies Lake Malawi at 475 metres above mean sea level. Lake Malawi
is a freshwater lake that covers 20 percent of Malawi’s land area, and three
quarter of the entire length of the country.
Under the Regional and District Boundaries and Place Names Act9, Malawi
is divided into three administrative regions10 that are further divided into 28
administrative districts. The northern region has six districts and hosts 12
percent of the country’s population.11 These districts are Karonga, Chi-
tipa, Mzimba, Nkhata Bay, Rumphi and Likoma. The central region has
ten districts and hosts 41 percent of the country’s population.12 The dis-
tricts are Lilongwe, Mchinji, Kasungu, Dowa, Ntchisi, Nkhotakota, Dedza,
Ntcheu and Salima. The southern region is made up of Mwanza, Neno,
Blantyre, Machinga, Balaka, Mangochi, Thyolo, Phalombe, Mulanje, Zomba,
Chiradzulu, Nsanje and Chikwawa, and hosts 47 percent of the country’s
population.13 The number of districts can be increased or decreased at any
8Malawi Government, URL: http://Malawi.gov.mw.
9Chapter 18:04.
10Roberts S ‘Malawi’ in Kritzer HM (ed) Legal Systems of the World: A Political, Social,
and Cultural Encyclopedia (2002) M-11.
11Lembani S The Social, Economic and Political Profile for Malawi (Unpublished)
(2007) 2.
12As above.
13As above.
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time as determined by the OPC. As a result, the number of districts has
been varying since independence.14 Between July 1964 to April 1968, there
were 23 districts. From May 1969 to January 1970 the number were reduced
to 22. Chiradzulu District was merged with Blantyre in May 1969. From
January 1970 to January 1971, there were again 23 districts. Chiradzulu
District was again made a separate district in January 1970. From January
1971 to 1973 there were 24 districts. Mwanza District was created out of
the western portion of Blantyre in January 1971.15 Recently, in the period
between 1994 and 2003, four new districts were created.16
The Malawi population is currently estimated at 12.6 million17, with women
comprising 51 percent of the total population. 85 percent of the population
are in the rural areas.18 The country is not homogenous. There are several
tribes. In the northern region there are, among others, Ngonis and Tum-
bukas.19 The Mang’anja, Yaos and Chewas are the largest groups in the
14Malawi attained political independence from Britain on 6th July 1964.
15Joffe SH Political Culture and Communication in Malawi (1973).
16Muula AS and Chanika ET Malawi’s Lost Decade 1994-2004 (2005).
17UNDP (n 4).
18The fact that a large population stays in rural areas is an important point to note
since, as will be noted later in this Chapter, most courts are based in the urban areas.
This has an implication on how women can access these courts and enforce their rights
as provided in the Bill of Rights. A full discussion, however, on how this can limit the
application of the Bill of Rights to African customary family laws is undertaken in Chapter
8.
19Green C and Baden S Women and Development in Malawi Report No. 23, May 1994,
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southern and central regions, respectively.20
Malawi’s history dates back many centuries. It is believed that the Mar-
avi21 started settling around Lake Malawi about 1 000 AD. The Maravi
people had a political and social organisation22 that tended towards an in-
evitable decentralisation of the authority of the nevertheless powerful king,
Kalonga, his clansman, Undi, and other tributary kings.23 In most cases,
the supremacy of a king over tribal groups was recognised. In the 16th
century there was a vast trading empire established by the Maravi people.
Slave trade, which ravaged most of Africa from the 16th century to the 19th
century, left its imprints on Malawi’s historical development.24
The modern history of Malawi is linked with the Scottish missionary ex-
plorer, Dr David Livingstone (1813-1873), who reached the lake he named
accessed at http://www.bridge.ids.ac.uk/reports.html on 22/01/05
20Miller D Matriliny and Social Change: How are the women of rural Malawi managing?
paper presented to CASID on 2nd June 1996, accessed at
http://www.ca.encarta.msu.com/encuet/refpages/search. aspx?=chewa, on 05/03/05.
21The Maravi consisted of the Chewa, Nyanja, Mang’anja, among others.
22It is not intended here to give an analysis of the social structure of the different tribes in
Malawi. On the political and social organisation of these tribes, see Von Benda-Beckmann
(n 1) 81-91; and Ibik JO Restatement of African Law: Malawi Vol 1, The Law of Marriage
and Divorce (1970).
23Lwanda JL Kamuzu Banda of Malawi: A Study in Power, Promise and Paralysis
(Malawi under Dr Banda 1961-1993) (1993) 1.
24As above, 2.
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Lake Nyasa in 1859.25 Following his appeal to other missionaries to come and
fight the slave trade in Central and East Africa, the first missionary expedi-
tion of the UMCA arrived in Malawi in 1861. Later on, Christianity brought
British colonial authority to Malawi and it became a British Protectorate
in 1891.26 Malawi attained political independence on 6 July 1964 with Dr
Hastings Kamuzu Banda as the Prime Minister, before he became the first
State President of Malawi on 6 July 1966. During the same year, Malawi
was declared a one-party state. This position was, however, changed in the
multiparty general elections held on 17 May 1994. Mr Bakili Muluzi won the
general election and became the second President of Malawi. Following from
that, in the multi-party general elections held on 20 May 2004, Dr Bingu wa
Mutharika was elected President. He is the third and current president of
Malawi since independence.
25See also Lembani (n 11) 2.
26Mutharika (n 2) 950.
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2.3 Historical overview of court systems and
customary laws in Malawi
2.3.1 Pre-colonial period
During the pre-colonial period, customary laws were administered by the
king’s bwalo. The bwalo was an open area under a tree in the village where
the king and elders sat when dispensing justice. The young were expected to
acquire knowledge of the customary laws of the land by paying close attention
to the proceedings and judgments.27
The lowest level of adjudication was the community dispute resolution
structure. This first level of adjudication constituted a loose traditional litis
contestatio.28 The first level of appeal was the headman and, should this
fail, the paramount king was the supreme court of appeal who had even the
power to banish persons from society.29
In all these cases, while the king or headman, as the case may be, was the
27Chimango LJ ‘Tradition and the Traditional Courts in Malawi’ (1977) CILSA 39.
28Bekker JC Seymour’s Customary Law in Southern Africa (1989) 28.
29Forster P ‘Law and Society under a Democratic Dictatorship: Dr Banda and Malawi’
(2001) Journal of Asian and African Studies 275 at 280. See also Koyana DS Customary
Law in a Changing Society (1980) 128 who has noted a similar position to Malawi that the
kings’ and headmen’s courts were the courts of first and final instance in the pre-colonial
days in South Africa.
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main adjudicator of the matter, anybody (including passers-by) who wished
to put in questions and comments could do so.30 The king’s main duty was to
figure out the consensus of the case and pass judgment from that consensus.
The adjudicator and his or her councillors also controlled the proceedings of
the case.31 The king could hear any case without any limitation either as a
court of first instance or on appeal from the village tribunals.32
The early most notable paramount kings in Malawian history are Kyungu,
who controlled the Ngonde-Nyakusa people in the north, Chikulamayembe,
who was the king of the Tumbuka people of the Nkhamanga kingdom in
Rumphi and surrounding areas, and Kalonga of the Maravi empire, which
at its peak stretched from Mozambique to eastern Zambia. The nineteenth
century migration of the Nguni and their subsequent invasions saw the es-
tablishment of the Mbelwa and Gomani king paramouncies in the northern
region and central region, respectively. In each of these kingdoms they had
distinct customs and traditional values that were in some respects similar. As
such, the customary law that was being applied in deciding cases continued
to be confined to unwritten customs of the people of that kingdom.33
The remnants of the pre-colonial justice system are the traditional leaders
30Chimango (n 27) 40.
31See also Mandela N Long Walk to Freedom. The autobiography of Mandela (1994) 25
who also wrote about how it went at the king’s palace, particularly meetings in South
Africa, which is similar to how kings were handling cases in Malawi.
32Chimango (n 27) 40.
33Von Benda-Beckmann (n 1) 34.
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court systems, observed in various parts of Africa.34 In Malawi, it has been
estimated that there are currently over 20 000 traditional leaders of varying
levels of seniority who administer justice in almost every village.35 These
courts, as will be noted later, have not received any formal recognition after
the colonial era, but continue to administer justice even after 1994.
The precolonial period and women’s rights
In the area of women’s rights, it is important to note that during the pre-
colonial period Malawian society, just like in most African countries,36 man-
ifested a variety of attitudes and practices toward women, with women pos-
sessing political and social power in some systems and having little or no
power in others. Thus, with regard to matrilineal societies in Malawi, Phiri37
notes that a Chewa woman was looked upon as the root of a lineage (tsinde)
which gave a woman high status and a certain amount of freedom, which
was not present in patrilineal systems. This position was, however, overlaid
34Bennett TW Customary Law in South Africa (2004) 135 also observes that the tradi-
tional rulers had been dispensing justice before colonisation and continued to do so after
colonisation in South Africa.
35Kanyongolo FE Malawi: Justice Sector and the Rule of Law (2006) 21.
36See the discussion by Gellar S., ‘The Colonial era’ in Martin P and O’Meara P (eds)
Africa (1995) 135 at 139-140.
37Phiri IA Women, Presbyterianism and Patriarchy: Religious Experience of Chewa
Women in Central Malawi (2000) 35.
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by Christianity and colonialism.38 It will be noted in the following section
that Christianity and colonialism came as male domination and anything
that was incompatible with this perspective was crushed. Women were not
a special case in the impact which Christian missionaries made upon 19th
century Africa.39 Further disruptions were seen when colonialism introduced
a new form of marriage aimed at improving the rights of women. Unfortu-
nately the new form of marriage produced a lot of inequities for the majority
of women because of the differences in expectations of women and men. The
new marriage had a major effect on women’s legal status, and gave rights
of succession to property to spouses and children which were not generally
recognised in customary law. This position, it is could be argued, created
a lot of conflicts when the applicable law to a particular dispute had to be
determined in court.
In the following section, what happened after Malawi was colonised is pre-
sented.
2.3.2 Colonial period
In the preceding section, it has been noted that kings of different tribes
were the main adjudicator in the customary court setting. The customary
38As above.
39Hastings A African Catholicism: Essays in Discovery 36 as cited by Phiri (as above)
48.
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laws that were being applied in deciding cases were confined to unwritten
customs of the people of a particular tribe. After Malawi had been colonised
the following developments took place.
Court system
After Malawi had been colonised the general legal system of the Protectorate
was founded upon the British Central Africa Order in Council, 1902 (the
Order). The standards of the Malawi court system were set by a HC40 and the
MC below it. Throughout this period the HC structure was a four-tiered one.
In the early years, between 1902-1946, there was the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council at the apex based in London, followed by the East African
Court of Appeal which ordinarily sat in Zanzibar.41 The HC of Nyasaland
and its SC were under the East African Court of Appeal. When Malawi
became recognised administratively as part and parcel of the Rhodesia and
Nyasaland Federation in 1953, the East African Court of Appeal was replaced
by the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Court of Appeal; later known as the Federal
Supreme Court.42 This system was primarily administering common law
40Art. 15 (1) of the Order created a HC with full jurisdiction, civil and criminal, over
all persons and over all matters in the Protectorate.
41Chimango (n 27) 44.
42In 1953, the British colonial authorities formed the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasa-
land, comprising of the then Southern Rhodesia (now the Republic of Zimbabwe), Northern
Rhodesia (now the Republic of Zambia) and Nyasaland (now the Republic of Malawi).
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and was not applying customary laws.43 Even though the HC did not apply
customary laws, the colonial power, as it will be noted later in the discussion,
continued to recognise the application of customary laws in the chiefs’ courts
albeit with limited jurisdiction.44
SC were created by the Subordinate Courts Ordinance.45 Initially there
were the following SC: District and Sub-District courts; and District Na-
tive and Sub-District Native courts. Magistrates in these courts were the
district and assistant district residents.46 They exercised the function of
magistrate in the District and District Native courts as well as Sub-District
and Sub-District Native courts.47 As was the case with the kings’ courts dur-
ing pre-colonial period, these magistrates also exercised both administrative
and judicial functions. Thus, there was no separation of powers.
Jurisdiction of District and Sub-District courts was limited to cases where
Europeans and Asians were parties.48 Appeals from Sub-District courts could
be lodged in the district courts. Obviously these courts could not have been
expected to apply customary laws to Europeans. On the other hand, the
jurisdiction of District Native and Sub-District Native courts was limited to
legal disputes between Africans. These courts could apply customary laws
43Allott AN Judicial and Legal Systems in Africa (1962) 62.
44This has also been noted by Chimango (n 27) 45.
45Ordinance No. 5 of 1906.
46Von Benda-Beckmann (n 1) 37.
47As above.
48Von Benda-Beckmann (n 1) 37.
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under certain conditions.49 Appeals from Sub-District Native courts could
be lodged in the District Native courts, and from both these courts50 appeals
could be made to the HC.51 It can, therefore be submitted that HC was
applying customary laws when presiding over an appeal from a SC in which
customary law was applied.
It should, however, be noted that during the colonial period, the judi-
cial institutions of the African population were not legally recognised in the
court system. They, however, continued to deliver justice in the villages.52
Seen as a move towards the recognition of the judicial institutions of the
African population, the District Administration (Native) Ordinances of 1912
and 192453 opened the possibility that certain chiefs and village headmen
could be authorised to administer justice in certain spheres and with limited
administrative powers. However, no use was made of this authorisation.54
As earlier noted, the absence of legal recognition did not mean that custom-
ary courts ceased to function. Many reports show that chiefs and village
headmen continued to exercise judicial functions, and in some places written
records of the proceedings were kept.55
49Chimango (n 27) 45.
50The District and Sub-District, and the District Native and Sub-District Native courts.
51Von Benda-Beckmann (n 1) 38.
52As it will be shown later in the discussion, this position continued during the one-party
rule of Dr Banda, as well as after 1994.
53Ordinance No. 13 of 1912 and No. 11 of 1924, Sections 11 and 13 respectively.
54See Von Benda-Beckmann (n 1) 38 and Chimango (n 27) 45.
55Von Benda-Beckmann(n 1) 39.
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It is also important to note that, during the colonial period, magistrates
and the HC could, however, not effectively dispose of all causes between
Natives in the districts.56 Thus, a large number of matrimonial cases, which
were brought before the District Resident Magistrates, were eventually sent
to the chief’s village where they were settled by the chief in spite of the
absence of a provision authorising them to do so.57 As earlier noted, many
of these chiefs’ court disputes were confined to administer ‘native law and
custom’ in both civil and criminal cases in so far as the customs were not
repugnant to justice and morality or inconsistent with the provisions of any
written law in force in the Protectorate.58
The lack of formal recognition of the chiefs’ status in connection with the
administration of local justice continued until 1933.59 The Native Courts
Ordinance of 1933 brought the following changes: Native Courts had to be
established in accordance with customary laws and their jurisdiction was
circumscribed in a warrant; the jurisdiction of these courts were limited to
legal disputes between Africans; and these courts had to apply customary
laws. Apart from customary law, these courts could also apply administrative
regulations issued by the Provincial and District Commissioners or those
issued by themselves in their capacity as Native authorities. In the area
of marriage, Native Courts presided over marriage disputes resulting from
56Chimango (n 27) 46.
57As above.
58As above.
59Chimango (n 27) 45.
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marriages under customary law or Islamic laws.60 This position was almost
similar to that in South Africa. During the colonial period in South Africa,
the Minister could authorise traditional leaders, approved by government, to
hear civil and minor criminal cases and apply customary laws.61
Another point worth noting is that the chiefs’ court system was not part
of the HC system. Appeals from the chiefs’ court were heard by the Native
Commissioners before landing in the HC.62
It should be noted that the introduction of Native Courts meant that
Malawi had officially received a two-tiered judicial system which was con-
nected by the HC. However, the appointment of chiefs and village headmen
as native authorities did not mean that the traditional judicial system had
been re-established in its original form. It happened that those who were
chiefs according to customary laws were not necessarily considered as chiefs.
Instead, Africans that were favoured by the administrators were appointed
as chiefs.63 This, obviously, suggests that the appointed chiefs may not have
been very knowledgeable with regard to the traditions of the people. Agree-
ing with Chimango,64 the possible bias in quasi-political issues by these ap-
pointed chiefs also cannot be ruled out.
60Von Benda-Beckmann (n 1) 42.
61See discussion by Bennett TW Human Rights and African Customary Law under the
South African Constitution (1995) 139.
62Chimango (n 27) 46.
63Von Benda-Beckmann (n 1) 43-44.
64Chimango (n 27).
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In 1947 the Native Courts were renamed African Courts.65 The Local
Courts Ordinance of 196266 extended the jurisdiction of local courts to include
legal disputes between Africans and non-Africans. This recognition, it has
been said, was a concession to a long-standing demand by Africans, who
suspected that Europeans could often escape justice, particularly in affiliation
cases, as they could not be sued in the Native Courts.67 It is submitted
that the 1962 Local Courts Ordinance, by extending the jurisdiction of Local
Courts to non-Africans, offered some protection to the rights of women and
children within customary laws.
Recognition and application of customary laws
As regards the recognition and application of customary laws, the Order
provided that, if the case before a court involved Africans, the court should
be guided by customary laws.68 Art. 20 of the Order, however, did not mean
that customary laws became a constituent component of the general law of
Malawi.69 This position, as it will be noted later, is to be contrasted to the
period after 1994 where customary law is part of the law to be administered
65African Courts Ordinance No. 17 of 1947.
66Ordinance No. 8 of 1962.
67Von Benda-Beckmann (n 1) 44.
68Art. 20 of the Order.
69See also Von Benda-Beckmann (n 1) 60.
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by all courts.70
In addition to the above, the recognition of customary laws was also to be
found in Art. 28 of the Order which provided that ‘where other provisions had
not been made by Ordinance, any law, practice, or procedure established by
or under the Africa Orders should, until other provision was made, continue
to exist, as if this Order had not been made’.71
Limitation on the application of customary laws
Having discussed the court system and the recognition of customary laws dur-
ing the colonial period, it should be noted that the application of customary
law, just like everywhere else in the British African possessions where English
law was introduced, was subjected to the so-called repugnancy principle.72
Customary laws were only applicable in so far as they were not ‘repugnant
to the principles of justice and morality’ or ‘inconsistent with any law in
force’.73 The repugnancy principle limited the application of customary law.
70See Section 200 of the Malawi Constitution.
71Chimango (n 27) 44.
72Von Benda-Beckmann (n 1) 61; Bennett (n 53) 58.
73Art. 20 of the Order provided that: ‘In all cases, civil and criminal, to which natives
are parties, every court shall (a) be guided by native law so far as it is applicable and is not
repugnant to justice and morality or inconsistent with any Order-in -Council or Ordinance
and (b) shall decide all such cases according to substantial justice without undue regard
to technicalities of procedure and without undue delay’. See the continuation of this rule
under Section 12 (d) of the Local Courts Ordinance No. 8 of 1962.
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This principle saw the mwabvi ordeal, for example, prohibited on the basis
that it was repugnant to principles of justice.74 The mwabvi ordeal was a poi-
sonous substance extracted from the bark of a tree and mixed with water.75
In court the mwabvi was given to the accused person. If the accused vomited,
his innocence was proved. If he died, it was proof that he was offender.76
Thus Obiagwu and Odinkalu77 note that the repugnancy principle comes
from the English common law standard and is meant for judicial overview
over applicable rules of custom. As it will be noted later, this limitation on
the application of customary laws continued even during Independence78 as
well as the period after 1994.79
It could be argued that, since the repugnancy principle did not take into
account the notions and interpretations of African justice, the principle di-
luted customary law. This, invariably, affected the delivery of justice as it
was seen in the eyes of the Africans.
74Forster (n 29) 279.
75Von Benda-Beckmann (n 1) 145.
76As above. See also Forster (n 29) 281.
77Obiagwu C and Odinkalu CA, ‘Nigeria: Combating Legacies of Colonialism and Mil-
itarism’, in An-Na’im AA (ed) Human Rights Under African Constitutions: Realising the
Promises For Ourselves (2003) 211 at 235.
78See Section 12 of the 1966 (Constitution) Act.
79The discussion on how the application of customary laws can be limited occurs in
Chapter 5.
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Colonial period and women’s rights
Before looking at the position of customary laws and the court system in the
period after Independence, it is important to note that during the colonial pe-
riod, some European’s judgments of African morality had an important effect
on women’s rights. They led to a willingness to intervene in African custom-
ary marriages.80 African sexual morality and the position of African women
were severely condemned. Thus, Chanock has said that the European’s mis-
sion appeared to be both the liberation of women and the improvement of
morality.81 According to him, the colonialists regarded Lomwe82 morality to
be of a low standard. In Lomwe morality adultery was not considered as an
offence, in that women were often shared amongst tribesmen.83 With the
Mang’anja84, the chastity of a woman and her feelings for being punished
was not considered. It was also their custom to occasionally exchange wives
with a friend or for money value to any stranger.85
It has further been observed that the repugnancy clause was used, for the
most part, to protect women’s rights. These included: trying to prevent
80Channock M Law, Custom and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and
Zambia (1998) 148.
81As above.
82This tribal group is found in Mulanje, a district located in the southern part of Malawi.
83Channock (n 80) 148.
84This tribal group is also found in Mulanje district.
85Chanock (n 80) 148.
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early marriages; preventing girls to be pledged into marriages; facilitating
women’s right to custody of children; and granting women the right to initiate
divorce.86
The above position, however, did not have much impact on discriminatory
customary family laws affecting women. As earlier noted, most customary
family law cases continued to be applied by chiefs’ courts and were not part
of the formal court system. This position meant that many family custom-
ary rules were not subjected to the repugnancy principle which could only
be applied in the formal court system. The implication for women, it is sub-
mitted, was that discriminatory customary family laws continued to violate
their human rights.
Furthermore, British colonial rule accepted the continuation of polygamy
provided it was not combined with other forms of marriages, such as civil
marriages.87 From the protection of women’s rights point of view, we see
that, in allowing the continuation of polygamy, colonialism was in support
of a system that is viewed as subjecting women to an inferior status. The
practice of polygamy, as will be discussed later in Chapter 4, is, arguably,
incompatible with the equality principle as provided by Section 20 of the
86Palley C The constitutional history and law of Rhodesia 1888-1965 as cited by Banda
F ‘Women, Law and Human Rights in Southern Africa’ (2006) Journal of Southern African
Studies 13 at 14.
87Nmehielle VO The African Human Rights Systems: Its Law, Practice and Institutions
(2001) 27.
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Malawi Constitution, since it allows only men to have more than one wife
and not women to have more than one husband. Therefore, by allowing the
continuation of polygamy, the colonialists continued to allow the traditional
violation of women’s right to equality.
2.3.3 Post colonial period
In the preceding section it has been noted that, before Independence, na-
tive courts were based on the African Courts Ordinance.88 The Ordinance
empowered the Governor to authorise the Provincial Commissioners to es-
tablish native courts and to declare by warrant the area in which they should
exercise jurisdiction. These courts administered African law and custom in
the area delimited by the warrant.89 These courts had certain civil and crim-
inal jurisdiction but could not deal with cases involving matters arising from
marriages, except those contracted under Muslim law or African law and
custom.90 The chief in each area invariably presided over the court. This
position, as earlier noted, was, however, changed with the coming into ef-
fect of the Local Courts Ordinance.91 The Local Courts Ordinance repealed
the African Courts Ordinance and also removed the judicial powers of the
88No. 17 of 1933 Ordinance.
89Section 12 (a) of the African Courts Ordinance.
90Section 11 (b ) of African Courts Ordinance.
91No. 8 of 1962.
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chiefs.92 The new Ordinance gave the Minister of Justice power to estab-
lish by warrant ‘such local courts as he shall think fit’.93 Just like under
the African Courts Ordinance, these courts had jurisdiction over marriages
contracted under Muslim law or African law and custom.
After the attainment of republic status,94 Malawi retained the two-tiered
court system95 that shared jurisdiction in certain matters. On the one hand,
there were the TC system with the NTAC as the highest court. On the other
hand, there was the SC, the HC and SCA (the HC system). This system of
legal dualism has been noted to be an inheritance from the colonial period.96
The two systems will now be discussed separately, making some comparisons
with other jurisdictions.
The western HC system was made up of the SCA, the HC and the SC. The
SCA was at the apex of the HC system. It was established under Section
67 of the 1966 Constitution of Malawi. Its establishment saw the abolition
of appeals from the HC to the Privy Council.97 The SCA had no original
jurisdiction; it only heard appeals from the HC against final decisions in civil
92Section 3 (2) of the Local Courts Ordinance.
93Section 3 (1) of the Local Courts Ordinance.
94Malawi became a Republic on 6th July 1966.
95Machika MRA The Malawi Legal System: An Introduction to Legal Systems in Malawi
(Unpublished) (1983) 3.
96Forster (n 29) 280.
97As above.
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and criminal proceedings.98 Since the SCA heard appeals from the HC, the
law that was administered was the same as that of the HC. The question of
whether this court was applying customary law is examined when discussing
the HC in the following paragraph.
The HC had both original and appellate jurisdiction. With regard to ap-
pellate jurisdiction Section 69 of the 1966 Constitution Act provided that
‘the HC could hear appeals from final decisions of the SC and local courts’.
It is, however, interesting to note that the TCs were not subordinate to the
HC. As will be seen later, the TCs had a separate system of appeal.
The law that was to be applied was determined by Section 15 of the 1966
Constitution Act, which provided that:
‘Until Parliament otherwise provides, the civil and criminal ju-
risdiction of the Supreme Court of Appeal, the High Court, and
subordinate courts (including Traditional Courts) shall, subject
to this Act and any law in force in Malawi, be exercised in confor-
mity with the existing laws and the substance of the common
law and the doctrines of equity’. [Emphasis added]
From the foregoing provision it is noted that the 1966 Constitution Act made
no reference to customary law.99 The application of customary laws in the
98Section 68(1) of the 1966 Constitution Act.
99See also Roberts (n 10) M-13.
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HC may be assumed on the basis that customary law was part of the law
in force in Malawi immediately prior to 6th July 1966.100 Furthermore, the
above provision and Section 62 of the 1966 Constitution Act provided that
the HC had unlimited original jurisdiction ‘to hear and determine any civil
and criminal proceedings under any law’.101 From this wording it could be
argued that the HC had power to administer customary law as part of the
‘existing laws’ and ‘any laws’, as referred to in Sections 15 and 62 respectively.
It is also interesting to note that Section 15 was in contrast to the earlier
provisions under the 1964 Independence Act. Under the 1964 Independence
Act, the HC was to be ‘guided by customary law so far as is applicable and
is not repugnant to justice or morality or inconsistent with any (other) law’
in cases to which Africans were parties.102 In addition to the above, the
1964 Independence Order made provision for the continuation of the existing
laws.103 Without such express provision in the later 1966 Constitution Act,
it could be argued that the drafters of the 1966 Constitution Act intended
that the HC should not apply customary law.
It should, however, further be noted that the 1964 Constitution Act was not
very clear on the status and jurisdiction of local courts.104 The local courts,
100As above.
101Section 62 of the 1966 Constitution Act.
102Section 16 (b) of the 1964 Independence Act.
103Art. 5 of the 1964 Independence Order.
104Roberts S ‘The Constitution of Malawi, 1964’ (1964) Journal of African Law 178 at
180.
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as noted in the preceding section, were under the control of the Minister of
Justice and were excluded from the supervisory jurisdiction of the HC. It was
also understood, based on Section 2 of the 1964 Independence Order, that
local courts were not subordinate to HC.105
With regard to appeals from the SC, in which customary law had been
applied, the cases seem to suggest that the HC could apply customary laws
in Malawi.106 But, in principle, because the appeal system was complicated,
the HC was not administering customary law.107 It should also be noted that
this position is similar to the current position after 1994.
The SC had original jurisdiction to hear both criminal and civil matters.
Unlike the SCA and the HC, the SC had no appellate jurisdiction to hear any
appeals from any other court. The TCs were not channeling their appeals
to these courts. In contrast, the SC of South Africa had both original and
appellate jurisdiction. As appellate courts, they could hear appeals from the
final judgments of chiefs’ courts.108 These courts, however, were supposed to
105According to Section 2, ‘SC’ means any court subordinate to the HC established under
the provisions of this Ordinance but does not include an African court established under
the African Courts Ordinance or any other Ordinance replacing the same.
106See, for example, Kandoje v Mtengerenji, 1964-66 MLR 558 as cited by Judge Unyolo
in Mungomo v Mungomo, Matrimonial Cause No. 6 of 1996, HC, Principal Registry (Un-
reported) 4.
107See Chimango (n 27) 52 for a detailed explanation of this appeal system.
108Section 12 (4) of the Black Administration Act of 1927.
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apply customary law only.109 The law that was applied was the same as that
discussed above in connection with the HC.
On the other hand, the TC system was recognised by the 1962 Traditional
Court Act.110 Just as it was during the colonial period, these courts were to
apply customary laws in civil cases and minor criminal offences. Members
of the local courts were appointed by the Minister of Justice. The presiding
adjudicator was appointed as chairman. In civil cases the chairman was
expected to sit with at least one assessor. The judgment was determined
by the chairman alone; the assessor had only an advisory function. The
jurisdiction of these local courts was still limited to legal disputes between
Africans. In 1967 some local courts were granted the wider jurisdiction to
deal with disputes between Africans and non-Africans.111 In 1969 the local
courts were renamed Traditional Courts.112 Appeals against the decisions of
the local courts went to the Local Appeal Courts. A Local Appeal Court
consisted of three local courts’ chairmen from the area concerned. The HC,
as the highest court of appeal, heard appeals against the decisions of Local
Appeal Courts. In the HC the judge was assisted by three assessors who
could advise him on questions of customary laws.113
109Bekker (n 28) 16.
110Traditional Court Act, No. 8 of 1962.
111Von Benda-Beckmann (n 1) 47.
112Local Courts (Amendment) Act, No. 31 of 1969.
113Von Benda-Beckmann (n 1) 47-48.
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However, during the 1970s President Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda extended
the criminal jurisdiction of TCs and authorised TCs to try capital offences,
including murder, rape and treason. Dr Banda, who ruled Malawi with an
iron fist from independence in 1964 to 1994, felt that the notions of justice and
the court procedures of the English law based HC system did not conform to
the notions of justice in the African context.114 The TC system was supposed
to work in parallel with the HC system, respecting the traditional notions of
crime, innocence and justice thereof.115
These TCs were not courts based on the customary laws of Malawi as Dr
Banda had intended everyone to believe, but rather courts created by Dr
Banda to ensure the outcome of political trials. Judges were appointed by
Dr Banda and were not required to have any legal training.116 Dr Banda was
of the view that the British magistrates and judges were acquitting people
whom in the traditional understanding would have been found guilty. This
view led to most criminal cases being tried in the TC. The TC did not allow
for legal representation, a feature which could be likened to the chiefs’ court
procedure before independence.117
114Phiri KM ‘Dr Banda’s Cultural Legacy and its implications for a Democratic Malawi’
in Phiri KM and Ross KR (eds) Democratisation in Malawi: A Stocktaking (1998) 147 at
159. See also Forster (n 29) 283.
115Dr Banda, speeches for the period 1964-1971, Information Department as cited by
Phiri (n 114) 159.
116Human Rights Watch Malawi accessed at http://www.hrw.org/reports/
1989/WR89/Malawi.htm accessed on 13/05/04.
117As above.
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The notion of traditional law, ‘that there is no smoke without fire’, was
understood to be the true picture of African justice because it could achieve
a 100 percent conviction rate.118
Generally the law that was to be applied by the TC was provided for by
Section 15 of the 1966 Constitution Act as discussed above in connection
with the HC system. In addition to the above, the specific law that was
administered by the TC was set out in Section 12 of the Traditional Court
Act. For purposes of this discussion, subsection (c) and (d) are of much
relevance, and state as follows:
‘Subject to this Act, a Traditional Court shall administer-
(c) the provisions of all rules, orders, regulations or by-laws made
under the Local Government (District Council) Act and in force
in the area of the jurisdiction of the court;
(d) the customary law prevailing in the area of the jurisdiction of
the court, so far as it is not repugnant to justice, or morality or
inconsistent with the constitution or any written law in force in
Malawi’.
The foregoing provision makes it clear that all TC had jurisdiction to admin-
ister customary laws, subject to the principle of repugnancy.
118Wanda B ‘Colonialism, Nationalism and Tradition: The evolution and development
of the Legal System of Malawi’ as cited by Forster (n 29) 281.
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The TC system consisted of NTAC, RTCA, DTCA, DTC and Grade A
& B TCs.119 These courts had jurisdiction over all cases, including murder
and treason. The NTAC was composed of a chairman, appointed by the
Minister of Justice, and such other members as the Minister may appoint.120
In practice it meant courts composed of three traditional chiefs, one of whom
was the chairman.
Just like the SCA in the HC system, the NTAC had no original jurisdiction.
It was also the final court in the TC system. As such, if one felt aggrieved
by the decision of this court, there was no other court to which one could
appeal. But, unlike the SCA which heard appeals only from the HC and not
from the SC, the NTAC heard appeals from the DTC, RTCA and DTCA.121
The law that was applied by NTAC was the specific law that ought to have
been applied by the lower court from against whose judgment the appeal was
to be heard.
The RTC was established by a ministerial warrant under Section 3 of the
Traditional Courts Act. There were three RTC, one located in each region.122
The composition of the court was the same as that of the NTAC. In terms of
jurisdiction, these courts were exercising original criminal jurisdiction only.
119Machika (n 95) 18.
120Section 33 (2) of the Traditional Courts Act. It should be noted that President Banda
for a greater part of his 30 year rule was also the Minister of Justice.
121See Section 34 (1) of the Traditional Courts Act.
122Malawi, being divided into three regions, namely: the north; south; and central re-
gions, each region had an RTC.
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This was provided for in the Regional Traditional Courts (Criminal Juris-
diction) Orders.123 Among other offences, they tried cases of witchcraft,
morality, murder, manslaughter, theft, and treason. As already alluded to,
during Dr Banda’s rule most people who were seen to be disagreeing with
him were charged with treason in these courts and not in the HC.124
The law that was applied by these courts was the Penal Code125 and other
Acts that created offences over which they had jurisdiction. These courts,
it is submitted, were not applying customary laws, since the Penal Code is
based purely on English common law and not customary laws.
The DTCA was established by ministerial warrant under Section 33(1) of
the Traditional Courts Act. The court was composed of a chairman, who was
appointed by the Minister, and such other members as the Minister might
appoint.126 In practice, however, the court consisted of a chairman and one
assessor. The assessor was selected from a panel of assessors appointed by
the Minister. The jurisdiction of the court was specified in the warrant
establishing such a court.127 This court was a court of appeal only. It could
hear appeals from local courts in the areas within which it had jurisdiction it
123These Orders were made under Section 13 of the Traditional Courts Act.
124See, for example, Chirwa and Chirwa v R, Criminal Appeal Case No. 5 of 1983, NTAC
(Unreported), in which the accused persons were charged with treason and initially tried
in the RTC.
125Chapter 7:01.
126Section 33 (2) of the Traditional Courts Act.
127Section 33 (4) of the Traditional Courts Act.
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terms of its warrant.128 Any person who had been aggrieved by any judgment
in any civil or criminal proceedings before any traditional court (other than
the RTCA, DTC and NTAC) could appeal to the DTCA.129 In effect, these
courts only heard appeals from Grades A and B TC. The law that was applied
was the same as that applied in the Grades A and B courts, as will be seen
below.
The DTC and Grades A and B TC were established by ministerial warrant
under Section 3 (1) of the Traditional Courts Act. They were composed of
a chairman, who was appointed by the Minister, and other members elected
by the Minister. It was also required that each court should sit with one
assessor chosen by the chairman from a panel of assessors appointed by the
Minister.130 In terms of jurisdiction, all these courts had original jurisdiction
over both civil and criminal cases. The DTC, however, was more powerful
than the Grades A and B courts: they could hear all cases, except those
involving customary laws. The cases that the DTC heard were the ones that
occurred in the districts and were beyond the jurisdiction of Grades A and
B courts. The DTC were not applying customary laws.
Grades A and B courts were generally situated at the chiefs’ headquarters.
They were mostly trying cases involving customary laws and petty criminal
offences that originated in their jurisdiction.
128Section 33 (6) of the Traditional Courts Act.
129Section 34 (2) of the Traditional Courts Act.
130Section 4 (1) and 4 (4) of the Traditional Courts Act.
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In conclusion, it should be recalled that the initial aim of these TC was
to administer justice as understood by the society within which context the
courts were operating. However, as time went by, Dr Banda started using
these courts as a tool to annihilate his opponents. By the time Dr Banda
stepped down,131 as Phiri puts it, ‘there was a cultural dimension to the
revolt against his regime’.132 Consequently the TC system was immediately
abandoned, as Dr Banda laid down the reins of power.
It should, however, be noted that the chiefs’ courts, as understood before
the colonial period, were still there, but not as part of the TC system as one
would expect. Moreover, they continued to operate with limited jurisdiction
as before Independence. It is my submission, that with the establishment of
the TC system, they were further sapped of their jurisdiction.
2.3.4 After introduction of democracy in 1994
In the preceding subsection it was noted that Section 62 (1) of the 1966
Constitution Act granted the HC unlimited original jurisdiction in civil and
criminal proceedings.133 In the area of customary family laws, a spouse could
commence proceedings in the HC.134 SC, excluding TC could not handle
131Dr Banda stepped down in 1994 having ruled Malawi for 30 years.
132Phiri (n 114) 164.
133See also the judgment of Mwaungulu J in Likaku v Likaku, Matrimonial Cause No. 10
of 1999, HC, Principal Registry (Unreported).
134Mwaungulu J (as above) 2.
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divorce.135 Their jurisdiction was limited by Section 39 (2) (e) of the Courts
Act136 which provided that:
‘Notwithstanding subsection (1), no subordinate court shall have
jurisdiction to deal with, try or determine any civil matter except
as specifically provided in any written law for the time being in
force, wherein the validity or dissolution of any marriage is in
question’. [My emphasis]
Section 11 (a) of the Traditional Courts Act,137 however, gave jurisdiction
generally to courts under the Traditional Courts Act, 1962 over customary
law marriages. TC ordinarily granted divorce in a customary law marriages.
Customary laws determined most rights and obligations of spouses and chil-
dren in these courts. This position, however, did not oust the unlimited
original jurisdiction of the HC over customary law marriages. Such jurisdic-
tion was conferred by virtue of Section 11 (b) of the Courts Act. Appeals
from the TC lay to the HC.138 As earlier noted, this position, however, was
changed with the introduction of the NTAC.139 All appeals were being chan-
135As above.
136Chapter 3:02.
137Chapter 3:03.
138See Kandoje v Mtengerenji 1964-66 MLR 558 as cited by Unyolo J in Mungomo v
Mungomo (n 106) 4.
139These courts were introduced in 1969 by the Local Courts Amendment Act No. 31 of
1969 and usurped the power of the HC.
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neled to the NTAC.140 The NTAC has now been abolished; and TC no longer
exist, having been integrated into the MC structure in or about 1994. After
1994 the following important developments took place.
Court system and its jurisdiction after 1994
After 1994 courts and their powers are defined in the Malawi Constitution.141
However, unlike the position during the 1964-1994 period, the Malawi Con-
stitution merged the HC and the TC system into a single system. In effect,
Section 103 (3) of the Malawi Constitution, which provides for the merging
of the two systems abolishes the TC system.142 The said section provides
that:
‘There shall be no courts established of superior or concur-
rent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court of Appeal or the High
Court’. [Emphasis added]
140See, for example, Mikwanda v Nachuma Civil Appeal Case No. 64 of 1979, NTAC
(Unreported); Menasi v Balakasi, Civil Appeal Case No. 98 of 1979, NTAC (Unreported);
and Mzumala v Gondwe, Civil Appeal Case No. 110 of 1979, NTAC (Unreported).
141See chapter IX of the Malawi Constitution.
142Mwambene L ‘Malawi: The melting pot of customary law: A comparative analysis’
(2006) Walter Sisulu University Law Journal 67 at 75.
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On the basis of the above section it could be argued that the Malawi
Constitution abolishes TC system.143 TC were transformed into MC, which
continued to hear customary law matters. Since SC had, before 1994, no
jurisdiction to grant divorce in customary law marriages, this created a legal
gap as no specific legal provision was made for SC to assume jurisdiction in
divorce of customary law marriages. It was only in 2000 that an amendment
to the Courts Act144 was made, giving SC the power to grant divorce in
African customary law marriages.145 After the amendment MC have been
exercising their jurisdiction to determine the validity of, or dissolve, such
marriages.146
143It should, however, be noted that the coming into effect of the Malawi Constitution
has not disturbed the chiefs’ courts in the various villages in Malawi. These courts, as was
the case in the colonial and independence eras, are not formally recognised, but continue
to deliver justice.
144Courts (Amendment) Act 2000.
145Interview with Judge C of the HC in Blantyre at that time, 10 May 2006.
146See, for example, Tafere Mafusa v Exton Mtemankhwawa, Civil Cause No. 136 of
2006, Mzuzu MC (Unreported) in which a woman successfully got a divorce decree from a
MC. Other unreported case examples are: Gracian Villi v Halliet Mphundi, Matrimonial
Cause No. 126 of 2006, Mzuzu MC (Unreported); Francis Phiri v Cecelia Phiri, Civil
Case No. 483 of 2005, Lilongwe MC (Unreported); and Patricia Banda v Andrew Banda,
Civil Cause No. 321 of 2004, Blantyre MC (Unreported), in all of which MCs dissolved
customary marriages.
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In addition to the above, after 1994 courts were organised in a hierachy.
The lowest courts are SC with appeals lying to the HC and SCA.147 A brief
discussion of each court follows.
Section 110 of the Malawi Constitution provides for the establishment of SC
to be presided over by professional and lay magistrates. In June 2006 there
were a total of 193 magistrates in posts, of which only 30 were professional
magistrates.148 The minimum academic qualification of lay magistrates is a
secondary school certificate. Some chiefs, who were previously presiding in
TC applying customary laws, have also been integrated into the judiciary
as magistrates. These lay magistrates have now received some legal training
at the Staff Development Institute in Mpemba on rules of English court
procedure and human rights law. Arguably this group of magistrates may
be better equipped with rules of customary laws having come from the TC.
On the other hand, professional magistrates are generally holders of a law
degree. They receive their academic education at the Law Faculty, Univer-
147See, for example, Mungomo v Mungomo, Civil Cause No. 23 of 2002, as cited by
Kanyongolo (n 35) 46, in which a person, who was dissatisfied with the dissolution of her
customary marriage by the MC, successfully appealed against that court’s decision to the
HC. Other unreported cases are: Willie Malilo v Martina Malilo, Civil Appeal Case No. 8
of 1997, HC, Lilongwe District Registry; Zindawa AB v Zindawa E, Civil Appeal Case
No. 27 of 2002, HC, Lilongwe District Registry; Bennings Manda v Jane Mpata, Civil
Appeal Case No. 59 of 2005, HC, Mzuzu District Registry; and Temwanani Nkhonjera v
Sebesian Gwengwenya, Civil Appeal Case No. 9 of 2004, HC, Mzuzu District Registry.
148Kanyongolo (n 35) 41.
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sity of Malawi. They do not, however, usually receive any instruction in
customary laws, as this subject is rarely taught at this University.149 This
obviously suggests both lack of knowledge of the traditions of the people and
a possible bias toward English law.
Section 108 (1) of the Malawi Constitution provides that the HC has ‘un-
limited original jurisdiction to hear any civil or criminal proceedings under
any law’. The phrase ‘under any law’ obviously includes customary laws.
Therefore, Section 108 (1) of the Malawi Constitution grants original juris-
diction to the HC to preside over customary law cases. Confirming its original
jurisdiction over customary marriages, Judge Unyolo stated in Mungomo v
Mungomo,150 that ‘Section 108 of the Malawi Constitution confers jurisdic-
tion on the HC to hear divorce petitions, even in cases involving customary
marriages’.151 There are, however, more specific powers that the HC can
exercise. The HC has original jurisdiction to review any law for conformity
with the Constitution.152 The power of judicial review is the principal means
by which the courts can check on the legality of customary laws that are
in conflict with the foundational norms of the Constitution. The HC is a
149This is based on my own experience of having passed through the same law school.
150See n 106 above.
151As above, 5.
152Section 108 (2) of the Malawi Constitution.
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court of record.153 The HC has both appellate and original jurisdiction.154
On the particular point of constitutional issues, Section 108 of the Malawi
Constitution establishes the HC as the constitutional court, and the Court
(Amendment) Act No. 2 of 2004 merely enables the HC to create, from within
itself, a small chamber to deal with constitutional matters.155 This position
is contrasted with that in South Africa where the composition of the CC, as
the highest court on constitutional matters,156 is separate from the HC.157
The HC is presided over by professional judges. It is currently composed of
twenty judges. Two of the judges are based in Mzuzu, four in Lilongwe, one
in Zomba and ten in Blantyre. Occasionally the HC also travels to districts of
the country to try murder cases. This position, however, is regrettable since
the jurisdiction of the HC in the districts should include cases in which the HC
could exercise its constitutional jurisdiction. Most judges have been trained
at the University of Malawi. Just like the professional magistrates, they may
not have received some instruction in the substantive rules of customary
family laws.
153This means that the court’s acts and judicial proceedings are recorded for perpetual
memory and testimony.
154See Section 108 of the Malawi Constitution.
155Mutharika AP Towards a More Manageable Constitution (Unpublished) (2006) 12.
156Section 167 (3) (a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
157Section 167 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
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The SCA, just as it was during the first republic, is the highest court of
the land and only exercises appellate jurisdiction.158 It hears appeals from
the HC and such other courts and tribunals as an Act of Parliament may
prescribe.159 Since all appeals from the SC go to the HC and eventually land
in the SCA, customary laws could be said to be applied by all levels of the
court system in Malawi. The SCA is located in Blantyre.
Recognition of African customary family laws
Unlike the 1966 Constitution Act which did not recognise African customary
laws as part of the law to be applied by the courts of Malawi, the Malawi
Constitution has many provisions that directly or indirectly recognise the
application and relevance of African customary laws in Malawi. Section
12 provides that the Constitution is founded upon the following underlying
principles:
‘· · · all legal and political authority of the State derives from
the people of Malawi and shall be exercised in accordance with
this constitution solely to serve and protect their interests; the
inherent dignity and worth of each human requires that the State
and all persons shall recognize and protect fundamental human
rights and afford the fullest protection to the rights and views
158Section 104 (2) of the Malawi Constitution.
159As above.
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of all individuals, groups and minorities whether or not they are
entitled to vote’.
Thus, Nyirenda, Hansen and Kaunda160 have argued, based on this pro-
vision, that the Malawi Constitution attaches great importance to African
customary laws and traditional values.
Several provisions in the Bill of Rights itself can support the above po-
sition. Section 26 of the Malawi Constitution provides that ‘[e]very person
shall have the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural
life of his or her choice’. Although this section does not make any explicit
reference to customary laws, it expressly recognises the significance of cus-
tomary or cultural values to human development, well-being and identity.161
In essence, it guarantees the right of everyone to live according to the legal
system applicable to the particular cultural grouping to which they (choose
to) belong.162
There is, however, a difference in the manner in which Section 26 of the
Malawi Constitution that recognises the right to culture has been drafted,
160Nyirenda J, Hansen TT and Kaunda D A Comparative analysis of the Human Rights
Chapter under the Malawi Constitution in an International Perspectives (Undated) xxiii.
161See also Himonga C ‘Implementing the rights of the child in African legal systems:
The Mthembu Journey in Search of Justice’ (2001) International Children’s Journal 89 at
94 who has noted that the right to culture gives Africans the right to have customary law
applied in appropriate cases.
162As above.
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as compared to the similar provision in South Africa. It is noted that the
Malawi Constitution does not have an internal limitation clause, as is the
case with its South African counterpart.163 With regard to South Africa,
some commentators have argued that in the inevitable clash between culture
and equality, equality must necessarily take priority.164 Their argument is
based on the fact that the right to equality is not internally limited in the
same way as the right to culture. Therefore, the right to equality trumps the
right to culture.165
Contrary to the above position, the Malawi Constitution, as already al-
luded to, does not have a comparable internal limitation. It is, therefore,
submitted that the drafters of the Malawi Constitution had not intended the
right to equality to trump the right to culture.166
163Section 30 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, provides that
‘everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life of their
choice, but no one exercising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with any
provision of the Bill of Rights’.
164See, for instance, Kaganas F and Murray C ‘The contest between culture and gender
equality under South Africa’s interim Constitution’ (1994) Journal of Law and Society 401
at 427-428.
165See Fishbayn L ‘Litigating the right to culture: family law in the new South Africa’
as cited by Grant E ‘Human rights, cultural diversity and customary law in South Africa’
(2006) Journal of African Law 2 at 9.
166A discussion of this will be provided in Chapter 5.
60
 
 
 
 
Section 22 (5) of the Malawi Constitution provides another angle to the
recognition of customary family laws. It provides for the recognition of mar-
riages according to custom. This, obviously, brings to rest the uncertainty
regarding the constitutional recognition of marriages contracted according
to customary laws. It also brings to rest the question of whether women,
married in such unions, are to equally enjoy the rights as guaranteed by
the Malawi Constitution or not. By recognising marriage by custom, the
Malawi Constitution affirms the fact that women married according to their
customary marriage rules are equally to enjoy their human rights. Thus,
persons who are party to such marriages are entitled to all rights applicable
to married persons as provided for under Sections 22 and 24 of the Malawi
Constitution, for example.167
On the other hand, the South African Constitution does not provide for the
right to marriage, let alone marriage by customary laws.168 Arguably, with
respect to South Africa, marriages by customary laws would be protected
under the right to culture.
167These include the right to be protected by law against all forms of neglect, cruelty or
exploitation; the right to enter into contracts; the right to acquire and maintain rights in
property; the right to acquire and retain custody of children; the right to citizenship and
nationality; the right to a fair disposition of property and fair maintenance on dissolution
of marriage.
168It is, however, noted that according to Section 15 (1) of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996 indirect reference is made to the recognition of legislation
that recognizes customary marriages.
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The implication for the protection of women’s rights, it could be argued,
is that, in Malawi, where the right to marriage and family, which includes
marriage according to customary laws, is a fundamental right and not just a
freedom, women governed by customary family laws are offered more protec-
tion than in South Africa. As a constitutional right within the Bill of Rights,
the right to family and marriage will be competiting with other fundamen-
tal rights within the Bill of Rights which may result in a series of conflicts
between the right to equality and the many rules that govern customary mar-
riages that subordinate rights of women. For a broad and profound analysis
on the conflict between customary family rules and women’s rights, see the
discussions by Nhlapo, Bronstein and Kaganas.169
Even though these contradictions are inevitable,170 the Malawi Constitu-
tion, however, does not give any indication as to whether the right to family
and marriage, especially marriages by custom, supersedes the right to equal-
ity or not.171 It is, therefore, submitted that the right to marry according to
169Nhlapo RT ‘The African family and women’s rights: Friends or Foes?’ (1991) Acta
Juridica 137 at 139-145; Bronstein V ‘Reconceptualizing the Customary Law Debate in
South Africa’ (1998) Southern African Journal on Human Rights 388 at 390; and Kaganas
and Murray (n 164) 401.
170These contradictions are inevitable simply because customary rules are aimed at pro-
tecting group rights whilst women’s rights are aimed at protecting the individual.
171It should be noted that in constitutions, such as that of Zambia (Act 1 of 1991), where
the right to customary law is shielded from the equality provision, this problem would not
arise. Furthermore, in South Africa, where a right to a family is not a fundamental
right within the Bill of Rights, the conflict between a particular customary rule (which
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one’s customary laws is ranked equally with other rights that are within the
Bill of Rights in the Malawi Constitution.
In addition to the above, customary law is now part of the law to be applied
by SC.172 Section 110 (3) of the Malawi Constitution provides:
‘Parliament may make provision for traditional or local courts
presided over by lay persons or chiefs: provided that the juris-
diction of such courts shall be limited exclusively to civil cases
at customary law and such minor common law and statutory of-
fences as prescribed by an Act of Parliament’.
It should be noted that, in practice, the third and fourth grade magistrates
are the ones who preside over cases in which customary laws are applicable.173
Since all appeals from the SC go to the HC and could eventually land in SCA,
customary laws would be said to be applied by all levels of the court system
in Malawi.174
is of course covered by the recognition of the right to culture) would not carry the same
implication as the Malawi right to family life and marriage.
172Section 110 (3) of the Malawi Constitution provides that the jurisdiction of the SC
shall be limited to civil cases at customary law.
173Third and fourth grade magistrates were, before 1994, adjudicating over cases where
customary laws would be applicable in the TC system. After 1994 when the TC were
abolished, these magistrates are now in the MC which are part of the HC system.
174This position should be contrasted with Dr Banda’s era where all appeals from the
TC were channeled to a NTAC.
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In addition, some recognition of customary laws in the Malawi Constitution
can be found in Section 200. The wording of Section 200 places customary
laws on the same status as common law and other laws in force in Malawi.
It provides:
‘Except in so far as they are inconsistent with this Constitution,
all Acts of Parliament, common law and customary law in force
on the appointed day shall continue to have force of law, as if
they had been made in accordance with and in pursuance of this
Constitution:· · ·’
The above provision, it is submitted, encompasses all customary laws that
are relevant to customary marriages. It will, however, be argued in Chap-
ter 7 that in terms of application, customary laws may not enjoy the same
status as other laws because of the conflict between customary laws and the
fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights.
Last, but not least, Section 108 (1) of the Constitution provides that:
‘· · · there shall be a High Court for the Republic which shall have
unlimited original jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil or
criminal proceedings under any law’.[Emphasis added]
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The phrase ‘under any law’ must, apart from common law, statutes and court
decisions, include customary laws.175
At the international level, many instruments also recognise the application
and relevance of African customary laws. Art. 22 of the UDHR176 states:
‘Everyone, as a member of society · · · is entitled to the realisation of the
economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free
development of his personality.’ Further, Art. 27 (1) provides: ‘Everyone
has the right to freely participate in a cultural life of the community, to
enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits’.[My
emphasis]
As a declaration, the UDHR is a non-binding instrument that is meant
to state mere aspirations of nation states. It is, however, submitted that it
has become part of binding international law in Malawi. Reasons that can
be advanced to substantiate this point are twofold. First, the standards laid
down in the Declaration were re-enacted in two conventions that are binding
175As already stated above, customary law is recognised, among others, under Section
200 of the Malawi Constitution as part of law that still has force in Malawi.
176UDHR was adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution in December 1948.
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on states. These are CCPR,177 and the CESCR.178 Art. 15 (1)(a)179 and
27180 of the CESCR and CCPR, respectively, provide for the protection of
cultural rights.
Secondly, the Malawi SCA has held that the Declaration applies and is
enforceable in Malawi.181 In this case the SCA said that the UDHR is part
of Malawi’s law and that the freedoms that it guarantees must be respected
and can be enforced in the courts of Malawi.182 Following the Chihana case,
177GA Resolution 2200A(xxi), 21UNGAOR Suppl.(No.16) at p.52, UN-
DOC.A/6316(1966), 999UNTS p.171, entered into force on 23 March 1976.
178GA Resolution 2200A(xxi),21UNGAROR Suppl.
(No.16) at p.49, UNDoc.A16316(1966), 993 UNTS p.3, entered into force on 3 January
1976.
179Art. 15 (1) (a) of the CESCR provides ‘The State Parties to the present Covenant
recognise the right of everyone: to take part in a cultural life.’
180Art. 27 of the CCPR provides that: ‘In those states in which ethnic, religious or
linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the
right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to
profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.’
181See the case of R v Chakufwa Chihana, SCA Criminal Appeal No. 9 of 1993 as cited
by White S et al Dispossessing the Widow: Gender based Violence in Malawi (2002) 32.
See also Hansen TT ‘Implementation of International Human Rights Standards through
the National Courts in Malawi’ (2002) Journal of African Law 31 at 37 who noted that
the SCA considered UDHR as being part of the law of Malawi.
182As above.
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the cases of Chisiza v Ministry of education and Culture183 and S v Nkhata184
have also made reference to provisions of the UDHR.185
From the above analysis, if any justification is required for the courts of
Malawi to apply customary laws, it is to be found in the recognition of cul-
tural rights by the Malawi Constitution as well as international instruments.
Consequently debate around the status of customary law is confined to such
issues as the degree and effects of such recognition, among others.186 It is
not necessary to engage in such debate at this point. It is only important,
for the purpose of the present discussion, to underscore the point that the
recognition of customary laws is embedded in Malawi Constitution as well
as international human rights instruments.
2.4 Conclusion
The overall intention of this Chapter was to evaluate the recognition of cus-
tomary law by the court system in Malawi from the pre-colonial period to
1994 and thereafter. It has been shown that during the pre-colonial period
kings maintained an efficient court system based on customary laws, which
183Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 10 of 1993 (Unreported).
184Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 6 of 1993 (Unreported).
185Hansen (n 180) 37-38.
186Nhlapo RT ‘African customary law in the interim constitution’ in Liebenberg S (ed)
The Constitution of South Africa from a Gender Perspective (1995) 157 at 157-158.
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the British disrupted with the 1902 British Order in Council. Then the first
republic introduced, alongside the Western HC system, the chiefs’ courts
which were not based on the customary laws. After 1994 several provisions
in the Malawi Constitution directly and indirectly recognise customary laws
as part of the law to be applied by the courts in Malawi.
However, throughout the development of the court system, what has been
evident is that customary laws continued to be applied by chiefs in the vil-
lages. Since the colonial era the chiefs’ courts, at the local level, are not part
of the formal justice system, and yet they are what most poor people go to for
their justice needs.187 Their interpretation of customary laws, for example,
covering marriages, divorce and custody of children, is of great importance
for the enforcement and protection of women’s rights. But given their in-
formal, oral and decentralised nature, it is difficult to assess the effect that
the chiefs’ courts have had, and how their practices relate to constitutional
norms of equality as contained in the Bill of Rights.
On the other hand, the analysis of the history and future of customary laws
shows that the recognition and application of customary law by the courts
is slowly ebbing. From the start of the colonial era the recognition and
application of customary laws has continuously been subjected to various
forms of the so-called repugnancy principle. First there was the evidently
187Grippen S and Kanyongolo FE ‘Courts and the poor in Malawi: Economics, Marginal-
isation, Vulnerability and the Law’ (2007) International Journal of Constitutional Law 258
at 258.
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clear policy of the repugnancy principle applied by the colonialists; then, by
Section 12 of the 1966 Constitution Act in the first republic. Currently its
full application is curtailed by the constitutional test principle as provided
for by Section 5 and other limiting provisions in the Malawi Constitution.188
What is evident from the whole analysis is that the recognition and ap-
plication of customary laws by the court system in Malawi has not been so
rigorous as to sustain their development and existence. This position is, un-
fortunately, regrettable. It is not easy to assess the impact that the Bill of
Rights may have on customary family laws in such an environment.
188See a full discussion on how the Malawi Constitution limits the application of custom-
ary laws in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 3
Customary laws and human
rights: Theoretical debates
3.1 Introduction
Since the drafting of the International Bill of Rights, 1 there has been an ex-
pansion of human rights to include cultural issues that are central to women’s
1Which includes: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948), GA
Res. 2174 (III), UN Doc. A/810; the International Covenant on Social, Economic and
Cultural Rights (CSECR) (1966), GA Res. 2200A (XXI), UN Doc. A/6316; and the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) (1966), GA Res. 2200A (XXI),
UN Doc. A/6316.
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rights.2 The inclusion of culture as part of human rights has increased the
debate between advocates of human rights universalism3 and those of cul-
tural relativism4 to the extent that societies and individuals perceive human
rights as imposing a foreign way of life.5 This debate has the effect of divid-
ing the international community and has generally been observed to serve
as a barrier to the promotion of human rights.6 This is especially important
when we talk about women’s rights because the plight of women through-
out the world has its roots deep in their respective cultures. This Chapter,
therefore, examines the relationship between UN human rights instruments
and their theoretical effect on customary family laws and women’s rights.
Emphasis is placed on the rights to culture and equality and the extent to
which these rights interact, conflict and overlap with one another. A detailed
examination is therefore made of the UN instruments relating to these rights.
2This is demonstrated by regional human rights instruments such as the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).
3Universalism promotes the belief that all human beings are born with the same set of
inherent human rights, guaranteed to them simply because they are human beings.
4Cultural relativism promotes the belief that human rights vary from one culture to
culture. They maintain that an activity perceived as a human rights violation in one
nation may be acceptable under the prevalent cultural values in another.
5Bennett TW Customary law in South Africa (2004) 81. See also Higgins TE ‘Anti-
Essentialism, Relativism and Human Rights’ as cited by Yuksel EJD ‘Universalists versus
Universalism’ accessed at http://www.yuksel.org/e/law/universalism.htm on 10/12/08.
6Mayer AE ‘Cultural Particularism as a Bar to Women’s Rights: Reflections on Middle
Eastern Experience’ in Peters J and Wolper A Women’s right, human rights: International
feminist perspectives (1995) 176 at 176; and Bennett (n 5).
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The Chapter is divided into five sections. The second section makes an
analysis of the polarized universalist and cultural relativist debates and con-
ceptions of cultures in human rights law, and of the manner in which human
rights law approaches cultures and cultural practices. Particular emphasis
is placed on the impact of the debates on the implementation of women’s
rights.7 In the third section a discussion on the international protection of
cultural rights is made. The analysis leads to a discussion on the interna-
tional approach to the interaction between customary laws and human rights.
The aim is to understand the weight that human rights law gives to cultural
practices and therefore addresses the interaction between customary laws
and human rights. In the fourth section, the Chapter then details important
developments in international human rights law that directly aim to affect
discriminatory family cultural practices against women through an examina-
tion of the right to equality under international human rights law. The last
section is a conclusion.
Overall, this Chapter demonstrates that international human rights law
approaches culture as an institution that serves the development of individ-
uals and deserves of protection only to the extent that they do not violate
their constituent’s human rights. Thus, human rights documents consistently
7Although the Malawi Constitution has an entrenched Bill of Rights that stipulates the
human rights guarantees for its citizens, it is externally influenced by international human
rights law. To understand the impact of the Bill of Rights on African customary laws
affecting women’s rights, we have to, therefore, look at and review relevant international
human rights documents and the development of international human rights concepts.
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address culture as a basis on which protections must be afforded; and when
cultures fail to protect, they loose their protection from human rights law.
3.2 Women’s rights: Universalism and cul-
tural relativism
The concept of universalism came into prominence after World War II.8 With
the adoption of UDHR, countries all over the world discussed and negotiated
values that would become the basis for human rights. The horrific conse-
quences of World War II left a legacy that great harm could result in allow-
ing individual countries or nations to define and pursue their own values. By
establishing racial purity laws that led to the extermination of ‘lesser human
beings’, it has been pointed out that Germany had showed the world how
destructive an individual culture could become without an overriding check.9
Universalism entails that all members of the human family share the same
inalienable rights and argues for more absolute overarching values.10 This
means that the international community has the right to judge, by reference
8Reichert Social work and human rights: a foundation for policy and practice as cited
in Reichert E ‘Human Rights: An examination of universalism and cultural relativism’
(2006) Journal of Comparative Social Welfare 23 at 26.
9As above.
10Hellum A Women’s Human Rights and Legal Pluralism in Africa: Mixed Norms and
Identities in Infertility Management in Zimbabwe (1999) 31.
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to international standards, the ways states treat their own citizens and that
states must reform their constitutions and laws where necessary to bring them
into conformity with international norms.11 Further, universalists12 argue
that people are autonomous individuals whose rights are to be respected
because of their individuality. They tend to take the view that the locus of
human rights is properly situated in an individual, and recognise that the
rights of groups are best protected through attention to individual rights.13
Furthermore, universalists argue that once individuals have been treated as
equals, with the respect and concern owed them as moral beings, there is
no further obligation to treat communities to which they belong as equals.14
Universalists also argue that other societies already possess basic human
rights that simply need further expression or reinterpretation. By doing so,
universalists generally champion a positivist approach, which suggests that
any bias found in the dominant human rights paradigm may be tempered
by empirical research that confirms the universality of core human rights.
Thus, the universality view emphasizes comparability of cross-culturally or
even globally applicable human rights dimensions and categories. From this
perspective, human rights gain legitimacy to the extent that they can be
located and expressed in all cultures.15
11Mayer (n 6) 176; Levesque JR Culture and family violence: Fostering change through
human rights law (2001) 95-96.
12For purposes of this discussion, universalists are those who support universalism.
13Kymlicka W Liberalism, community and culture (1989) 140.
14As above.
15Levesque (n 11) 96.
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With regard to changes in cultural practices, universalists argue that hu-
man rights seek to transform specific, illegitimate cultural practices. They
argue that a search will locate legitimate, indigenous beliefs that comport
with universal human rights values and that claims of cultural relativism run
the danger of being without cultural basis, and instead, derive from manip-
ulations of repressive regimes and elites who have long since left traditional
cultures behind.16 On the extent to which international human rights law
transforms cultural life, universalists propose that universalism deals with
only a small core of violations and leaves intact legitimate cultural practices.
In their view, the dilution of universalism allows oppressive regimes to con-
tinue violations of basic human dignities and to inappropriately justify their
practices by claiming cultural rights.17
Universalism is, however, not without its criticism. Critics argue that
universalism perpetuates colonialist practices; complaining that one group
assumes superiority over the other and bases values, ethics, power on that
assumption.18 Women’s rights activists and scholars have also stated that
the problematic nature with the universalist approach resides in the fact
that universal model are restricted only to men’s rights, and not realised
as such.19 Most governments that propose universal human rights still de-
16Levesque (n 11) 97.
17As above.
18Ife Human Rights and Social work: towards rights based approach as cited by Reichert
(n 8) 27.
19See, among others, Charlesworth H ‘What are Women’s International Human Rights?
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fine universality of human rights in terms of male models and patterns of
thinking. Consequently, this is still causing women’s rights abuses to be per-
vasive and systematic in that they are regarded as part of the natural order
of things. Put it differently, because universal human rights are defined in
terms of male models and patterns of thinking, some universalists may tend
to justify some women’s rights violations under the notion of patriarchy. For
instance, the fact that women are denied their right to choose who to marry
under the customary family laws in Malawi might be justified by patriarchal
universalists who might argue that it is important that only men who are
the bread winners of the house choose who to marry, rather than women.
Such patterns of thinking obviously lead to ignorance of the importance of
universal human rights to be applied to women equally.
On the other hand, relativism was introduced by, among others, the sophist
Protagoras. He rejected the objective truth by saying, later quoted by
Plato20:
‘The way things appear to me, in that way they exist for me and
the way things appear to you, in that way they exist for you’.
Relativism as linked to culture appeared in the works of anthropologists
who empirically demonstrated that there exist in the world many different
in Cook RJ (ed) Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives (1994)
58 at 64.
20Ross K ‘Relativism’, accessed at http://www.firesan.com/relative.htm on 24/11/08.
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cultures, each equally worthy.21 Cultural relativism, however, received its
greatest prominence as a means to counter colonialism.22 The theme during
colonialism in the 1800s was that one culture was superior to others. How-
ever, in the 1900s anthropologists questioned this cultural superiority and
emphasised that each culture has values in itself. At the time, it has been
said, this view appeared innovative and progressive.23
Cultural relativism is the assertion that human values, far from being uni-
versal, vary a great deal according to different cultural perspectives and all
points are equally valid, and any truth is relative.24 The truth belongs to
the individual or his/her culture. All ethical, religious, and political be-
liefs are truths related to the cultural identity of the individual or society.25
Relativists argue that the promulgation of universal human rights law does
not recognise the extreme diversity of cultural practices and that universal
rights should be subsidiary to local cultural practices.26 Thus, the doctrine
of cultural relativism insists that all cultures, notwithstanding their differ-
ences, deserve equal respect and that the values of one culture should not be
21See, for example, Hellum (n 10 ) 418.
22Pierpont ‘The measure of America: How a rebel anthropologist waged war against
racism’ in Reichert (n 8) 28.
23As above.
24Ayton-Shenker D ‘The Challenge of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity’ accessed
at http://www.un.org/rights/dpi1627e.htm on 21/11/08.
25Reichert (n 8) 28.
26Levesque (n 11) 96.
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imposed on any other.27 Relativists also argue that people are understand-
able only in a cultural context, and their contexts may require respect just
as much as their alleged individualiality. Thus, cultural relativists adopt a
group-centered view of the world;28 a partition of the world into intersect-
ing cells. Furthermore, relativists affirm that universal truths actually vary
among societies and that positivistic empirical paradigms do not uncover
truths obvious to other societies. They assert that the universality of human
rights should be sought and achieved through sustained intra-cultural and
cross-cultural dialogue, rather than as an abstract cultural neutral propo-
sition, which it can never be. They focus on the context of human rights
within a culture and prize the ability to investigate and understand human
rights within the culture’s own frame of reference.29
Relativists, further, state that the structure of modern human rights recog-
nises the need to respect tradition and cultural practices.30 Relativists argue
that leaving legitimate practices intact requires also leaving intact a small
core of violations and, more importantly, that the core violations are not
necessarily violations of human rights as conceived by the host culture.31
An important aspect of cultural relativism today is that it challenges the
27Bennett (n 5) 80.
28Levesque ( n 11) 96.
29Levesque (n 11) 96-97.
30As above.
31As above.
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universality of standards that actually belong to one culture. The cultural-
relativist approach, which regards different value systems as unique and in-
comparable units, may on the other hand constitute a barrier to change and
dialogue. Thus, it has been stated, taken to its extreme, that cultural rel-
ativism would pose a dangerous threat to the effectiveness of international
law and the international system of human rights that has painstakingly been
constructed over the decades. If cultural tradition alone governs state com-
pliance with international standards, then widespread disregard, abuse and
violation of human rights would be given legitimacy.32
In summary, we see that the debate between universalism and cultural
relativism generally revolves around the sources of standards that determine
how countries should treat their citizens and how people should treat one
another.33 The debate also centers around the issues of whether the standard
has an absolute, minimal character or whether it is contingent and relative
to different communities and cultures.34 In other words, both sides of the
debate hold different views of the individual, private life, human rights and
the legitimacy of international law.35 Unfortunately, women are often caught
and badly caught in these debates and continue to suffer untold hardship from
cultural relativists’ position.36
32Ayton-Shenker (n 24).
33Levesque (n 11) 95-96.
34As above.
35As above.
36This position will be illustrated in Chapter 4 where a discussion on cultural practices
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3.2.1 Significance of universalist-relativist debates in
the women’s rights domain
For purposes of this study, the universalist-relativist debates are signifi-
cant for two reasons. Firstly, polarized positioning on human rights allows
women’s rights violations to continue and ensures that significant develop-
ments in international human rights law remain ignored and unlikely to elicit
commitment or compliance. Certain standards of human rights are contin-
uously and frequently violated because they are not perceived as culturally
legitimate in the context of a particular society.37 Secondly, the debate sug-
gests a need to rethink popular conceptions of how international law works
and how it actually may address discrimination against women and legit-
imately lead to reforming customary family laws that are discriminatory
against women, for example.38
These debates lead to the conclusion that attempts to address, for instance,
customary family laws that are discriminatory against women must consider
the impact of abolishing problematic customs and practices, even practices
not perceived by the indigenous culture as overtly problematic. The sig-
nificance of this concern cannot be overestimated. As relativists correctly
suggest, ending certain practices may mean ending a practising group’s ex-
that are inimical to women’s rights in Malawi is ensued.
37Levesque (n 11) 99.
38As above, 98.
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isting culture because cultures construct some of the questioned practices as
central to cultural conceptions of human development, cultural participation,
and cultural life. At the extreme, then, human rights hold the potential to
erase cultural diversity. These potential consequences, it has been observed,
result in the need to proceed cautiously in efforts to determine which practices
have legitimacy and which practices need transforming without compromis-
ing legitimacy.39
Levesque has further noted that the manner in which the debates allow
violations to continue suggest a need to rethink the dominant views of in-
ternational law and how international law develops.40 International law con-
tinues to be viewed as a series of contracts between nations. Addressing
the debate requires a modification of the concept of national sovereignty
to enhance the principle of international accountability for violating human
rights.41 Levesque further observes that although the debate is an old one, it
has taken on a renewed vigour in light of human rights movements’ increasing
progress.42 Notions of sovereignty, domestic jurisdiction, and cultural auton-
omy formerly enjoyed great strength, but they now suffer increasing strain as
they are challenged by efforts to establish an international, universal human
rights order.
39As above.
40As above, 99.
41As above.
42As above.
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On the face of them, however, human rights instruments fall on the ‘uni-
versalists’ side of the debate.43 It is asserted that the UN Charter and UDHR
use the language which is couched in individualistic terms and therefore im-
ply that the human rights in question are not applicable to group rights.44
While the CCPR and CESR to a certain extent do depart from such an ap-
proach, their thrust is individualistic.45 For example, Art. 27 of the CCPR,
dealing in particular with minorities’ rights to enjoy their own culture, does
not assert that these minorities have rights but merely that they shall not be
denied certain rights.46 Furthermore, the most recent declaration regarding
the balance between cultural and universal rights, the Vienna Declaration,
also falls on the side of universalism: In Section 1, paragraph 5, it provides
that:
‘all human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent
and interrelated · · · While the significance of national and re-
43As above.
44Thornberry P International Law and the Rights of Minorities (1991) 5.
45Bennett TW Human rights and African customary law under the
South African Constitution, 1999, 11 and Niec H ’Cultural Rights: At
the End of the World Decade for Cultural Development’ accessed at
http://krachtvancultuur.nl/uk/archive/commentary/niec.html on 21/11/08.
46Art. 27 of the CCPR provides that: ‘In those states in which ethnic, religious or
linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the
right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to
profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language’.
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gional particularities and various historical cultural and religious
backgrounds must be born in mind, it is the duty of States, re-
gardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to
promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms’.
[Emphasis added]
From the above, we see that as human rights law develops, it demands a
universal approach that keeps in mind the need to respect some cultural tra-
ditions but nevertheless press forward in the search for universals. On the
other hand, as human rights law moves forward, resistance accumulates. Yet
much of the resistance comes from a lack of understanding of how interna-
tional human rights law conceives of cultures and from assertions that it only
gains power and legitimacy through them.47
In the next section, I address these issues to emphasise why and how human
rights principles and modern conceptions of human rights law should mat-
ter to those who respond to customary family laws that are discriminatory
against women.
47Levesque (n 11) 100.
83
 
 
 
 
3.3 International protection of the right to
culture
The first basis of a right to culture can be found in a state’s legal duty to
guarantee the rights of minorities.48 This duty emerged soon after World
War I, when a series of treaties were concluded with respect to the newly
formed states of Europe.49 After 1945, these treaties lapsed, and the task
of securing protection for minorities passed to the UN.50 At the UN level,
when we examine international human rights law, we find that cultural rights
as human rights are declared both at universal and regional levels.51 At
universal level, these rights are first declared in the UDHR. Art. 27 states
that:
‘Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life
of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific
advancement and its benefits.’
In Art. 22 it states that:
‘Everyone, as a member of society, has a right to social security
48Bennett TW Human rights and African customary law under the South African Con-
stitution (1995) 11.
49Thornberry (n 44) 38.
50Bennett (n 48) 11.
51Niec (n 45).
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and is entitled to realisation, through national effort and interna-
tional cooperation and in accordance with the organisation and
resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights
indispensable for his dignity and free development of his person-
ality.’
The right to culture is also an integral part of other fundamental rights
enunciated in the UDHR such as freedom from conscience, expression and
religion. However, it has been observed that despite the fact that the UDHR
recognises the right to culture, cultural rights have remained the least devel-
oped in terms of legal content and enforceability.52
Cultural rights acquired a treaty binding character in the following treaty
documents. Firstly, Art. 15 (1) (a) of the CESCR provides that:
‘The State Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right
of everyone: to take part in a cultural life; to enjoy the bene-
fits of scientific progress and its applications; to benefit from the
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.’
Secondly, Art. 27 of the CCPR provides that:
52Karim and Wayland ‘Culture, Governance and Human Rights’ as cited by Tamale S
‘A Critical Perspective on Women’s Sexual Rights’ (2008) Feminist Legal Studies 47 at 51.
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‘In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the
right, in community with the other members of their group, to
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion,
or to use their own language.’
On the regional level, rights to culture are declared in the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights.53
The above sources of cultural rights declare these rights most specifically
for the individual.54 Within the international framework of human rights,
it has been noted that there also exists the recognition of cultural rights as
collective right.55 For example, the first articles of both the CESCR and
CCPR state that ‘All peoples have a right to self determination. By virtue
of that right they · · · may freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development’.
Having said that, the question that is asked is whether the right to culture
under international instruments means that communities should be able to
determine, without external influences, the content of that culture even if it
violates the human rights norms such as the norm of equality? Of particular
53Art. 17. See also Art. 13 of the Inter-American Declaration on Human Rights and
Art. 14 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
54Niec (n 45).
55As above.
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interest in this study is whether the protection of cultural rights constitutes
a justifiable reason for differential treatment of women and men? In the
following subsection, I make an analysis of the international approach to the
right to culture seen as against the background of human rights.
3.3.1 The place of culture in international law: Does
it support cultural relativism?
Despite the apparently forceful recognition of cultural rights as discussed in
Subsection 3.3, not one cites culture as a basis on which protections may be
abridged.56 Rather than protecting culture at the expense of human rights,
international documents reveal that culture necessarily must cede to universal
standards.57 Indeed as the above mandate suggests, cultures are protected
so that they may enhance human rights and not lead to their derogation.
The interpretation finds support from Art. 1 (3) of the UN Charter which
seeks:
‘to achieve international cooperation in solving international prob-
lems of an economic, social, cultural, humanitarian character and
in promoting respect for human rights and for fundamental free-
56Levesque (n 11).
57Cook R ‘State Accountability under the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms
of Discrimination Against Women’ in Cook R (ed) Human Rights of Women: National
and International Perspectives (1994) 228 at 234-235.
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doms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or re-
ligion’.
It should be noted that the language of the above provision makes two
things clear: Human rights are not dependent on specific culture and that
human rights are to be respected without distinction as to the basic markers
that influence different manifestations of cultural life: sex and religion, among
others.
Several treaties that followed the UN Charter serve as examples of the
approach that places the preservation of human rights as the most funda-
mental universal principle, even when human rights protections challenge
cultural practices. The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Dis-
crimination against Women (CEDAW)58 confronts the possibility of misuse
of culture as a pretext to violate women’s rights in the following fashion.
Art. 5 of CEDAW requires States Parties to take all appropriate measures
to:
58CEDAW was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 18 December 1979, General
Assembly Resolution 34180, 32 UN GAOR Suppl.(No.46) at P.193, UNDOC.A/34/46, and
entered into force on 3 September 1981. CEDAW was the first international legally binding
document devoted solely to the rights of women. Its significance is further emphasized by
its wide ratification, being the second most ratified international human rights treaty with
180 ratifications (71 of them have accepted the possibility for individual petition), straight
after the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, with 192 ratifications (situation of
29 July 2005) and comprehensive scope, notwithstanding the high number of reservations
made to it.
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‘modify the social and cultural patterns of men and women, with
a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary
and all other practices which are based on the idea of the infe-
riority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and
women’.
Another important provision that targets cultural-sex discrimination by re-
quiring the elimination of discriminatory legislation and custom is Art. 2 of
CEDAW. Art. 2 (f) in the pertinent part states that:
‘State Parties · · · by all appropriate means and without delay · · ·
undertake: (f) To take all appropriate measures, including leg-
islation to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs
and practices which constitute discrimination against women.’
With particular reference to discriminatory customary family law practices,
Art. 16 of CEDAW provides that:
‘States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage
and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of
equality of men and women:
(a) The same right to enter into marriage;
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(b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into
marriage only with their free and full consent.
Commenting on Art. 16 (1) (a) and (b), the CEDAW Commit-
tee59 in its General Recommendation 21 said this:
‘While most countries report that national constitu-
tions and laws comply with the Convention, custom,
tradition and failure to enforce these laws in reality
contravene the Convention. A woman’s right to choose
a spouse and enter freely into marriage is central to her
life and to her dignity and equality as a human being.
An examination of States parties’ reports discloses that
there are countries which, on the basis of custom, reli-
gious beliefs or the ethnic origins of particular groups of
people, permit forced marriages or remarriages. Other
countries allow a woman’s marriage to be arranged for
59The CEDAW Committee established under Art. 17 of CEDAW to oversee the imple-
mentation of its provisions is composed of 23 experts which are nominated by their own
governments, but which serve in their personal capacity and not as delegates or represen-
tatives of their country of origin. The CEDAW Committee monitors the implementation
of CEDAW by examining reports submitted by the state parties. The CEDAW Committee
also interprets the provisions of CEDAW through General Recommendations. These Gen-
eral Recommendations are published in the annual reports of the CEDAW Committee to
the General Assembly of the United Nations and can also be found at the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights website (http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/).
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payment or preferment and in others women’s poverty
forces them to marry foreign nationals for financial se-
curity. Subject to reasonable restrictions based for ex-
ample on a woman’s youth or consanguinity with her
partner, a woman’s right to choose when, if, and whom
she will marry must be protected and enforced at law’.
(c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at
its dissolution;60
(d) The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective
60Commenting on this provision, the CEDAW Committee in its General Recommenda-
tion 21 said this:
‘An examination of States parties’ reports discloses that many countries in their
legal systems provide for the rights and responsibilities of married partners by
relying on the application of common law principles, religious or customary
law, rather than by complying with the principles contained in the Convention.
These variations in law and practice relating to marriage have wide-ranging
consequences for women, invariably restricting their rights to equal status and
responsibility within marriage. Such limitations often result in the husband
being accorded the status of head of household and primary decision-maker
and therefore contravene the provisions of the Convention. Moreover, generally
a de facto union is not given legal protection at all. Women living in such
relationships should have their equality of status with men both in family life and
in the sharing of income and assets protected by law. Such women should share
equal rights and responsibilities with men for the care and raising of dependent
children or family members’.
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of their marital status, in matters relating to their children;
in all cases the interests of the children shall be paramount;
(f) The same rights and responsibilities with regard to guardian-
ship, wardship, trusteeship and adoption of children, or sim-
ilar institutions where these concepts exist in national leg-
islation; in all cases the interests of the children shall be
paramount.61
(g) The same personal rights as husband and wife, including the
right to choose a family name, a profession and an occupa-
61On Art. 16 (1) (d) and (f), the CEDAW Committee said that:
‘As provided in Art. 5 (b), most States recognize the shared responsibility
of parents for the care, protection and maintenance of children. The principle
that “the best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration” has
been included in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (General Assembly
resolution 44/25, annex) and seems now to be universally accepted. However,
in practice, some countries do not observe the principle of granting the parents
of children equal status, particularly when they are not married. The children
of such unions do not always enjoy the same status as those born in wedlock
and, where the mothers are divorced or living apart, many fathers fail to share
the responsibility of care, protection and maintenance of their children. The
shared rights and responsibilities enunciated in the Convention should be en-
forced at law and as appropriate through legal concepts of guardianship, ward-
ship, trusteeship and adoption. States parties should ensure that by their laws
both parents, regardless of their marital status and whether they live with their
children or not, share equal rights and responsibilities for their children’.
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tion;62
(h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the owner-
ship, acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment
and disposition of property, whether free of charge or for a
valuable consideration.63
62With respect to Art. 16 (1) (g), the CEDAW Committee made this comment:
‘A stable family is one which is based on principles of equity, justice and indi-
vidual fulfillment for each member. Each partner must therefore have the right
to choose a profession or employment that is best suited to his or her abili-
ties, qualifications and aspirations, as provided in Art. 11 (a) and (c) of the
Convention. Moreover, each partner should have the right to choose his or her
name, thereby preserving individuality and identity in the community and dis-
tinguishing that person from other members of society. When by law or custom
a woman is obliged to change her name on marriage or at its dissolution, she is
denied these rights’.
63Referring to Art. 16 (1) (h), the CEDAW Committee said:
‘The rights provided in this article overlap with and complement those in article
15 (2) in which an obligation is placed on States to give women equal rights
to enter into and conclude contracts and to administer property. Art. 15 (1)
guarantees women equality with men before the law. The right to own, manage,
enjoy and dispose of property is central to a woman’s right to enjoy financial
independence, and in many countries will be critical to her ability to earn a
livelihood and to provide adequate housing and nutrition for herself and for
her family. In countries that are undergoing a programme of agrarian reform
or redistribution of land among groups of different ethnic origins, the right of
women, regardless of marital status, to share such redistributed land on equal
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It also provides that the betrothal and the marriage of a
child shall have no legal effect, and all necessary action, in-
cluding legislation, shall be taken to specify a minimum age
for marriage and to make the registration of marriages in an
official registry compulsory.
Apart from CEDAW, other international instruments that deal with dis-
criminatory customary family law practices that affect women, especially
young girls, are the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)64 and the
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (The Charter).65
Art. 24 (3) of the CRC provides that ‘States Parties shall take all effec-
tive and appropriate measures with a view to abolishing traditional practices
terms with men should be carefully observed. In most countries, a significant
proportion of the women are single or divorced and many have the sole respon-
sibility to support a family. Any discrimination in the division of property that
rests on the premise that the man alone is responsible for the support of the
women and children of his family and that he can and will honourably discharge
this responsibility is clearly unrealistic. Consequently, any law or custom that
grants men a right to a greater share of property at the end of a marriage or
de facto relationship, or on the death of a relative, is discriminatory and will
have a serious impact on a woman’s practical ability to divorce her husband, to
support herself or her family and to live in dignity as an independent person.
All of these rights should be guaranteed regardless of a woman’s marital status’.
64Ratified by Malawi on 2 January 1991.
65Ratified by Malawi on 10 September 1999.
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prejudicial to the health of children’. The CRC stresses, in Art. 29, the tra-
ditional practices and, in Art. 19, the need to strengthen the family unit.
Arguably, these extra protections seemingly make it difficult to base human
rights abuses on cultural tradition. However, the CRC clearly places a focus
on the child’s best interests,66 the child’s evolving capacities,67 the principle
of non-discrimination68 and the respect for the child’s evolving capacities69-
all of which recenter the focus of human rights back to children and require
placing children’s interests before those of their abusive cultural practices.
On the regional level, Art. 21 of the Charter provides that:
‘States Parties to the present Charter shall take all appropriate
measures to eliminate harmful social and cultural practices af-
fecting the welfare, dignity, normal growth and development of
the child and in particular:
(a) those customs and practices prejudicial to the health or life
of the child; and (b) those customs and practices discriminatory
to the child on the grounds of sex or other status.
2. Child marriage and the betrothal of girls and boys shall be pro-
hibited and effective action, including legislation, shall be taken
to specify the minimum age of marriage to be 18 years and make
66Articles 3, 9, 20, 21,and 40 of the CRC.
67Articles 5, 12, 14 and 40 of the CRC.
68Art. 2 and the Preamble of the CRC.
69Articles 21, 28, 39, 40, and Preamble of the CRC.
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registration of all marriages in an official registry compulsory’.
In addition, the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women
of 199470 makes an important statement. Art. 4 firmly rejects cultural rela-
tivism as it prohibits States from invoking ‘any custom, tradition or religious
consideration to avoid their obligations’ in pursuing a policy of eliminating
gender discrimination by all appropriate means and without delay. This
recent recognition of the need to combat culturally ingrained gender discrim-
ination reflects the increasingly accepted view that no other social groups
have suffered greater violation of their human rights in the name of culture
than women and children.
However, seeing how countries go about reconciling the tensions that arise
between the application of international human rights norms of equality and
African customary family laws, forms the basis of much of the literature on
universalism and cultural relativism.71 In the following subsection, therefore,
I discuss these theoretical debates.
70UN General Assembly, 48th Session, Official Records, GA Resolution 04, Agenda item
11, A/RES/48/104, 1994.
71See also Banda F Women, Law and Human Rights: An African Perspective (2005)
253.
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3.3.2 Resolving conflicts between African customary
family laws and women’s rights
The debate about the nature of customary family laws72 and how they affect
women’s rights73 has already received considerable attention in the literature.
It is, therefore, not necessary to provide details, but a summary of some of
the main ideas on the subject for purposes of theoretical development.
The theory-oriented literature seems to be agreed that African customary
family laws (or rather some African customary family laws) do conflict with
women’s rights.74 What seems not to be readily agreed upon, however, is the
approach on how to resolve these conflicts between the application of African
customary family laws and the resultant effect that they have on women’s
rights. This problem is, of course, part of a wider question about the impact
of the Bill of Rights on African customary family laws, which is the focus of
this study.
72See for instance: Himonga C Family and Succession Laws in Zambia (1995); Chanock
M ‘Neotraditionalism and customary law in Malawi’ (1978) African Law Studies 80;
Chanock M Law, Custom and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and
Zambia (1998); and Ibik JO Restatement of African Law: Malawi Vol 1, The Law of mar-
riage and divorce (1970).
73See for instance: Banda (n 71) 108-157; Bennett (n 45); Bennett (n 5); Kaganas F
and Murray C ‘Law, Women and the Family: the Question of Polygyny in a New South
Africa’ (1991) Acta Juridica 116; and Maithufi IP ‘The constitution and the application
of customary family law in South Africa’ (2002) De Jure 207.
74See, for instance, Bennett (n 45) and Banda (n 71).
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Different scholars propound different approaches on how best to resolve
the conflict.75 Some scholars76 propose that if the application of African
customary family laws were to result in unfair discrimination, then common
law should be applied in its place. Thus, Bennett argues that because the
Bill of Rights is a transcendent code of norms, the conflict of laws should
no longer remain value-blind.77 This approach, however, seems to be giving
the common law a superior status over customary laws, thus giving effect
to the arguments given by proponents of cultural relativism. Other scholars
propose that cultural norms be put through a filter of human rights. If they
are found to discriminate against women, then human rights norms have to
prevail over culture.78 The revolutionary approach by Bennett and Beyani,
largely influenced by universalism, has been criticised as being insufficiently
sensitive to the needs of people who may value the cultural traditions that
75See also the discussion by Banda (n 71) 254 who has grouped them into three. First
are those who hold that delivery of human rights is only possible where states are prepared
to act on discriminatory cultural practices by way of prohibition. Second are those who
see culture as not necessarily being an impediment to the enjoyment by women of their
rights. Thirdly reference must be made to An Na’im who incorporates the two arguments
in presenting his methodological model for the mediation of culture and human rights in
a transformative process for both as cited by Banda (n 71) 254.
76For example, Bennett (n 45) 57.
77As above.
78See also Beyani C ‘Towards a More Effective Guarantee of Women’s Rights in the
African Human Rights System’ in Cook R (ed) Human Rights of Women: National and
International Perspectives (1994) 285 at 292.
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do not do well in the human rights test.79
On the other hand, some scholars’ approach, largely influenced by cultural
relativism theory, conceives another version of addressing the conflict: the use
of African customary laws. They argue that instead of abolishing customary
laws that appear to be inimical to women’s rights, we should closely look at
local cultures and see which aspects we can best use to achieve the aspirations
of human rights.80 This is, as it were, sending a thief to catch another of his
kin. In other words, this approach is against the view of ignoring customary
laws in favour of the common law and human rights.
Specifically addressing himself to the central argument of the second group,
Ibhawoh81 says that:
‘· · · it is not enough to identify the cultural barriers and limita-
tions to modern domestic and international human rights stan-
dards. It is even more important to understand the social basis
of these cultural traditions and how they may be adapted to or
79Nhlapo T ‘Cultural Diversity, Human Rights and the Family in Contemporary Africa:
Lessons from the South African Constitutional Debate’ as cited by Banda (n 71) 254.
80Nyamu-Musembi C ‘Are local norms and practices fences or pathways? The example
of women’s property rights’ 126 as cited by Banda (n 71) 256. See also the MHRC
Cultural practices and their impact on the enjoyment of human rights, particularly women
and children (Unpublished) (2005) 89 in which it was established that some customary
laws promote the enjoyment of human rights.
81Ibhawoh B ‘Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural Legitimacy
of Human Rights in the African State’ (2000) Human Rights Quarterly 838 at 839.
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reintegrated with national legislation to promote human rights.
Such adaptation and integration must be done in a way that does
not compromise the cultural integrity of peoples. In this way, the
legal and policy provisions of national human rights can derive
their legitimacy not only from the state authority, but also from
the force of cultural traditions’.
The two main approaches to resolving the conflict between African customary
family laws and the Bill of Rights can be deduced from the literature. These
are: application of common law instead of African customary family laws,
and the development of African customary family laws.
The approach to addressing the conflict between customary laws and women’s
rights that I prefer in this study was ascertained from three sources. One
was the court cases. The other was people, including magistrates and judges,
and is manifested in the statements which I have taken from individuals, and
in observed or reported instances of court dispute resolution. The last one is
from the literature reviewed. Accordingly, the conflict between the right to
culture and other rights within the Bill of Rights will therefore be addressed
by the development of African customary family laws.
This approach is undoubtedly important to the analysis of the impact of
the Bill of Rights on African customary family laws in Malawi, and perhaps
elsewhere, for several reasons. Firstly, it is necessary to distinguish between
customary family laws that are inimical to women’s rights and those that
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advantage women’s rights, for the purpose of determining what are the op-
tions of developing those that are against women’s rights. Secondly, the
right to marry according to customary family laws continues to be asserted
by most people who are in opposition to changing of the customary marriage
system.82 Thirdly, the dichotomy between replacing customary laws with
the common law, and developing customary laws so that they are consistent
with human rights, is carried into the debate about the protection of mostly
women and children against discrimination. The development of customary
laws is considered to be a good approach to achieving international human
rights aspirations because of the cultural legitimacy that it derives from the
said communities.83
82Ngwira N et al Women’s Property and Inheritance Rights in Malawi (2002), n 13
in Chapter 1. Similarly, in South Africa, as noted by Bonthuys E and Erlank N ‘The
interaction between civil and customary family law rules: implications for African women’
(2002) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse 748 ‘in a review of a number of surveys, the South
African Law Commission points out that 90 percent of respondents had indicated that
lobolo, which is a prerequisite for the customary marriages, had being paid and 80 percent
were against the abolition of customary marriages’.
83For a full discussion of the cultural legitimacy, see An-Naim AA ‘State Responsibility
under the International Human Rights Law to change Religious and Customary Laws’ in
Cook RJ Human rights of women: National and International Perspectives (1994) 167 at
173-175 who argues that unless international human rights have sufficient legitimacy within
particular cultures and traditions, their implementation will be thwarted, particularly
at the domestic level, but also at the regional and international levels. Without such
legitimacy, it will be nearly impossible to improve the status of women through the law
or other agents of social change.
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On the one hand, the literature, as earlier stated, displays uncertainty as
to the problem of resolving the conflict between equality and culture. One
dimension of this uncertainty, which will be mentioned here, is that to which
Grant84 draws our attention. Commenting on the South African Bhe case85
he argues that:
‘As the judgment shows, on one level, reconciling equality and cul-
ture is simply a matter of identifying those aspects of customary
laws which offend the constitutional guarantee of equality, and
striking them down. On the other level, it required the striking
down of the male primogeniture rule in customary laws as incom-
patible with the right to gender equality. What to put in its place
84Grant E ‘Human rights, cultural diversity and customary law in South Africa’ (2006)
Journal of African Law 2 .
85Bhe and others v Magistrate Khayelitsha and others, Shibi v Sithole and others, South
African Human Rights Commission and Another v President of the Republic of South
Africa and Another, 2005(1) BCLR 1 (CC); 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC). Both the Shibi and
Bhe cases concerned the customary law of succession embodied in the Black Administra-
tion Act 38 of 1927 and the constitutionality of the principle of male primogeniture. The
only difference in them is that the female excluded from succession to the deceased’s estate
in Shibi was the deceased’s sister as compared to the deceased daughters in Bhe. On the
other hand, the applicants in South African Human Rights Commission applied for direct
access to the CC to have section 23 of the Black Administration Act and the regulations
promulgated thereunder declared unconstitutional, on the ground that its provisions in-
fringed the rights to equality and human dignity, and the court granted direct access to
the applicants.
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is far more complicated matter. It is complicated not merely be-
cause of practical problems which preoccupied the majority of
the court in Bhe case, but because of potentially contradictory
demands of equality and the maintenance of legal dualism’.
It would appear from this that the solution proposed by many writers86 to
interpose common law in those areas of customary laws that are incompatible
with the Constitution would meet with challenges.
On the other hand, it is very difficult to argue that the development of
customary laws, so that they are to be in line with the constitution, is also
not without its challenges.
3.3.3 Feminism and African culture: The public and
private dichotomy in the application of human
rights
Globally, it is now recognised that women’s rights are human rights.87 This
was acknowledged by world leaders in 1993 at the World Conference on Hu-
86For example, the SALC Discussion Paper 93 Project 90 on the Law of Succession
(1998).
87Kisaakye EM ‘Women, Culture and Human rights: Female Genital Mutilation,
polygamy and bride price’ in Wolfgang B, Kisaakye EM and Oberleitner G (eds) Human
rights of women: international instruments and African experiences (2002) 268.
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man Rights.88 However, while it is universally accepted that women’s rights
are human rights, the question as to whether human rights apply to private
law remains crucial for the protection of the rights of the women whose lives
are governed by customary family laws.
The concept of the application of human rights in private law adopted
in this study is what Barak89 has called the ‘direct application model’ as
opposed to the ‘non-application model’. This model is based on the idea
that human rights apply directly in private law.90 Human rights protect
the individual not only against the State, but also against private parties.91
Under this model, a private person is likely to obtain a result in court against
another individual that would not be available otherwise.92 For example, if
A shouts and disturbs a meeting, he infringes the constitutional human right
of B, a fellow participant, to associate freely, and will be held liable to him.93
88The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna, Austria recognised that
the human rights of women and of the girl-child are an inalienable, integral and indivisible
part of universal human rights (see para. 18 of the Vienna Declaration). This position
was reaffirmed by the world community in subsequent conferences held in Cairo, 1994,
Copenhagen and Beijing, 1995.
89Barak A ‘Constitutional Human Rights and Private Law’ in Friedmann D and Barak-
Erez D (eds) Human Rights in Private law (2003) 13 at 14.
90As above.
91As above.
92As above.
93As above. Applying this reasoning to a woman, whose rights are affected by customary
family laws as will be seen in Chapter 4, it is submitted that she is likely to obtain a result
in court against another individual that would not be available otherwise. For example,
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This model, it is submitted, is important for the protection of women’s
rights precisely because the lives of women, especially women married under
customary laws, are lived out largely in the private sphere, where violations
against women are more likely than not to be committed by individuals.94
As observed,95 ‘a common thread that runs through all feminist movements
in Africa is the struggle to extend human rights to female citizens of the
continent’. Tamale further notes that the usual snag that such activists im-
mediately confront is the conceptual divide between the so called ‘public’ and
‘private’ spheres.96 Thus, Bunch97 observed that this distinction between pri-
vate and public is a dichotomy largely used to justify female subordination
if A forces B to enter into marriage with C, A infringes the constitutional right of B
that she should not be forced to enter into marriage. A woman is therefore guaranteed
a constitutional remedy that will be offered by the court and which would otherwise not
have been possible if human rights were not to be applicable in private law.
94Charlesworth H, Chinkin C and Wright S ‘Feminist Approaches to International Law’
613 as cited by Banda (n 71) 43. See also Onoria H ‘Introduction to the African System
of Protection of Human Rights and the Draft Protocol’ in Wolfgang B, Kisaakye EM and
Oberleitner G (eds) Human Rights of Women: international instruments and African ex-
periences (2002) 231 at 234 and Romany C ‘State Responsibility goes Private: A Feminist
Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International Law’ in Cook RJ (ed) Human
Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives (1994) 85 at 94-95.
95Tamale (n 52) 54.
96As above.
97Bunch C ‘Transforming Human Rights from a Feminists Perspective’ in Peters J and
Wolper A (eds) Women’s rights, human rights: International feminist perspectives (1995)
11 at 14.
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and to exclude human rights abuses in the home from public scrutiny. The
traditional human rights framework places an emphasis on the duty of the
state to uphold the rights of its citizens within the public sphere. The state
is taken as the primary violator of rights.98 Furthermore, it has also been
observed that the assumption that states are not responsible for violations
of women’s rights in the private sphere ignores the fact that such abuses are
often condoned or even sanctioned by states even when the immediate per-
petrator is a private citizen.99 This means that communities and individuals
from within the community that violate women’s rights fall outside the ambit
of the human rights structure and fall under the jurisdiction of culture.100
For example, Murray takes that part of feminist analysis which focuses on
the exclusion of different voices in the construction of norms to argue that
African states, like women, have been largely ignored by the international
community. She does, however, qualify the private-public dichotomy, noting
that the state in Africa has evolved in such a way that the dichotomy between
public and private is not clear-cut as it appears in the North.101 It should
also be observed that many post-independence constitutions of African states
exempted private laws (for example, marriage, inheritance and succession)
from the operation of the non-discrimination principle.102
98Cook (n 57).
99Bunch (n 97) 14.
100Fox and Hasci Women’s rights as human rights as cited by Tamale (n 52) 54.
101Murray The African Commission on Human Rights and International Law as cited
by Banda (n 71) 43.
102See for example, such provisions in the constitutions of Zimbabwe, Zambia and Kenya.
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It has also been noted103 that feminist scholars have contended that women’s
and children’s rights are vulnerable to infringement in private relations.104
To support this view, Romany105 has observed that:
‘Family, through canonization, becomes the refuge for the flour-
ishing of those spheres of privacy and freedom that lie at the
core of the non-political foundations of the liberal state. At the
root of the enshrinement of family in conventional human rights
law within the blown-up liberal state of international society lies
a convergence of narratives which legitimates a hierarchical or-
dering of intimate relations; this convergence is hidden from the
refuge narrative claims that the family as a social unit is beyond
the purview of the state’.
On the other hand, the ‘non-application model’ is to the effect that human
rights are applicable only in public law. This model is based on the original
conception that human rights were rights and freedoms against the State and
other public authorities.106 Their very fundamental purpose was to protect
103See, for example, Chirwa DM Towards binding economic, social and cultural rights,
obligations of non-state actors in international and domestic law: A critical study in
emerging norms Unpublished LLD thesis (2005) University of the Western Cape, 62-63.
104See, for example, Clapham A Human rights in the private sphere (1993) as cited by
Murray C ‘A feminist perspective on reform of the African human rights system’ (2002)
African Human Rights Law Journal 205 at 211-212.
105Romany (n 94) 94-95.
106Friedmann D and Barak-Erez D ‘Introduction’ in Friedmann D and Barak-Erez D
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the individual against the omnipotent State with its vast powers.107 They
are directed at the State and the State alone. In the realm of private law,
according to the ‘non-application model’, the regular laws continue to apply
as they did before human rights were granted constitutional status.108
The arguments in favour of the ‘direct application model’ have been said to
depend on the language of the relevant constitutional provision, including its
formulation.109 For example, in Switzerland, the language of several cantons
explicitly mandates application of the direct model.110 Another example is
Germany. In Germany, the human rights set forth in the Basic Law apply not
only to relations between an individual and the State in the sphere of public
law, but also to relations between private parties in private law.111 Similarly,
in Malawi112 the formulation of the relevant provisions, as quoted above, it is
(eds) Human Rights in Private law (2003) 1 at 1.
107Barak (n 89) 14.
108As above.
109As above.
110See Constitution of Canton of Jura, para. 14 (2), which states that every person must
use his basic rights in a manner that respects the basic rights of others as cited by Barak
(n 89) 15.
111As above.
112The Malawi Constitution provides in Section 15 (1): ‘The human rights and freedoms
enshrined in this chapter shall be respected and upheld by the executive, legislature and
judiciary and all organs of the Government and its agencies and, where applicable to them,
by all natural and legal persons in Malawi and shall be enforceable in a manner prescribed
in this chapter’. Similarly, Section 8 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa, 1996 provides that ‘a provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic
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submitted, explicitly mandates both vertical as well as horizontal application
of constitutional human rights.113 Thus the application of human rights, as
defined in these constitutions,114 applies to both public and private laws.
Accordingly, the enjoyment of the right to culture exists not only against the
State, but also in the context of relations between individuals.115
It is, however, noted that in relations between private parties, a conflict
may arise between different human rights.116 For example, one’s freedom
of contract may conflict with the freedom of expression of another person.
Such clashes are resolved by balancing constitutional rights directly in pri-
vate law.117 In the area of customary family laws, as mentioned earlier, the
right to culture frequently contradicts the right to equality. Similarly, it is
submitted, the conflicting rights concerned can be resolved by balancing the
constitutional rights.
person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the
right to the nature of any duty imposed by the right’.
113This point has also been noted with reference to South Africa by Fagan A ‘Determining
the Stakes: Binding and non-Binding Bill of Rights’ in Friedmann D and Barak-Erez D
(eds) Human Rights in Private law (2003) 73 at 91.
114The 1995 Malawi Constitution and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996.
115Likewise, a woman who participates in the enjoyment of a cultural right has a right
not to have her right to choose whom to marry, for example, infringed through forcing her
to marry someone against her will.
116Barak (n 89) 18.
117As above.
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The ‘direct application model’, as defined here, avoids the ‘non-application
model’ which, it is submitted, does not recognise the power imbalance that
exists between a husband and a wife, as unequal parties in a customary mar-
riage contract. Apart from the fact that the ‘non-application model’ does
not recognise the imbalance between husband and wife, the assumption in-
herent in it that marriage family laws will apply equally to parties is without
content.118 Furthermore, according to Section 5 of the Malawi Constitution,
all laws have to pass a constitutional test for them to be valid. Therefore,
if private law is left out of this test, the assumption is that private law is
above the Constitution. It is thus not helpful to our analysis of the impact
of the Bill of Rights on customary family laws and the enjoyment of women’s
rights. For a proper understanding of the impact of the Bill of Rights on
customary family laws and the rights of women married under it, the direct
model, which assumes that human rights apply to private laws, is preferred.
Considered in relation to courts implementing and enforcing women’s rights,
and of course law reform in the area of customary family laws, the question
of direct application, as defined here, goes beyond academic debate. It high-
lights the options for, and effectiveness in, the implementation of women’s
118Historically, private law, which regulates the legal relationship of private individuals,
is predicated in practically all modern societies on the theory of equality before the law.
A theory that has a long tradition dating back to the Old Testament: ‘Thou shall not
prefer the person of the poor, nor favour the person of the mighty; but in righteousness
shall thou judge thy neighbour’ (Leviticus 19:15) as cited by Friedmann and Barak-Erez
(n 106) 1.
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rights by courts and law reformers.
3.4 International norm of equality and non-
discrimination
The principles of equality and non-discrimination are commonly described as
the right to treat like cases alike and different cases differently.119 The right
to equality guarantees, first and foremost, that all persons are equal before
the law, which means that the law shall be formulated in general terms
applicable to every human being and enforced in an equal manner. Secondly,
all persons are entitled to equal protection of the law against arbitrary and
discriminatory treatment by private actors. In this regard, the law shall
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, and sex,
among others.
The principles of equality and non-discrimination have also been described
to be the cornerstone of democracy, and indeed, they imbue and inspire the
whole human rights concept.120 Since the beginning of the human rights
119Wentholt K ‘Formal and substantive equal treatment: the limitations and potential
of the legal concept of equality’ in Loenen T and Rodrigues PR (eds) Non-Discrimination
Law: Comparative perspectives, (1999) 53 at 53.
120Nowak M UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (1993)
458.
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discourse in the Minorities Treaties era after World War I, these principles
have been at the fore, having a prominent place in all major human rights
instruments.121 By now, the principle of non-discrimination has undoubt-
edly acquired the status of a fundamental rule of international human rights
law.122 The principle of non-discrimination is a principle of customary inter-
national law and, at least as regards discrimination on the basis of sex, race
and ethnic origin, also has a status of jus cogens.123
In order to ensure the principles of equality and non-discrimination, various
human rights instruments over the years have enumerated certain grounds
on which discrimination is prohibited, and indeed, the prohibition of dis-
crimination on the ground of sex has been fundamental to the concept of
the promotion of the principle of equality and non-discrimination.124 The
significance of these principles, where women’s rights are concerned, cannot
be over-emphasised. Indeed, as Cook125 points out:
‘The reasons for this general failure to enforce women’s rights are
121See, for example, Art. 2 of the UDHR; Art. 2 of the CESCR; Art. 2 (1) of the CCPR;
Art. 2 of CEDAW; Art. 2 (1) of the CRC; and Art. 2 and 3 of the ACHPR.
122United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Pro-
gramme of Action, UN Doc.A/CONF.157/24 (Part I) (1993), June 1993, 1.
123According to Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, no
derogation is permitted from a jus cogens norm.
124See, generally, Art. 1 of CEDAW.
125Cook RJ ‘Women’s International Human Rights Law: The Way Forward’ in Cook RJ
(ed) Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives (1994) 3 at 3.
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complex and vary from country to country. They include lack
of understanding of the systemic nature of the subordination of
women, failure to recognise the need to characterise the subordi-
nation as a human rights violation, and lack of state practice to
condemn discrimination against women’.
To this end, she observes that the legal obligation to eliminate all forms
of discrimination against women is a fundamental tenet of international hu-
man rights law.126 International jurisprudence on this point has consistently
affirmed the fact that the principles of equality and non-discrimination are
recognised, and their value conceded.127
126As above. See, for example, Art. 1 of CEDAW; and Art. 24 (3) of the CRC.
127In the South African case of Bhe and others v Magistrate Khayelitsha and others, Shibi
v Sithole and others, South African Human Rights Commission and Another v President
of the Republic of South Africa and Another, 2005(1) BCLR 1 (CC); 2005 (1) SA 580
(CC), for example, Langa, DCJ noted that:
‘The rights to equality· · ·are of the most valuable of rights in an open and
democratic state. They assume special importance in South Africa because
of our past history of inequality and hurtful discrimination on grounds that
include race and gender’.
Again, in the case of Legal Resources Foundation v Zambia, Communication 211/98, Deci-
sion of AfCmHPR, 29th Ordinary Session, April/May 2001 [2001] IIHRL 1 (1 May 2001),
paragraph 63, in which a case was brought by a non-governmental organisation challenging
an amendment to the Constitution of Zambia, which provided that before a person could
contest for the country’s presidency, she or he had to prove that both her or his parents
were of Zambian origin as being discriminatory, the Commission noted that:
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The principles of equality and non-discrimination, however, are elusive
and complex concepts which give rise to several controversies referring to
the scope of these concepts.128 A main theme in feminist legal studies con-
cerns the question of whether the legal concept of equality can attain genuine
equality between men and women. Or is it a concept which offers women
the same legal position as men have, without criticising the underlying male
dominance of the law? This controversy deals with the potential and limi-
tations of the concept of equality. The questions this controversy raise flow
partly from the distinction between a formal and substantive approach to
equality.129
In this section, therefore, the focus will be on such international law pro-
visions that prohibit discrimination either generally or on the basis of sexual
orientation, focusing on the scope of the equality norm as established by
international human rights instruments, and lists specific extensions to the
family and its comprehensive elaboration in CEDAW.
‘The right to equality is very important. It means that citizens should expect
to be treated fairly and justly within the legal system and be assured of equal
treatment before the law and equal enjoyment of the rights available to all
citizens. The right to equality is important for a second reason. Equality or
lack of it, affects the capacity of one to enjoy many other rights.
128Wentholt (n 119) 53.
129As above.
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3.4.1 Scope of equality and non-discrimination princi-
ples at international law
The principles of equality and non-discrimination first came to the fore on
the universal level in the Minorities Treaties era after World War I.130 The
Peace Conference held in Paris in 1919-1920 considered, among other things,
protecting groups, especially, but not exclusively, minorities, against dis-
crimination.131 Despite the very noble intentions of the Minorities Treaties,
the provisions therein were never rigidly implemented or enforced and were
ultimately not a great success. They were, however, the first step in the
international recognition of the importance of the principles of equality and
discrimination.
The Permanent Court of International Justice was the forum through which
the provisions of the Minorities Treaties could be enforced. The case law of
this court illuminates the concepts of equality and non-discrimination. For
example, in its Advisory opinion of 10 September 1923 in the German Settlers
in Poland case,132 the Permanent Court of International Justice said:
130Higgins N ‘The Right to Equality and Non-Discrimination with regard to Lan-
guage’ accessed at http://www.murdorch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v10n1/higgins101nf.html on
21/11/08.
131As above.
132Permanent Court of International Justice 1922-5, Series B, No 6, (1923); Judgment
of 10 September 1923 in Patel BN (ed) The World Court Reference Guide: Judgments,
Advisory Opinions and Orders of the Permanent Court of International Justice (1922-
2000) (2002) 15.
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‘... there must be equality in fact as well as ostensible legal equal-
ity in the sense of the absence of discrimination in the words of
the law’.
This statement was endorsed in a subsequent Advisory Opinion on Minority
Schools in Albania.133 In this judgment, the court said:
‘It is perhaps not easy to define the distinction between the no-
tions of equality in fact and equality in law; nevertheless, it may
be said that the former notion excludes the idea of a merely formal
equality, that is indeed what the court laid down in its Advisory
Opinion of 10 September 1923, concerning the case of the German
settlers in Poland. “Equality in law”, the court went on to say,
precludes discrimination of any kind whereas equality in fact may
involve the necessity of different treatment in order to achieve a
result which establishes an equilibrium between different situa-
tions’.
133Permanent Court of International Justice 1935, Series A/B, No 64 at 17, in Patel,
as above, 75. In this case, the court considered that in order for minorities to be able
to live peacebly alongside the majority while at the same time retaining their special
characteristics, two elements were necessary: to ensure that nationals belonging to racial,
religious or linguistic minorities shall be placed in every respect on a footing of perfect
equality with other nationals of the State; and that to ensure for the minority elements
suitable means for the preservation of their racial peculiarities, their traditions and their
national characteristics.
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Commenting on the Minorities Schools case, Higgins134 said:
‘This decision shows that the Minorities Treaties placed a positive
obligation on the State to take affirmative action measures in
order to place minorities on an equal footing with the majority
in order for true equality to realised ...’
From the Minorities Treaties era, principles of equality and
non-discrimination on the basis of sex are clearly enshrined in international
law.135 First, the United Nations Charter adopted on 26 June 1945 pro-
vided the blueprint for the development of international system of human
rights.136 Although it did not outline the specific human rights that States
were to respect and the mechanisms for their protection and enforcement, it
identified non-discrimination and equality as central principles to underpin
international human rights law.137
134Higgins (n 130).
135Stamatopoulou E ‘Women’s Rights and the United Nations’ in Peters J and Wolper
A (eds) Women’s rights: International feminist perspectives (1995) 36 at 37.
136Drzewicki ‘The United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights’, in Hanski R and Suksi M, (eds), An Introduction to the International Protec-
tion of Human Rights: A Textbook, as cited by Chirwa DM ‘Reclaiming (Wo)manity: The
merits and demerits of the African Protocol on women’s rights’ (2006) Netherlands Inter-
national Law Review 2.
137Art. 1 of the UN Charter provides that one of the purposes of the UN is to achieve
international cooperation in ‘promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
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Following from that, the principle of non-discrimination under interna-
tional law was further reiterated under the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights (UDHR).138 Its non-discrimination provision has had major political
influence and is of theoretical importance.139 The non-discrimination provi-
sion in Art. 2 of the UDHR reads as follows:
‘Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in
this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status’.
(Emphasis added)
Unlike for instance the UN Charter, the listing of grounds in Art. 2 of UDHR
is open-ended.140 It does not have independent standing, but is, in a way,
accessory to the other articles of the UDHR. While not much is said about
women, Art. 2 does entitles all the rights and freedoms set forth in the UDHR
without distinction of any kind, including sex.141 Furthermore, when read
from the perspective of women’s lives, many violations of women’s rights such
138UN General Assembly, Resolution 217A (III), 10 December 1948.
139Makonnen T The principle on non-discrimination in international human rights law
and EU law (2005) 5 accessed at
http://iom.fi/elearning/files/european-law/essential- reading/Principle-of-
Discrimination.pdf,
on 11/11/08.
140See the distinction between Art. 1(3) of the UN Charter and Art. 2 of the UDHR.
141Bunch (n 97) 13.
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as widow cleansing can readily be interpreted as forbidden under existing
clauses. The protection provided is therefore extensive, as the rights guar-
anteed cover nearly the entire range of what today are recognised as human
rights and fundamental freedoms.142 Several other articles of the UDHR pro-
vide added protection from discrimination in particular situations.143 Art. 7
in turn provides for equality before the law:
‘All are equal before the law and are entitled without any dis-
crimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to
equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this
Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination’.
It must be noted that the rule that all people are entitled to protection
not only from discrimination but also from incitement to discrimination is
a unique and thus important feature of the UDHR which has been reaf-
firmed in many other international instruments, including, the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR),144 and the International
142As above.
143As an example, Art. 23 provides: ‘[e]veryone, without any discrimination, has the
right to equal pay for equal work’.
144General Assembly Resolution 2200A(xxi),21UNGAOR Suppl.(No.16) at p.52, UN-
DOC.A/6316(1966), 999UNTS p.171, entered into force 23 March 1976. The Human
Rights Committee is tasked with the monitoring and implementation of the CCPR. The
views expressed by the Committee and other treaty monitoring bodies are hereby given
considerable weight in the interpretation of the respective human rights treaty. While the
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Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR).145 Both of
these instruments were ratified by Malawi in 1993 and contain provisions that
proscribe discrimination on the basis of sex and guarantee equality before the
law.146
The CCPR contains two all-important provisions on non-discrimination.
The first one is to be found in Art. 2 and it relates to the obligation to ensure
the rights recognized in the CCPR to all individuals without discrimination
as follows:
‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject
to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, lan-
guage, religion, political or other opinion, national or social ori-
gin, property, birth or other status’.(Emphasis added).
The obligation to ‘respect’ and to ‘ensure’ implies both a negative and a
positive obligation.147 States are thus obliged both to refrain from restrict-
views are not legally binding, they are authoritative since the members of these bodies
are experts in their specific fields of law and hence worth noting their position on certain
matters.
145General Assembly Resolution 2200A(xxi),21UNGAROR Suppl.(No.16)at p.49, UN-
Doc.A16316(1966), 993 UNTS p.3, entered into force on 3 January 1976.
146CCPR arts 2, 2(1), 3 and 26; CESCR arts 2, 2(2) and 3.
147Makonnen (n 139) 6.
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ing the rights guaranteed in the CCPR, as well as to take positive steps to
give effect to these rights.148 The means by which a state gives effect to
these rights has been left up to them; to be decided in accordance with its
constitutional processes and legislation. The obligation to ensure the rights
have been interpreted to mean that the state party must take effective mea-
sures to secure that the rights in question are protected in relation to all
violations, including those that result from actions by private individuals or
other private actors.149 The obligation in Art. 2 also means that the level of
protection afforded cannot vary from group to group. It has to be the same
for all. The list of grounds is not exhaustive, as is indicated by the words
‘such as’ and ‘other status’.150 It is also important to note that the Human
Rights Committee has in its practice established that the concept of ‘sex’
includes sexual orientation.151
While the CCPR speaks in Art. 2 of ‘distinctions of any kind’, it is a well-
established interpretation that only arbitrary or otherwise unjust distinctions
are prohibited.152 As the Human Rights Committee153 has observed:
148As above.
149As above.
150As above.
151Toonen v Australia, Communication No 488/1992 as cited by Makonnen (n 139) 6.
The Human Rights Committee is a UN body of 18 experts that meets three times a year
to consider the five yearly reports submitted by UN member states on their compliance
with the CCPR.
152See e.g. Thornberry (n 44) 283.
153Para. 13 of the UN General Comment No. 18 (Non-discrimination), adopted at the
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‘not every differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimi-
nation, if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and
objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate
under the CCPR’.
Thus, positive action or other preferential action measures are allowed and
may even be required, if they are needed to correct discrimination in fact and
are used only as long as is necessary. In the Mauritian Women’s Case,154 for
example, the Human Rights Committee in finding a violation of articles 2 (1)
and 3 of the CCPR considered that a distinction based on gender was not in
itself conclusive. The determining factor was that no sufficient justification
had been given for such a distinction. Thus the decision in this case shows
that not all differentiation of treatment constitutes discrimination under the
CCPR.
The principles of equality and non-discrimination does not mean that all
are always to be treated in an identical manner. This would only be the
case if all were really identical in all aspects and lived in exactly the same
thirty-seventh session (1989).
154Communication No. 35/1978, UN Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 67 (1984). In this case 20
Mauritian women’s claim was that the enactment of the Immigration (Amendment) Act
1977 and Deportation (Amendment) Act 1977, by Mauritius constitutes discrimination
based on sex against Mauritian women, violation of the right to found a family and home,
removal of the protection of courts of law, in breach of articles 2, 3, 4, 17, 23, 25 and 26
of the CCPR.
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conditions. Evidently, this is not the case; there are obvious differences
between us such as our gender, the languages we speak, whether we are rich
or poor, just to mention a few. Where these differences are relevant to a given
right or situation, equal treatment may, in fact, mean different treatment.
In addition, another example of a situation familiar to us all where equal
treatment requires different treatment is maternity. Evidently, only women
become pregnant (up until now anyway). In order for women to have equal
access to health care, there need to be doctors specially trained to deal with
the situation that women experience and not men; thus meting out different
treatment.
Furthermore, what the principles of equality and discrimination mean, as
it was very eloquently expressed in Judge Tanakas’ dissenting judgment in
the South West Africa Case,155 and has since been repeated by many courts,
is that:
‘All human beings, notwithstanding their differences in their ap-
pearance and other minor points, are equal in their dignity as
155South West Case (Second phase) (1966) International Court of Justice Rep. 6 pp
303-305. In the case at hand, Judge Tanaka was discussing the practice of apartheid. He
found that discrimination according to the criterion of race, colour, national or tribal origin
in establishing the rights and duties of the inhabitants of the territory is not considered
reasonable and just. .. If differentiation be required, it would be derived from the difference
of language, religion, custom, etc. not from the racial difference itself. The policy of
apartheid he consequently found to be fundamentally unreasonable and unjust.
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persons. Accordingly, for the point of view of human rights and
fundamental freedoms they must be treated equally.’
‘The principle of equality does not mean absolute equality, but
recognises relative equality, namely different treatment propor-
tionate to concrete individual circumstances. Different treatment
must not be given arbitrarily; it requires reasonableness, or must
be in conformity with justice...’
Secondly, is Art. 26 of the CCPR containing a free-standing prohibition of
discrimination:
‘All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect,
the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on
any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.’
From the foregoing, we see that Art. 26 is couched in similar terms as Art. 7
of the UDHR and is wide in scope. While Art. 2 limits the scope of the rights
to be protected against discrimination to those provided for in the CCPR,
Art. 26 is not similarly limited.156 The scope of this article is mainly delimited
156UN General Comment No. 18 of the UN doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, Compilation of
124
 
 
 
 
by the concepts of ‘equality before the law’ and ‘equal protection of the law’.
This double-faceted formulation provides that the equal treatment obligation
is binding both in the law-making (‘equal protection of the law’) and in
the application of law (‘equality before the law’). Thus, when legislation is
adopted by a State Party, it must comply with the requirement of Art. 26
in that its content should not be discriminatory. And when that law is
applied in courts or by administrative bodies, it must be applied in a non-
discriminatory manner.157 The scope of Art. 26 is thus sweeping and covers
all matters dealt with by law.
Another UN document which illuminates the concepts of equality and dis-
crimination, and should therefore be examined is the UN General Comment
No. 18158 which deals with Art. 26 of the CCPR. Defining the concept of
discrimination the Human Rights Committee159 states that:
‘ · · · that the term “discrimination” as used in the Covenant
should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restric-
tion or preference which is based on any ground such as · · · sex
· · · and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal
General Comments and General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty
Bodies, 134-137.
157See also Nowak (n 120) 466-469 and Thornberry, (n 44), 285.
158See n 131 above.
159UN General Comment of the Human Rights Committee, No. 18, para. 7.
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footing, of all rights and freedom.’
From the above, the concept of discrimination is rather broad as it cov-
ers intentional as well as unintentional conduct which has discriminatory
effects. Given that Art. 26 prohibits any discrimination and that the defi-
nition provided above refers to the effects of discrimination, this article has
been deemed to cover indirect discrimination.160
It is also important to note that General Comment No. 18 also deals with
other issues affecting the principles of non-discrimination and equality.161 For
example, in para. 9162 it looks at the distinction between discrimination in
fact and discrimination in law to States who are parties to the CCPR:
‘Reports of many States parties contain information regarding
legislative measures and court decisions, which relate to protec-
tion against discrimination in law, but they very often lack in-
formation, which would reveal discrimination in fact. When re-
porting on articles 2 (1), 3 and 26 of the Covenant, States parties
usually cite provisions of their constitution or equal opportunity
laws with respect to equality of persons. While such information
is of course useful, the Committee wishes to know if there remain
160Human Rights Committee in the case of Bhinder v Canada as cited by Makonnen (n
139) 9.
161Higgins (n 130).
162Para. 9.
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any problems of discrimination in fact, which may be practised
either by public authorities, by the community, or by private per-
sons or bodies. The Committee wishes to be informed about legal
provisions and administrative measures directed at diminishing or
eliminating such discrimination.’
Furthermore, it has also been interpreted that the enjoyment of rights and
freedoms on an equal footing does not mean identical treatment in every in-
stance.163 The Committee has considered, for example, that a differentiation
between married and unmarried couples does not amount to a violation of
Art. 26 of the CCPR, since married and unmarried couples are subject to
different legal regimes and the decision on whether or not to enter into a
legal status by marriage lies entirely with the cohabitating persons.164 As de
Varennes165 put it:
‘It is widely accepted that not all distinctions are necessarily dis-
criminatory: Equality and the right to non-discrimination require
that individuals be protected against unreasonable or unaccept-
able different treatment. How a court of law is to decide whether
a particular distinction is acceptable or not is a difficult task, as
163General Comment No. 18 para. 8.
164Communication No. 976/2001, CCPR/C/80/D/976/2001,15 June 2004 as cited by
Makonnen (n 139) 10.
165de Varennes ‘Language, Minorities and Human Rights’ as cited by Higgins (n 130).
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it involves a balancing act between the interests and priorities of
the government- normally mirroring those of the majority group
controlling the state machinery-and the interests and rights of the
individuals affected.’
It is also important to note that the prohibition of discrimination does not
rule out affirmative action measures. Quite on the contrary, States are re-
quired to take affirmative action in order to diminish or eliminate conditions
which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination prohibited by the CCPR.
This was noted by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment
No. 18 on Non-Discrimination166:
‘For example, in a state where the general conditions of a certain
part of the population prevent or impair their enjoyment of hu-
man rights, the state should take specific action to correct those
conditions. Such action may involve granting for a time to the
part of the population concerned certain preferential treatment
in specific matters as compared with the rest of the population.
As long as such action is needed to correct discrimination in fact,
it is a case of legitimate differentiation’.
Coming to the CESCR, it is particularly important to discuss the principles
of equality and non-discrimination issues in relation to economic, cultural
166Para. 10.
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and social rights,167 since it is in this area in which vertical discrimination
between an individual and authorities often arises, particularly as regards
women. Art. 2(2) of the CESCR reads:
‘The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guar-
antee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be
exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or so-
cial origin, property, birth or other status’.
The formulation of this provision has been described to be absolute and
practice-oriented, as implied by the notions ‘guarantee’ and ‘will be exer-
cised’.168 As noted above, it imposes obligations on State parties which are
of immediate effect. If a state has not taken all measures needed to effec-
167According to General Comment No. 3 on the nature of States parties obligations,
adopted by the Committee at its fifth session(1990), a distinction is often made between
civil and political rights on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights on
the other. The distinction being that only the former are seen as readily justiciable
rights, i.e. as rights that can be enforced through courts of law. While it is true that
the economic, social and cultural rights are often framed as state obligations aiming at
progressive realization and acknowledging also the constraints due to the limits of available
financial resources, economic, social and cultural provisions do impose various obligations
which are of immediate effect. The justiciable nature of several economic, social and
cultural rights has become increasingly recognised, the clearest example of such a right
being the right to enjoy economic, social and cultural rights without any discrimination.
168Makonnen (n 139) 11.
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tively ensure that all economic, social and cultural rights can be enjoyed in
practice without any discrimination, it is in breach of the ESCR.169
The list of prohibited grounds is the same as in articles 2 and 26 of the
CCPR. Reference can therefore be made to what was submitted above with
regard to articles 2 and 26 of the CCPR. On the other hand, unlike Art. 2(2)
of the CCPR, Art. 2(2) of the CESCR explicitly employs the notion of ‘dis-
crimination’. The criteria used for a legitimate differentiation must be rea-
sonable and objective, and the differentiation is to be aimed to achieve a
purpose that is legitimate under the CESCR. Affirmative or other preferen-
tial action is not prohibited by the Article; quite to the contrary, it is in some
instances required. For example, the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights170 has submitted that regarding people with disabilities:
‘... the obligation in the case of such a vulnerable and disadvan-
taged group [people with disabilities] is to take positive action to
reduce structural disadvantages and to give appropriate preferen-
tial treatment to people with disabilities in order to achieve the
objectives of full participation and equality within society for all
169In its General Comment No. 5 Persons with disabilities, adopted at the Eleventh
session (1994), para. 11, for example, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights(CESCR) has noted that also non-public entities, such as private employers and
private suppliers of goods and services, should be subject to both nondiscrimination and
equality norms, especially given the increasing privatisation of public services.
170General Comment No. 5 paras 9 and 18.
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persons with disabilities. Such actions are not to be considered
discriminatory in the sense of Art. 2 (2) as long as they are based
on the principle of equality and are employed only to the extent
necessary to achieve that objective.’
The CESCR itself does not contain a definition of ‘discrimination’, and
neither has the CESCR Committee provided such a general definition. The
CESCR Committee has, however, defined discrimination on the basis of dis-
ability as follows:
‘For the purposes of the Covenant, “disability-based discrimina-
tion” may be defined as including any distinction, exclusion, re-
striction or preference, or denial of reasonable accommodation
based on disability which has the effect of nullifying or impair-
ing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of economic, social or
cultural rights.’
From the foregoing, we see that the definition provided by the CESCR Com-
mittee has been greatly influenced by the definition employed by the Hu-
man Rights Committee, which is a positive matter as this contributes to
the coherence of human rights law.171 It has been submitted that for all
practical purposes the definition of discrimination adopted by the Human
171As it will be noted below, the definition used by the Human Rights Committee, for
its part, is based on the definition in CEDAW.
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Rights Committee is, mutatis mutandis, applicable also in regard of Art. 2 of
the CESCR.172 However, given that Art. 2 of the CESCR is not self-standing
but accessory to the other rights enunciated in the CESCR, there might arise
situations where discrimination in the social, economic and cultural sphere
does not amount to discrimination in the enjoyment of any of the rights
enshrined in the CESCR. Paradoxically, it has been observed, such discrimi-
nation would thus be prohibited under Art. 26 of the ICCPR but not CESCR
itself.173
In addition to the general guarantee against discrimination discussed above,
the CESCR separately underlines the need to take positive measures to
achieve equal enjoyment by men and women of all economic, social and cul-
tural rights in Art. 3:
‘The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to en-
sure the equal rights of men and women to the enjoyment of
all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the present
Covenant.’
Particularly on the protection of women’s rights against discrimination, Art. 1
of CEDAW defines discrimination as follows:
‘For the purposes of the present Convention, the term “discrim-
172Makonnen (n 139) 13.
173Makonnen (n 139) 13.
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ination against women” shall mean any distinction, exclusion or
restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or pur-
pose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or ex-
ercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis
of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any
other field’.
From the above, we see that Art. 1 of CEDAW provides a comprehensive
definition of discrimination that is applicable to all provisions of CEDAW and
covers acts falling within the private sphere. The words ‘irrespective of their
marital status’ indicate that the elimination of discrimination on the grounds
of marital status is a goal in addition to, and separate from, elimination of
discrimination on the grounds of sex.174
It should also be observed that the definition in Art. 1(1) is put into use in
the substantive provisions of CEDAW. In Art. 2, for example, States parties
undertake, inter alia, to adopt appropriate legislative and other measures
prohibiting all discrimination against women and to ensure through compe-
tent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection
of women against any act of discrimination. Discrimination is not to be
prohibited only with regard to those rights and freedoms that are explicitly
mentioned in CEDAW, but in respect of all human rights and fundamen-
174Makonnen (n 139).
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tal freedoms, in accordance with the definition in Art. 1.175 In terms of
Art. 2 (e) states undertake to take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women by any person, organisation or enterprise. It
is thus not enough to strive for ‘vertical’ gender equality of the individual
woman vis-a-vis public authorities, but states must also work to secure non-
discrimination at the ‘horizontal’ level, including such semi-public areas as
employment and provision of services, and even to some extent the family.
As noted by the Committee on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination
against Women176:
‘[u]nder general international law and specific human rights covenants,
States may also be responsible for private acts if they fail to act
with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate
and punish acts of violence, and for providing compensation.’
In its General Recommendation No. 19, the Committee observed that the:
‘definition of discrimination includes gender-based violence, that
is, violence that is directed against a woman because she is a
woman or that affects women disproportionately’.
175States parties to the Convention must take steps to eliminate discrimination in both
public and private spheres.
176General Recommendation No. 19 Violence against women, Eleventh session (1992),
para. 9.
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In an individual case of domestic violence against a woman, a state is in
breach of its international obligations under CEDAW if it has not taken
appropriate measures to ensure the effective protection of women from such
violence. CEDAW goes beyond the traditional public sphere in Art. 2(f), in
which states undertake to take all appropriate measures, including legislation,
to modify or abolish not just existing discriminatory laws and regulations,
but also such customs and practices which constitute discrimination against
women.
In addition to the above, Art. 4 of CEDAW recognizes that the adoption
by States of special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between
men and women or at protecting maternity shall not be considered discrim-
ination. It is thus acknowledged that even if women are provided equality
before the law (de jure equality), as exemplified by the approach of Art. 1,
this does not automatically guarantee that they will in reality be treated
equally (de facto equality) and thus affirmative action is needed to remedy
existing discrimination. While the CEDAW Committee has noted that sig-
nificant progress has taken place, it also noted that much remains to be done
in order to achieve equality in fact. Hence it recommended in its General
Recommendation No. 5177 that:
‘State parties make more use of temporary special measures such
as positive action, preferential treatment or quota systems to ad-
177General Recommendation No. 5 (Temporary special measures), adopted at its seventh
session (1988) para. 21.
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vance women’s integration into education, the economy, politics
and employment’.
Thus, according to the above provision, the appropriateness of any special
measure should thus be evaluated with regard to the actual existence of
discriminatory practices. These special measures aimed at achieving de facto
equality have to be temporary in character, and must not be put in place
as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate standards between
women and men.
Furthermore, the basic legal norm of CEDAW is the prohibition of all forms
of discrimination against women. This norm cannot be satisfied merely by the
enactment of gender-neutral laws.178 In addition to demanding that women
be accorded equal rights with men, CEDAW goes further by prescribing the
measures to be taken to ensure that women everywhere are able to enjoy the
rights to which they are entitled. It has also been noted that CEDAW has
distinctive features that makes it different from other international instru-
ments that proscribe discrimination.179 Firstly, it addresses discrimination
178See, for example, general prohibitions of non-discrimination provisions in Articles
55(c) as read with 56 of the UN Charter which obligates all members of the UN to take
joint and separate action to, among things, promote ‘universal respect for, and observance
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language or religion.
179Byrnes A ‘The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against
Women’ in Wolfgang B, Kisaakye EM and Oberleitner G (eds) Human Rights of Women:
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against women and not sex.180 It has been applauded that it provides a
rights-oriented framework for development that is essential to the full recog-
nition of women’s contributions and participation in economic, political, so-
cial and cultural life.181 It is submitted that the rights-based framework is
precisely important because under customary family laws women are viewed
as possessing no rights.
On the regional level, the rights of women were first protected by the
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR).182 Art. 2 of the
Charter reads as follows:
‘Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights
and freedoms recognised and guaranteed in the present Charter
without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national
and social origin, fortune, birth or other status’.
Additional protection of women against discrimination in the Charter can
also be found in Art. 3 (1) and (2)183 and 18 (3). Furthermore, the regional
protection is extended by the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights
international instruments and African experiences (2002) 120.
180As above.
181As above.
182The Charter was ratified by Malawi in 1989.
183Art. 3 (1) and (2) of the Charter provides that ’every individual shall be equal before
the law and shall be entitled to equal protection of law.
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of Women in Africa (the Protocol).184 It was promulgated out of concern by
the AU that despite the ratification of the ACHPR and other international
human rights instruments by its member states, women in Africa continue
to be victims of discrimination and harmful practices.185 The Protocol has
been applauded as an interesting document which goes further than CEDAW
in terms of the content.186 It contains provisions relating to the elimination
of harmful practices including the prohibition, through legislative measures
backed by sanctions, of all forms of genital mutilation.187
It is, however, noteworthy that the Protocol has taken a step further than
mere non-discrimination provisions in most international human rights in-
struments, which usually only focus on proscribing discrimination against
women generally as a class on the basis of sex.188 What is particularly re-
184The Protocol was adopted by the Assembly of the Heads of State and Governments of
the African Union (hereinafter the “AU”) at its second ordinary session, on 11th July 2003
in Maputo, Mozambique. This was in line with Art. 66 of the ACHPR, which was adopted
in 1981 and came into force in 1986. The Protocol came into force on 25th November 2005,
upon receiving the requisite 15 ratifications.
185See Preamble to the Protocol.
186Murray R, 2004, 151.
187Art. 5 of the Protocol.
188See Art. 1 (f) of the Protocol which provides:
‘Discrimination against women means any distinction, exclusion or restric-
tion or any differential treatment based on sex whose objectives or effects
compromise or destroy the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, re-
gardless of their marital status, of human rights and fundamental freedoms
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markable about this categorisation of the women deserving of this special
protection, is the Protocol’s responsiveness to the African perception of vul-
nerable women and the reasons for their vulnerability. Thus while widows
may not be viewed as a vulnerable class in other regions, the Protocol has
singled them out as needing special protection through, for instance, States’
enactment of laws proscribing their subjection to inhuman, degrading or hu-
miliating treatment.189 This provision, it is submitted, responds to Africa’s
concerns where widows are concerned, as for instance, they are often sub-
jected to cultural practices which undermine their human dignity, such as
widow inheritance190 and widow cleansing,191 which are, for example, still
rampant in Malawi.192
The provision also protects the widow’s right to custody of her children, as
well as to the matrimonial property, which are outstanding issues of concern
where women are concerned.193
in all spheres of life’. [Emphasis added]
189See Art. 20 of the Protocol.
190This is a practice whereby a brother or male relative of a deceased person marries the
deceased’s widow.
191This is a practice whereby a brother or other male relative of a deceased person has
sexual intercourse with the deceased’s widow.
192A full discussion of this will be provided in Chapter 4 when discussing conflicts between
the Bill of Rights and customary family laws.
193On the prevalence, see report by the Malawi Human Rights Commission (MHRC)
Cultural practices and their impact on the enjoyment of human rights, particularly women
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Looking at the scope of principles of equality and non-discrimination in
the family, international human rights instruments specifically prescribe the
content of equal rights in the family, imposing an obligation upon states to
make substantive interventions into the world of the home and family.194 Re-
gional human rights instruments similarly call for recognition and protection
of the family life.195
Similar guarantees may be found in CEDAW which also contains guaran-
tees of equality before and under the law, and of equality in marriage and
family law.196 The provisions of CEDAW, and in particular the requirements
that State parties modify or amend customary laws that constitute discrimi-
nation against women, as earlier on discussed under Section 3.3.1,197 provide
a radical challenge to laws that regulate customary marriages in Malawi. In
its general recommendation on marriage and family relations,198 CEDAW
and children (2005) 69. See also White S et al Dispossessing the Widow: Gender Based
Violence in Malawi (2002) 21-29; 49-87.
194See, for example, Art. 16(1) of the UDHR, Art. 23 (1) of the CCPR, and Art. 10 (1) of
the CESCR. See also Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 19 on Protection of
the Family, the Right to Marriage and Equality of Spouses (Art. 3, 27 July 1990 (Thirty-
nineth session 1990) HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7.
195See, for example Art. 18 of the ACHPR; Art. 17(1) of the American Convention
Human Rights 1969, 1114 UNTS 123; and Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights 1950, 213 UNTS 221.
196Art. 16 of CEDAW.
197Art. 2 (f) of CEDAW.
198CEDAW General Recommendation (1994) No. 21, para. 13. As earlier noted, un-
der Art. 21 of CEDAW, the CEDAW Committee has the power to make suggestions and
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makes clear that:
‘The form and concept of the family can vary from State to
State and even between regions within a State. Whatever form
it takes, and whatever the legal system, religion, custom or tra-
dition within the country, the treatment of women in the family
both at law and in private must accord with the principles of
equality and justice for all people, as Art. 2 of the Convention
requires.’
On the regional level, the Protocol has provisions on family relations, in-
cluding marriage,199 divorce and separation,200 inheritance,201 and rights of
widows,202 that closely mirror those found in CEDAW.
From the above discussion on the scope of the principles of equality and
non-discrimination, equality and non-discrimination have been illustrated as
more than just a matter of treating everyone identically: formal equality and
general recommendations to state parties. These recommendations elaborate its under-
standing of particular articles of the CEDAW, or of how the CEDAW applies to thematic
issues, such as violence against women. Though the general recommendations are not
binding interpretations of the CEDAW, they are however, considered as influential inter-
pretations of it.
199Art. 6 (c) of the Protocol.
200Art. 7 (c) of the Protocol.
201Art. 20 of the Protocol.
202Art. 20 of the Protocol.
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substantive equality are necessary. In the following subsection, therefore, a
brief discussion of the distinction between formal and substantive equality is
made.
3.4.2 Formal and substantive equality
Formal equality means sameness of treatment: the law must treat individuals
in the same manner regardless of their circumstances.203 In other words, for-
mal equality supports the view that a person’s individual physical or personal
characteristics should be viewed as irrelevant in determining whether they
have a right to some social benefit or gain. At the heart of most protagonists
of this model is the principle of merit. It is a principle that can be applied
either to a single individual, whose right to be treated on his or her own
merits can be viewed as a right of individual autonomy, or to a group, whose
members seek the same treatment as members of other, similarly situated
groups.204 Formal equality is defended in that it favours arbitrary decision-
making processes when policies or people selectively disadvantage others due
to a particular irrelevant trait.205
203See also De Waal J, Currie I and Erasmus G Bill of Rights 4th ed, (2001) 200 who
gives an example of educating all children according to the same school curriculum as a
conception of achieving formal equality. See also Bartlett KT and Harris A ‘Formal equal-
ity’ accessed at http://academic.udayton.edu/gender/02Unit/index.htm on 20/11/08.
204As above.
205Brest P ‘In defense of the Anti-discrimination Principle’ (1976) Harvard Law Review
1 at 1.
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What makes an issue about formal equality, however, is that the claim is
limited to treatment in relation to another, similarly situated individual or
group and does not extend beyond same-treatment claims to any demand
for some particular situation.206 Formal equality does not produce equal
results because of significant differences to avoid gender-related outcomes
that are considered unfair.207 Consequently, it has been noted that formal
equality applies to sex based classifications that discriminate against men
as well as those that discriminate against women.208 The goal in formal
equality terms is equal treatment for all, not just women. However, extending
formal equality principles to rules that discriminate against men or favour
women, might also be justified on the grounds that rules that appear to
benefit women instead promote attitudes and expectations about women,
including their dependency or status as victims, that disadvantage them
across a wide spectrum. Those who offer this rationale may favour formal
equality as a strategy, but in so far as their choice of this principle is based
on its woman-centered results or outcomes, they already have their foot in
the door of substantive equality, examined below.209
In view of the above discussion, the position adopted in this thesis is
that formal equality is not sufficient in order to address the concerns of
206Bartlett KT and Harris A ‘Substantive equality’ accessed at
http://academic.udayton.edu/gender/03Unit/index.htm on 20/11/08.
207As above.
208Bartlett and Harris (n 203).
209As above.
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women, in particular women married married under customary family laws.
As Charlesworth210 has put it, ‘the fundamental problem women face world-
wide is not discriminatory treatment compared to men. Women are in an
inferior position because they have no real power in either public or private
worlds’.211 It can thus be argued, human rights are not the only strategy to
address the problems of women married under customary family laws. The
structure of oppression and subordination of women needs to be analysed
from many angles. It needs, however, to be emphasised that one of the rea-
sons why formal equality is not sufficient to address the concerns of women
married under customary family laws is that it is not interpreted and applied
in a comprehensive and effective manner. As it will be shown in Chapter 7, in
some cases some magistrates and judges have used the provisions on equal-
ity and non-discrimination to enforce women’s rights while in other cases,
the interpretation has not been to the benefit of women. Moreover, the
problem with formal equality endorsed by Teson212 is that it offers equality
when women and men are in the same position, but it fails to address the
underlying causes of sex discrimination.
On the other hand, substantive equality requires the law to ensure that
210Charlesworth (n 19) 60-61.
211To illustrate, see discussion in Chapter 5 on the socio-economic factors that affect
women to enforce their human rights.
212Teson as cited by Charlesworth H ‘Feminists critiques of international law’ (1994-95)
Third world legal studies, 1 at 8.
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there is equality of outcome.213 It represents a departure from the traditional
notion of formal equality or treating likes alike and unlikes unlike. It is
partially based on a redistributive justice model, suggesting that measures
are taken to rectify past discrimination, because to fail to do so would leave
people and groups at different starting points. Advocates of substantive
equality demand that rules take into account of the significant differences in
the characteristics and circumstances of women and men to avoid gender-
related outcomes that are considered unfair.214 However, determining what
differences should be taken into account and in what ways or what is fair
is not always an easy matter. Thus, it has been observed that substantive
equality is not one theory, but several theories reflecting multiple types and
sources of difference and a number of alternative or overlapping substantive
ideals.215 One version to which Bartlett and Harris216 draws our attention is
an attempt to remedy the effects of past discrimination:
‘For example, women historically have been excluded either by
law or by gender role norms from having certain jobs excluded
wages comparable to those earned by men. Affirmative action
designed to boost women into occupational fields dominated his-
torically by men and comparable worth schemes designed to re-
213De Waal, Currie and Erasmus (n 203). See also Bartlett and Harris (n 206).
214As above.
215As above.
216As above.
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structure wage scales to eliminate the effects of past patterns of
gender-based job segregation are examples of remedial measures
designed to reverse the effects of this past discrimination.’
Another type of substantive equality focuses on biological differences be-
tween women and men. Only women become pregnant, for example, and
pregnancy may disadvantage a woman worker.217
CEDAW promotes the substantive model of equality and consolidates two
central approaches to equality. It stresses the importance of equality of op-
portunity in terms of women’s entitlements on equal terms with men to the
resources of the country. As earlier observed, the basic legal norm of CEDAW
is the prohibition of all forms of discrimination against women. This norm
cannot be satisfied merely by the enactment of gender-neutral laws.218 In ad-
dition to demanding that women be accorded equal rights with men, CEDAW
goes further by prescribing the measures to be taken to ensure that women
everywhere are able to enjoy the rights to which they are entitled.219
217As above.
218See for example general prohibitions of non-discrimination provisions in Articles 55(c)
as read with 56 of the UN Charter which obligates all members of the UN to take joint and
separate action to, among things, promote‘universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race sex, language or
religion.
219Division for the Advancement of Women accessed at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw on 15/10/04.
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Needless to say, the achievement of equality between men and women,
both formally and substantively, would influence women’s realisation of their
human rights. With regard to women married under customary family laws,
their bargaining power of choosing whom to marry, the number of children
to have in a family, and control over the property they acquire, would be
increased. Unfortunately, the gap between the formal guarantees and the
extent to which the rights are actually enjoyed in practice is frequently a
wide one.220
In view of the above, it is noteworthy that the Malawi Constitution, for
example, has made significant steps toward the attainment of formal equal-
ity between men and women.221 However, substantive equality continues to
remain a remote possibility where women are concerned. As it will be illus-
trated in Chapter 5, the majority of women continue to generally operate
from disadvantaged positions in various aspects.
3.5 Conclusion
This Chapter has demonstrated that the conflicts of values arising from
world-wide implementation of international human rights instruments oc-
220Byrnes A ‘Towards More Effective Enforcement of Women’s Human Rights Through
the use of International Human Rights Law and Procedures’ in Cook RJ (ed) Human
Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives (1994) 190 at 190.
221See Section 20 of the Malawi Constitution.
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cupy a central position within family and women’s law. Whether and to
what extent an absolute hierarchy of values should be established at the
level of substantive international and domestic law is today a contested is-
sue. Proponents of universalism tend to argue in favour of the establishment
of a more absolute hierarchy of values. Cultural relativists deny the existence
of overarching values. As it will be noted in Chapter 6, which discusses law
reform in the area of customary family laws, it is also an area of law that
epitomises the debate on whether a uniform or plural marriage and family
law is the best path to pursue in order to improve the position of women mar-
ried under African customary family laws. On the one hand, the creation of
equality in marriage by means of legal unification and abolition of polygamy
by law, for example, may imply that entitlements and obligations guaranteed
by membership of the family group are fragmented or undermined. On the
other hand, the recognition of family based customs and values may imply vi-
olating women’s right to equality. What is clear is that there is a plethora of
human rights norms which call for state intervention in the domestic sphere.
Moreover, those norms make clear that men and women are to have equal
rights within marriage and at its end.
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Chapter 4
Conflicts between African
customary family laws and the
Bill of Rights in Malawi
4.1 Introduction
The question of what impact the Bill of Rights has on African customary
laws in Malawi cannot be adequately answered if customary family laws that
are incompatible with the Bill of Rights and international standards on the
protection of women’s rights, as discussed in Chapter 3, are not discussed.
For this reason, this Chapter explores the nature of women’s rights abuses
based on cultural relativism by discussing how the Bill of Rights and inter-
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national standards conflicts with a plethora of principles, rules and practices
relating to customary family laws in Malawi. However, due to the wealth of
material, the discussion of African customary family laws that are at variance
with the Bill of Rights will be limited to certain basic principles pertinent
to our discussion. These will be in the area of African customary rules that
govern marriage, divorce and inheritance in Malawi.
Before I proceed to the main discussion, I first present the geographical
location of the main tribes of Malawi so that the rules and practices that
will be discussed are put in perspective. For the same reason, I discuss
forms of marriages. The main theme of this section is an elucidation of the
conflicts between the Bill of Rights and international human rights standards
on the one hand and customary marriage laws. However, in tandem with and
sometimes tangential to, customary marriage laws are practices and rules
that are applicable to sex and sex related rituals. I present these and discuss
how they confront the values inherent in the Bill of Rights and international
human rights standards.
This Chapter is divided into six sections. The second section presents the
geographical location of the main tribes of Malawi. The third section presents
an overview of the forms of customary marriages in Malawi. An understand-
ing of African customary family laws is not possible without knowledge of
the forms in which customary marriages are contracted. Therefore, its dis-
cussion is important. The fourth section gives an account of the principles
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and practices governing customary marriages in Malawi.1 Both matrilineal2
and patrilineal3 marriages will be examined with a view to revealing the tra-
ditional values implicit in them that are incompatible with the Bill of Rights.
The focus will be on the essential requirements to validate a marriage and the
rights and obligations flowing from a customary marriage. The fifth section
will look at the issue of divorce. The fifth section looks at inheritance. The
last section contains the conclusion.
4.2 Geographical location of main tribes of
Malawi
As previously noted in Chapter 2, Malawi is not a homogeneous country. It
consists of different tribes whose origins go back to a historical ancestor or
1Marriage, according to Banda F Women, Law and Human Rights: An African Per-
spective (2005) 93, being an almost universal starting point in any discussion on family
law, seems a good place to begin consideration of the content of the customary family law
systems. With regard to law reform, which will be discussed in Chapter 6, it is only when
we appreciate what the prevailing laws governing customary marriages are like that we
will be able to appreciate the changes proposed by the law reformers to advance the rights
of women married under these laws.
2‘Matrilineal customary marriages’ refers to all customary marriages that trace their
descent line through female relatives.
3‘Patrilineal customary marriages’ refers to all customary marriages that trace their
descent line through male relatives.
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ancestress.4 Generally, for purposes of customary family laws, these tribes
are divided into two categories: matrilineal and patrilineal.5 The matrilineal
tribes are mostly found in twenty districts of the central and southern re-
gions, viz, Dedza, Dowa, Kasungu, Lilongwe, Mchinji6, Nkhotakota, Ntheu,
Ntchisi, Salima, Blantyre, Chikwawa, Chiradzulu, Machinga, Mangochi, Mu-
lanje, Mwanza, Thyolo, Zomba, Balaka and Phalombe. The patrilineal tribes
are mostly to be found in all of the six districts that are in the northern region
and Nsanje, the only patrilineal district in the southern region.7 However,
for a detailed description of the social organisation of Malawian tribes, see
the discussion by Ibik.8
4Von Benda-Beckmann F Legal pluralism in Malawi: Historical development 1858-1970
and emerging issues (2007) 81.
5Chigawa M Customary law and social development: de jure marriages vis-a vis de
facto marriages at customary law in Malawi (Unpublished) (1987) 3.
6Mtika MM and Doctor HV Matriliny, patriliny, and wealth
flows in rural Malawi African Sociological Review (2000) accessed at
http://www.codesria.org/Links/Publications/ asr6-2full/mtika.pdf
on 26/11/06, have shown that this district is in transition to the patrilineal system.
7White S at el Dispossessing the Widow: Gender based Violence in Malawi (2002) ix.
8Ibik JO Restatement of African Law: Malawi Vol 1, The law of marriage and divorce
(1970).
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4.3 Forms of customary marriages
As pointed out above, in Malawi there are two forms of customary marriages,
namely, patrilineal and matrilineal marriages.9 As a general rule all custom-
ary marriages, whether matrilineal or patrilineal, are contracted according
to the customary law of the parties.10 A discussion of the formation and
dissolution of these customary marriages has already received considerable
attention in the literature.11 It is, therefore, not necessary to provide details,
but only a summary of the main ideas relating to the two forms of customary
marriages.
4.3.1 Matrilineal customary marriages
The matrilineal customary marriages can be grouped into chikamwini and
chitengwa.12 In chikamwini marriages the man moves to the wife’s village
9Chigawa (n 5) 3.
10Generally customary laws require that the intending spouses must be of marriageable
age and that they should be in a good state of mind. For a detailed discussion see Himonga
C Family and Succession Laws in Zambia (1995) 75. The same issues are equally important
in Malawi.
11See, for example, Ibik (n 8); Chigawa (n 5); Koyana DS, Mwambene L and Bekker JC
Customary Marriage Systems in Malawi and South Africa (2007); Bekker JC Seymour’s
Customary Law in Southern Africa (1989); and White (n 7).
12Ngwira N Women’s property and inheritance rights and the land reform process in
Malawi (2003) 6,
153
 
 
 
 
and has only a few rights there.13 Lineage is traced through the woman.14 In-
heritance of property passes through the female line. Similarly, in Tanzania’s
matrilineal societies property is inherited through the wife’s lineage.15
In addition to the above, women under matrilineal system have custodial
ownership of land. This position is contrasted to Tanzania’s matrilineal so-
cieties where, as noted by Butegwa,16 women do not have effective control
or ownership of the family land. It should also be noted that in matrilineal
systems children ‘belong’17 to the woman and remain under the guardianship
of the wife’s eldest brother.18 A woman’s child inherits from her brother’s
property. Upon death of a man, the wife and children continue to live at the
place of their abode and continue to use the land. When a woman dies, the
accessed at http://www. sarpn.org.za/documents/doooo585/
p522-Malawi-property-rights.pdf on 19/10/06. See also Ntata P and Sinoya C Customary
law and the UN conventions on women and children (Unpublished) (1999) 14.
13Von Benda-Beckmann (n 4) 89.
14Phiri KM ‘Some Changes in the Matrilineal Family system among the Chewa of
Malawi since the Nineteeth Century’ (1983) The Journal of African History 257 at 258.
15Butegwa F ‘Using the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights to Secure
Women’s Access to Land in Africa’ in Cook RJ (ed) Human Rights of Women: National
and International Perspectives (1994) 495 at 497.
16As above.
17The word ‘belong’ is used to mean that rights and obligations toward the children in
a matrilineal society accrues to the woman.
18Mandala E ‘Capitalism, kinship and Gender in the Lower Tchiri (Shire) Valley of
Malawi, 1860-1960: An Alternative Theoretical Framework’ (1984) African Economic His-
tory 137 at 139. See also Phiri (n 14) 258-259.
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husband returns to his home. Compared to patrilineal tribes, Von Benda-
Beckmann notes that the woman has a much stronger position vis a vis her
husband.19
In chitengwa marriages too the above rules apply. There are, however,
points of difference. In chitengwa (matrilineal) marriages the woman goes
to live in the man’s village, but the children still belong to the woman’s
lineage.20 Upon the death of the husband, the widow and children return to
the widow’s village of origin. Therefore, matrilineal is similar to patrilineal’s
lobola system in other respects.
4.3.2 Patrilineal customary marriages
Whilst in chikamwini matrilineal marriages residence is in the woman’s vil-
lage, under the patrilineal marriage systems the matrimonial residence is in
the man’s village. The wife leaves her village and resides in her husband’s
village. The man pays lobola to the wife’s father/guardian. The payment of
lobola21 establishes his right to take his wife and children to his own village,
signifies that the man owns all the property, and makes the children of the
19See n 13 above.
20Ngwira (n 12) 6 and Phiri (n 14) 262.
21This will be discussed later in this Chapter when examining how it conflicts with the
Bill of Rights.
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marriage legitimate.22
It should also be noted that whilst in matrilineal tribes descent is from the
oldest brother of the wife, in a patrilineal system descent is also through males
but from the husband’s side.23 Daughters are expected to get married and live
in their husbands’ villages. Therefore, they cannot inherit property.24 Thus,
some commentators have argued that the patrilocal nature of the marriage
and payment of lobola in patrilineal tribes, place the man in a position to
enjoy a superior status without any qualification.25 It should also be noted
that, unlike in the matrilineal system where children belong to the wife and
her kin, in the patrilineal system children of the family belong to the man
and his kinsmen.
4.4 Rules and practices governing customary
marriages
This section examines some rules and practices related to customary mar-
riage which are incompatible with the Bill of Rights, as well as international
22Ngwira (n 12) 6. See also Armstrong A et al ‘Towards a cultural understanding of
the interplay between children’s and women’s rights: An Eastern and Southern African
perspective’ (1995) The International Journal of Children’s Rights 333 at 345.
23Ibik (n 8) 79. See also Armstrong (n 22) 355.
24Ngwira (n 12) 7.
25White (n 7) 56.
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standards for the protection of women’s rights in Malawi.
All customary marriage laws recognise as essential to the validity of the
marriage compliance with the following: the parties must have attained the
age of puberty; consent of the parents of a woman must have been given to the
marriage; in patrilineal societies lobola must be paid by a man to the woman’s
parents or other relatives who are her guardians; in matrilineal systems there
must have been a chinkhoswe; and the woman must be unmarried.
There is, however, no precise age when one attains puberty and may marry
under the customary marriage laws in Malawi.26 In the following subsections,
an examination of these rules is pursued.
4.4.1 Consent
Art. 16 (1) (a) and (b) of CEDAW27 concern the goal of equality at the point
of entering marriage. One of the key issues on this provision is consent: Do
women have the same degree of freedom to give consent to a marriage as
men?
Under customary family laws, consent to a customary marriage by parents
of a woman is strictly adhered to whether the marriage is taking place be-
26This position has to be contrasted to civil law where there is a fixed age as to when
one can marry.
27For a full quotation of the provision, see Chapter 3.
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tween a minor or not.28 Traditionally the consent of the father in patrilineal
tribes or the maternal uncle in matrilineal tribes was not a decision of that
of the guardian as an individual. The whole family considered the matter
since the issue of marriage concerned the whole family. In some instances
it concerned the whole village.29 This position, it could be argued, robs a
woman of the opportunity for her to enter into marriage autonomously.
Furthermore, where women, particularly young girls, are forced by their
families to marry men who have chosen them, the issue of choice is also not
exercised. In addition to the above, in some cultures, the question arises as
to whether the widow is free to refuse to be inherited by a brother to her
deceased husband or not.30 Polygamy also raises significant questions about
equality and choice.31
It should, however, be noted that the requirement of consent in respect of
customary law marriages has to be contrasted with that for civil marriages
where consent of parents or guardians is only required when one is marrying
below the age of 21.32 Commenting on this difference, Bennett33 states that
28Ibik JO The Law of Marriage in Nyasaland 524 as cited by Von Benda-Beckmann (n
4) 86. See also discussion by Armstrong (n 22) 362.
29Ibik, as above.
30For a full discussion on widow inheritance see subsection 4.5.1 of this Chapter.
31See discussion in subsection 4.4.2 of this Chapter.
32See Section 11 (b) of the Marriage Act, Chapter 25:01. See also Section 24 of the
South African Marriage Act No. 25 of 1961.
33Bennett TW Human Rights and African Customary Law under the South African
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‘while a civil or Christian union is exclusively the concern of the spouses and
depends for its validity on their consent, a customary marriage is an alliance
of two families, for which the co-operation of the spouses is desirable, but
not essential’. To understand this customary family rule, the definition of
customary marriage by Bekker34 is instructive. A customary marriage is
defined as ‘· · · a relationship that concerns not only the husband and wife,
but also the family groups to which they belonged before the marriage.’
Thus the consummation of a customary marriage brings into being recip-
rocal rights and obligations between the spouses for which their respective
family groups are collectively responsible.
On the other hand, Section 22 (3) of the Malawi Constitution guarantees
all men and women the right to marry and found a family. A similar provision
is also to be found in several international instruments and regional human
rights instruments to which Malawi is a party.35 It is, however, noted that
Sections 22 (6) and 22 (4) of the Malawi Constitution set restrictions for
entry into marriage. It is, therefore, submitted that these sections provide
limitations to Section 22 (3) of the Malawi Constitution.
Section 22 (6) of the Malawi Constitution provides that ‘no person over the
Constitution (1995) 113.
34Bekker (n 11) 96.
35See, for example, Art. 16 (1) of the UDHR. It provides that ‘men and women · · · have
a right to marry and found a family · · · ’; Art. 17 and 23 of the ICCPR; Art. 10 of the
ICESCR; Art. 16 of CEDAW; and Art. 18, 27 and 29 of the ACHPR.
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age of eighteen years shall be prevented from entering into marriage’. This
means that every person over 18 years is at liberty to marry. The opposite is
also true of those who are below 18 years. They lack legal capacity to enter
into marriage. On the other hand, Section 22 (4) is to the effect that for
those who are 18 years and above, marriage shall take place only with their
free and full consent.36
It is, therefore, submitted that the legal requirement of consent by a
guardian37 to a customary marriage conflicts with a number of women’s rights
in the following ways. First, if the guardian withholds his consent to a woman
who is older than 18 years, this would be in conflict with Section 22 (3) of
the Malawi Constitution which, as noted in the preceding paragraph, grants
every person the right to marry. This customary law requirement, therefore,
diminishes a woman’s status since it effectively relegates her to a position of
a legal minor rather than a mature adult. Furthermore, in view of Section 22
(4) of the Malawi Constitution, a marriage which requires the consent of the
village or a marriage guardian, conflicts with the right to enter into marriage
with a woman’s free and full consent.
Secondly, if the guardian gives his consent to a girl who is younger than 18
36Section 22 (4) of the Malawi Constitution is similar to Art. 16 (1) (b) of CEDAW that
states that ‘women should also enjoy the right to freely choose and enter into marriage
only with their free and full consent’.
37It should be noted that ‘guardian’ is used interchangeably with the parents of the
woman intending to marry under customary laws.
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years, this would be in conflict with Section 22 (6) that sets the marrying age
at 18. Fourthly, this would also be an infringement of her personal freedom.38
From the above analysis we see that the customary law rule in Malawi
that no marriage can be contracted without the consent of the guardian is at
variance with the Bill of Rights and international human rights instruments
aimed at protecting women’s rights to equality and choice.
4.4.2 Polygamy
Conflicts over whether polygamy constitutes a violation of women’s rights or
is in fact a ‘good’ system that protects them, have been an on-going debate
for a long period of time.39 Those who are against polygamy point to the fact
that the custom is degrading to women and violates their rights to equal-
ity with men. This view finds support within the human rights paradigm,
which does not condone polygamy.40 Those who support the continuation
of the practice of polygamy argue that rather than violating women’s rights,
polygamy may facilitate their enjoyment.41 Banda42 further notes that the
38See Section 19 of the Malawi Constitution.
39Banda (n 1) 116.
40See, for example, CEDAW General Recommendation No. 21 para. 21; Art. 6 (c) of
the African Protocol on Women’s Rights.
41Nhlapo ‘African Family Law under an Undecided Constitution: the Challenge for Law
Reform in South Africa’ as cited by Banda (n 1) 116.
42As above.
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intensity of the debate over polygamy has not lessened with time, pointing
to the debates held during the drafting of the Protocol in which Art. 6 (c)
of the Protocol was reached as a compromise.
As earlier noted, both matrilineal and patrilineal customary marriages in
Malawi are potentially polygamous.43 The husband is allowed to marry more
than one wife.44 On the other hand, a married woman is barred from con-
tracting further marriages for as long as she remains legally married.45 Con-
curring with Kamchedzera,46 customary laws favour the husband with regard
to sexuality.
In Malawi the prevalence of this practice is demonstrated by a study con-
ducted by the MHRC47 which shows that polygamy is still a common practice
in all areas.48 The study shows that about 98 percent of the respondents in-
terviewed stated that polygamy is still practised in their areas. It has also
been established that 17 percent of all women in Malawi are in polygamous
unions.49
43See Mphumeya v Republic as cited by Kamchedzera GS ‘Malawi: Improving family
welfare’ (1993-1994) Journal of Family Law 369 at 372. As noted by Bekker (n 11) 126,
this is also similar to the patrilineal customary marriages of South Africa.
44Ibik (n 8) 191.
45See Msowoya v Milanzi, Civil Appeal Case No. 99 of 1979, NTAC (Unreported).
46Kamchedzera (n 43) 374
47MHRC Cultural practices and their impact on the enjoyment of human rights, partic-
ularly women and children (Unpublished) (2005) 18.
48The study covered 10 of the 27 administrative districts in Malawi.
49WLSA Malawi and SARDC WIDSAA, Beyond inequalities 2005: Women in Malawi
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In other African countries a 1995 survey of eight anglophone countries
established prevalence rates of married women in polygamous marriages as
follows: in Ghana, approximately 28 percent; in Kenya, 19.5 percent; in
Nigeria, 42.6 percent; and in Zimbabwe one in five married Zimbabwean
women and the average union was found to consist of 2.3 wives per man.50
In South Africa, a study by Govender51 shows that only 6 percent of the
women interviewed were married to men who had more than one wife.
More interesting to note is that the MHRC study also found that strong
support for the continuation of the practice came from women respondents.52
(2005) 19-20.
50The Centre for Reproductive Law and Policy and FIDA-(K), Women of the World:
Laws and Policies Affecting their Reproductive Lives - Anglophone Africa as cited by
Kisaakye EM ‘Women, Culture and Human Rights: Female Genital Mutilation, Polygamy
and Bride Price’ in Wolfgang B, Kisaakye EM and Oberleitner G (eds) Human Rights of
Women: international instruments and African experiences (2002) 268 at 277.
51Govender P The status of women married in terms of African customary law: A study
of women’s experiences in the Eastern Cape and Western Cape Provinces (Unpublished)
(2000) 32.
52This finding has to be contrasted with the Malawi Law Commission Report on the
Review of Marriage and Divorce Laws in Malawi (2005) 29 which found, during the re-
gional consultations, ninety five percent of the respondents cited more disadvantages than
advantages of polygamy and had voiced strong support for it to be abolished. The study
by Malawi Law Commission could be compared to the study by Govender (n 51) in South
Africa which shows that the predominant view (75 percent), reflected by most interviews,
was for the abolition of polygamy.
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Similarly, Kisaakye53 has also noted that support for the practice has been
voiced by some women.
This position, it could be argued, has a bearing on what impact the Bill of
Rights can have on discriminatory customary family laws. For polygamy to
be abolished, women have to acknowledge the oppressive nature of polygamy
and the inherent conflict it presents to equality.54
On the other hand, Sections 20 (1)and (2) of the Malawi Constitution
provide that:
‘Discrimination of persons in any form is prohibited and all per-
sons are, under any law, guaranteed equal and effective protection
against discrimination on grounds of race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, nationality, ethnic or social
origin, disability, property, birth or other status. Legislation may
be passed addressing inequality in society and prohibiting dis-
criminatory practices and the propaganda of such practices and
may render such practices criminally punishable by the courts’.
[Emphasis added]
The prohibition of discrimination on the ground of sex is, arguably, intended
to protect women. This position is also similar to that in terms of Con-
53Kisaakye (n 50) 279.
54See the discussion on the enforcement of constitutional rights in Chapter 5.
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stitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.55 On the other hand, by
including sex as a ground on which discrimination is not allowed, Section
20 of the Malawi Constitution leaves no doubt that no discrimination based
on being a woman will be tolerated. Moreover, in international law, sev-
eral international conventions, to which Malawi is a party, also proscribe
discrimination on the basis of sex.56
In a polygamous marriage, especially in a patrilineal system, the inequali-
ties between a man and a woman include the following: women bear children
but have no rights over them; women carry the burden of labour both within
and outside the house so that their husbands may prosper materially and
enhance their status; and property rights are vested in men.57 Most im-
portantly, a man unilaterally may introduce new wives to the family and
has many opportunities to marry, while each wife may have only one shared
husband.58 These practices, it is argued, go against a woman’s rights and
55See Section 9 (3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South African Constitution,
1996. It should, however, be noted that other constitutional provisions, for example,
Section 13(5) of the Constitution of Tanzania, as noted by Banda (n 1) 35, do not include
sex as one of the grounds on which discrimination is prohibited in their non-discrimination
clause.
56For example: Art. 2 and 7 of UDHR; Art. 2, 2(1), 3 and 20 of ICCPR; Art. 2, 2 (2)
and 3 of ICESCR; Art. 1 of CEDAW; and Art. 2, 19 and 28 of ACHPR.
57Mann K, ‘Marriage, status, and social change among the educated elite in colonial
Lagos’ 58 as cited by Kaganas F and Murray C ‘Law, Women and the Family: the Question
of Polygyny in a New South Africa’ (1991) Acta Juridica 116 at 127.
58Dlamini CRM ‘The Ultimate Recognition of the Customary Marriage in South Africa’
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freedoms as guaranteed by the Malawi Constitution.
With the coming of HIV/AIDS, polygamy also puts the women’s right to
health in jeopardy.59 Under Art. 12 of the CESCR state parties recognise
the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard
of physical and mental health. Given the attendant problems associated
with polygamy, including compromised rights to sex and to a relationship
generally, women are denied of their rights.60
In light of the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Malawi, polygamy also affects
women’s rights right to life. The conduct of a husband having multiple part-
ners increases women’s vulnerability to be infected with HIV. This position
is supported by Malawi Law Commission’s findings61 that some respondents
believed that ‘polygamy helps in the spread of HIV and AIDS as wives who
may feel lonely and neglected may turn to other men for the satisfaction of
their sexual needs. The implications of HIV and AIDS infection in a polyga-
mous family were considered quite serious as large numbers of a family may
be wiped out by the pandemic’.
Coming back to the theme of this Chapter, the practice of polygamy di-
rectly conflicts with Section 20 of the Malawi Constitution and international
instruments on the protection of women’s right to equality as it treats women
(1999) Obiter 14 at 32.
59Kisaakye (n 50) 279.
60As above.
61Malawi Law Commission (n 47) 29. See also Kisaakye, (n 50) 279.
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differently to men. Arguably, in both matrilineal and patrilineal marriage
systems, there is a prima facie case of unfair discrimination because women
are treated differently to men.
However, one can hardly suggest that the inequality would be addressed
if women were given the same opportunity to accumulate men as spouses.62
Concurring with Goody, the notion of one woman acting as a wife to more
than one man would indeed suggest greater oppression, not liberation.63
4.4.3 Lobola
In patrilineal systems payment of lobola by the bridegroom’s represented by
the bridegroom/guardian family members to the bride’s family as represented
by the bride’s guardian is a prerequisite for a valid marriage under African
customary law.64 Mofokeng65 defines lobola as:
‘An agreement between the family group of the prospective hus-
band and the family group of the prospective wife that on or
62Kaganas and Murray (n 57) 126.
63Goody J The Oriental, the Ancient and the Primitive: Systems of marriage and the
family in the pre-industrial societies of Eurasia 140 as cited by Kaganas and Murray (n
51) 127.
64Chigawa (n 5) 5.
65Mofokeng LL ‘The lobola agreement as the silent prerequisite for the validity of a cus-
tomary marriage in terms of the Recognition of Customary Marriage Act’ (2005) Tydskrif
vir Hedendaagse Romeins Hollandse Reg 277 at 278.
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before the marriage ceremony, there would be the transfer of
property from the family group of the husband, to the family
group of the wife in respect of the marriage’.
Although traditionally, lobola was given to the father of the bride, it ap-
pears that there are now cases where the mother of a woman, who may have
raised her daughter on her own, will receive the lobola for her. This is what
happened in the South African case of Mthembu v Letsela,66 where, inter alia,
the father-in-law of a woman whose husband had died questioned whether it
could be said that the woman had a customary marriage with his son, lobola
having been paid to her mother. The court replied in the affirmative.
In Malawi the prevalence of this practice is presented by the research find-
ings of MHRC. Of the people interviewed by MHRC, about 62 percent were in
support of the institution. Similarly, in South Africa, a study by Govender67
shows that 85 percent of the women interviewed indicated whole-hearted
support for the system of lobola.
It is important to note that under patrilineal marriages, failure to insti-
tute lobola negotiations renders the marriage void. As Dlamini68 has rightly
observed, Africans in general:
661997 (2) SA 936. Upheld on appeal 2000 (3) SA 867.
67Govender (n 51) 29.
68Dlamini CRM ‘The modern legal significance of ilobolo in Zulu society 149 as cited in
Mofokeng (n 65) 279.
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‘are unable to regard a relationship as a marriage even if there
can be compliance with all legal requirements if lobola has not
been delivered or an agreement for its delivery [has not been]
concluded’.
In the past lobola was paid only in the form of cattle. Nowadays money is
often acceptable too.69
Furthermore, it is important to note that for African patrilineal societies
lobola has a deeper cultural symbolism than the commercial meaning as-
cribed to it by its detractors.70 It underscores the fact that a customary
marriage creates an alliance not only between husband and wife but also be-
tween their respective families and kinships.71 It is the bedrock on which the
African family in patrilineal societies is based. From lobola arises reciprocal
rights and duties amongst the family groups concerned.72 For instance, the
male guardian who receives lobola does not only act as a mediator in cases
involving disputes between the parties to a marriage, he is also expected to
assist in stabilising the marriage by protecting the wife if she is mistreated,
deserted or neglected. In highlighting its significance in the African fam-
ily, Koyana, Mwambene and Bekker have rightly observed that lobola is the
‘great invention of customary law’ that adequately balances the interests of
69Chigawa (n 5) 5; Von Benda-Beckmann (n 4) 87; and White (n 7) 53.
70See the criticisms by White (n 7) 53.
71See Bekker (n 11) 151 and Banda (n 1) 108.
72Mofokeng (n 65) 282.
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the parties in a marriage.73 If it is established that a woman was persistently
treated cruelly and she refuses to go back to her husband, customary law
favours her. Lobola is forfeited.74 Lobola is also a token of appreciation by
the man’s side to a woman’s father/guardian for bringing up the woman to
marriageable age.75 Similar views were also expressed by Shenge, who noted
that in Zimbabwe lobola is also a token of appreciation by the bridegroom’s
side to the brides family.76
For purposes of our discussion, however, it is important to note that the
payment or non-payment of lobola has great legal significance for the rights of
women. It determines the rights that a man has over his wife and children.77
Custody over children depends on the fulfillment of the obligations under the
lobola agreement.78 A father and his family are entitled to the custody of any
children born out of the marriage as long as lobola was paid or where the wife’s
people are satisfied enough with the instalments not to question the validity
of the marriage. It is, however, to be noted that there is no similar customary
law that applies to the woman. In this instance, the customary law works to
73Koyana, Mwambene and Bekker (n 11) 32.
74As above.
75See research conducted by White (n 7) 53. See also Von Benda-Beckmann (n 4) 87.
76Shenje A ‘Balancing gender, equality, and cultural identity: Marriage payments in
post-colonial Zimbabwe’ (1996) Harvard Human Rights Journal 105 at 106. See also
Kisaakye (n 50) 281.
77See also Aiya v Aiya, Divorce Cause No. 8 of 1973 (Unreported) Ugandan case as cited
by Kisaakye (n 50) 281.
78See also Bekker (n 11) 234 and Armstrong (n 22) 348.
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the advantage of men. It has also been observed that, traditionally, children
were regarded as the most important, and sometimes the only, reason to
get married.79 The payment of lobola thus denies women all rights to their
children, as well as control over their lives.
It has, however, been noted that the rule that children ‘belonged’ to the
male line was a major cause of friction in colonial times with colonial officials
regarding it as repugnant that a child should be separated from its mother.80
Banda81 further contends that it was this ‘repugnance’ that resulted in the
introduction of the rule that a child under the age of 7 had to continue living
with its mother. In post-colonial states the presumption has been replaced
by the best interests principle articulated in Art. 3 of the CRC and Art. 4
of the Charter.82
In addition to the above, the privileged position of a husband, that comes
with the lobola institution, is also evident in the married persons’ property
relationships.83 Under patrilineal customary family laws, any property the
wife brought into the marriage, and which was part of the common household
is accredited to the husband. A wife does not have property rights. In the
lifetime of a husband, he has control. A wife cannot dispose of household
79Shenje (n 76) 106.
80Banda (n 1) 109.
81Banda (n 1) as above.
82See, for example, Section 28 of the Republic of South Africa Constitution 1996.
83Von Benda-Beckmann (n 4) 89.
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goods without the consent of her husband.84 A striking similarity to lack of
property rights of married women in patrilineal marriages is what Fredman85
draws our attention to. She noted that in post-feudal legal system:
‘Coverture gave the husband near-absolute control over the wife’s
property as well as her person. Married women were perpetual
minors, divested of the possibility of economic independence. Any
property which a married woman had owned as a single woman
became her husband’s property on marriage: personal property
vesting absolutely, real property during the lifetime of a husband.
Similarly, he had absolute rights to all property which came into
her hands during her marriage, including all her earned income’.
On the other hand, Sections 24 (1) (a) (ii) and (iii) of the Malawi Constitution
provide that:
‘(1) Women have the right to full and equal protection by the law,
and have the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of
their marital status which includes the right· · · (a) to be accorded
the same rights as men in civil law, including equal capacity;- · · ·
84As above. See also White (n 7) 58.
85Fredman S Women and Law (1997) 40, based on accounts by Blackstone W Commen-
taries on the Law of England (1809); Baker JH An Introduction to English Legal History
(1979), among others.
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(ii) to acquire and maintain rights in property, indepen-
dently or in association with others, regardless of their mari-
tal status; (iii) to acquire and retain custody, guardianship
and care of children and to have an equal right in the
making of decisions that affect their upbringing’ [Empha-
sis added].
It should be noted that the above constitutional provision is a unique one
and finds its parallels in Art. 16 (1) (c), (d) and (f) of CEDAW. At the same
time, lobola has often been criticised for being an institution of oppression
against women.86 Critics link women’s subordination and lack of strong voice
within marriage with the payment of lobola, which makes both the women and
their families of origin dependent on their abusive partners.87 Some critics
go so far as to say that lobola constructs women as property.88 Ironically, it
has been noted that this was also the view of colonial authorities who likened
it to purchase.89 People holding this view argue that to continue with the
practice is to perpetuate and encourage the subjugation of women.90
86White (n 7) 53.
87Banda (n 1) 110.
88Southern African Research and Documentation Centre (SARDC) Beyond Inequalities:
Women in Zambia as cited by Banda (n 1) 110.
89Kisaakye (n 50) 281.
90As above.
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It is, therefore, not surprising that Section 24 of the Malawi Constitution
guarantees an equal right to full and equal protection by law. Furthermore,
Section 22 (1) of the Malawi Constitution guarantees equality within the
family. It provides:
‘Each member of the family shall enjoy full and equal respect and
shall be protected by law against all forms of neglect, cruelty or
exploitation.’
Arguably, this constitutional provision can be used to address the inequality
that comes with the lobola institution.
Therefore, the legal significance of the cultural determination of the cus-
tody of children and of property rights depending on the institution of lobola,
clearly goes against women’s rights and freedom. It violates not only inter-
national standards91 to which Malawi is a party but also what the Malawi
Constitution provides in Sections 19, 20, 24 and 28.92
91See Art. 16 (1) (c), (d) and (f) of CEDAW.
92Section 28 provides for the right to property. See also White (n 7) 59.
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4.4.4 Child marriage
Child marriage is particularly problematic throughout the continent. Writing
on the child marriages in Africa, Poulter93 stated:
‘Marriages of girls under the age of 16 are not uncommon in
Africa. It is very unusual for African customary laws to specify a
minimum age for marriage. Rather it is left to parents to decide
when a girl is ready for marriage and the onset of puberty is often
regarded as the key pre-requisite’.
At international level, there has been several international attempts to
tackle the problem of child marriages, including the 1956 Slavery Conven-
tion,94 the UN Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age of Mar-
riage and Registration of Marriages 196295 and CEDAW.96 On the African
93Poulter S ‘African customs in an English setting: Legal and policy aspects of recog-
nition’ (1988) Journal of African Law 207 at 210.
94Art. 2 of the UN Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave
Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery 1956.
95This Convention did not actually set a minimum age for marriage, preferring to leave
it to individual states. However, the 1965 Recommendation on Consent to Marriage,
Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, UN GA Res. (1 November
1965) A/RES/2018 (XX) Principle II, as cited by Banda (n 1), sets the relatively low age
of 15 as the minimum.
96Art. 16 (2) of CEDAW. See also CEDAW General Recommendation No. 21 paras 36,
38, and 39.
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continent, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 1990
(the Charter) prohibits early marriage and specifies 18 as the legal age of
marriage97 and the Protocol on the Rights of African Women 2003 has also
specified a minimum age of marriage of 18 years.98
On the other hand, Sections 22 (6), (7) and (8) of the Malawi Constitution
regulate the age for entering into marriage. Subsection (6) provides that:
‘No person over the age of eighteen years shall be prevented from entering
into marriage’. This provision, it is submitted, sets the marrying age at 18
years.99 It can further be submitted that this constitutional provision is in-
tended to protect young girls against child marriages. However, subsection
(7) requires that those who are aged between 15 and 18 need parental con-
sent. By allowing persons of between 15 and 18 to enter into marriage with
the consent of their parents, the Malawi Constitution fails to categorically
prohibit child marriages.100 Subsection (8) discourages marriages between
persons where either of them is under the age of 15 years.101 This provision
97Art. 21 (2) of the Charter.
98Art. 6 (b) of the Protocol.
99See also Chirwa DM ‘A Full Loaf is Better than Half: The Constitutional Protection
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Malawi’ (2005) Journal of African Law 207 at
215.
100Similar sentiments were also expressed in Malawi Law Commission Constitutional
Review Programme: Consultative Paper (Undated) 21. See also Ntata and Sinoya (n 12)
13.
101Section 22 (8) of the Malawi Constitution provides that:
‘The State shall actually discourage marriage between persons where either
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suggests that marriage with a person younger than 15 years of age may be
permitted since the State is obliged only to discourage such a marriage and
not prohibit.102 The cumulative effect of Section 22 (8), as read with Section
23 of the Malawi Constitution that provides for the rights of children against
exploitation, however, is that children under 18 years of age should rather
not marry. Such an interpretation would be in accordance with the age of
majority as required by the international standards to which Malawi is a
party.
In respect of both matrilineal and patrilineal marriages there is no precise
age as to when one attains adulthood and may be able to marry under the
customary marriage laws of Malawi. The age of marriage is determined
by attainment of puberty.103 The graduation to adulthood is, in most cases,
attained when one has reached puberty and in some cases, after completing an
initiation ceremony.104 Puberty and completion of ceremonies is not directly
connected to age.105
of them is under the age of fifteen years’
.
102Section 22 (8) of the Malawi Constitution.
103See also a discussion by Bennett TW Customary Law in South Africa (2004) 304 for
a similar position with respect to the patrilineal marriages of South Africa.
104Puberty for girls is reached when one starts menstruating.
105Bennett (n 66) 304; Chigawa (n 5) 5 and Armstrong (n 22) 337-340.
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In addition to the above, some cultural practices encourage child marriages
in Malawi. These cultural practices are now discussed.
Chimeta masisi
Chimeta masisi means replacement of a deceased wife.106 It is a practice by
which a bereaved husband marries a younger sister or niece of his deceased
wife.107 In most parts where this practice is common, the MHRC found that
it is usually encouraged by parents who let their young daughters marry the
brother-in-law. In most cases, however, these young daughters try to run
away, but always end up being taken back. This, obviously, points to the
fact that they are forced into these marriages, otherwise there would not
be attempts to run away. Some parents, in areas where lobola is paid, do
this because they are afraid that the husband will ask for his lobola back.108
Others, it was established, do it because they think that the death of the
daughter will prevent them from accessing the wealth of the son-in-law.109
Yet other parents are said to do it because they would want to keep the
son-in-law in their family since he is of good character. And some think that
106MHRC (n 47) 22.
107According to the MHRC (n 47) study, 40 percent of the respondents reported that
replacement of a deceased wife takes place in their areas. It was, however, found to be
particularly common in patrilineal systems.
108Under patrilineal customary laws, however, there is no rule that upon death of a wife
lobola should be paid back.
109MHRC (n 47) 22.
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they would be protecting their grandchildren.
More disturbing is the fact that these daughters could be as young as 15
and marry a man who might be 50 or older.110 Clearly, this is a form of child
marriage.
Mbirigha
Mbirigha means ‘bonus wife’. In this practice the husband is given a younger
sister or niece of his wife to take as his second wife. The girl is sometimes
enticed by the sister to join her in her marriage, or encouraged by aunts and
parents to enter the union.111 Sometimes the husband initiates the process
himself.
The purposes of mbirigha include the following. First, it is a sign of grat-
itude to the son-in-law who is regarded as very generous or as one who
takes proper care of their daughter and the parents themselves. Secondly,
a mbirigha is offered to bear children for the husband if the elder sister is
barren, or has stopped bearing children because of advanced age. Thirdly, if
the husband is rich, the wife may want to protect the wealth by letting her
younger sister join her so that the man does not marry elsewhere. At times
the older sister would invite her younger sister in order to have someone with
110As above.
111The MHRC found that 45 percent of the interviewees said that ‘bonus wife’ is a
practice that takes place in their area.
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whom to live in the event that the husband dies. So too, the older sister may
want to consolidate her power at her new home.
This practice, although said to be in general decline, was found to have
been common in many of the areas covered by the study conducted by the
MHRC. The mbirigha, like in the case of chimeta masisi discussed above, can
be as young as 15, if not younger depending on the age at which she attained
puberty. Here again, we see that similar violations occur to the mbirigha.
Kupawila
Kupawila means paying off a debt by marrying a daughter.112 The most
common form of kupawila in the northern parts of the Chitipa district occurs
when the daughter’s parents get into debt and as payment for the debt offer
the daughter in marriage to the creditor. The daughter could be as young as
9 and the man could be 40 or older. The daughter in this situation ends up
attaining puberty while staying with the husband. Such daughters, it was
established, stick with this arrangement because they are threatened that
some curse would befall them if they tried to run away.113 The MHRC found
that 15.4 percent of the respondents in this survey said that kupawila still
persists in their communities.
A variation of kupawila in the Mzimba district takes place when parents eye
112My definition.
113MHRC (n 47) 23-24.
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a male tenant on an estate who is hard working and shows good prospects
for doing well financially. The parents could then ask the tenant to do some
piecework for them at their house. When the work has been done, some
parents claim that they cannot pay for the services rendered but can instead
give the tenant their daughter. In such cases the tenant is not asked to pay
lobola.
Another form of kupawila the study came across is when parents send
daughters as young as 9 to stay with a rich man. The parents and the rich
man would already have agreed, and money or cattle would already have
changed hands. The daughter would be oblivious of the arrangement that
her stay with the rich man is going to materialise into a marriage.
In both the Chitipa and the Mzimba districts a variation of the practice of
kupawila involves an arrangement by which the parents of a boy and those of
a girl become very close and, in an attempt to strengthen their relationship,
arrange that their children should marry each other. In the end they force
their children into marriage.114
Chithyola msana
Chithyola msana means that a father or grandfather is having sexual inter-
course with his daughter or granddaughter, respectively. The study by the
MHCR found that in all the districts visited there had been isolated cases
114MHRC (n 47) 24.
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of fathers or grandfathers who had had such sexual intercourse with their
daughters or granddaughters, respectively.115 Such occurrences are a form of
incest, and are often linked to rituals associated with witchcraft or charms
to boost one’s business venture.116
Discussion on child marriages
The problem of child marriages in Malawi is compounded by non-registration
of births,117 making it difficult to check on the age of girls who are marry-
ing. Thus, it can be argued, outlawing child marriages by itself may be
not enough.118 So, while it may be a good starting point to specify a mini-
mum age of marriage, in order to comply with human rights norm, this legal
sanction must go hand in hand with strong social rights provision, including
appropriate schooling.
From the discussed cultural practices, we see that several of them are at
variance with the rights of young girls as provided in the Bill of Rights
and in international instruments. In almost all the practices that have been
115The MHRC found that 16.8 percent of the interviewees said that this practice occurred
in their community.
116MHRC (n 47) 24.
117From my own experience there is no birth registration requirement in Malawi once a
child is born.
118In Chapter 6, it will be seen that the Malawi Law Commission proposes 18 years as
the age at which one can marry.
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discussed, young girls are forced to enter into marriages. This practice is a
flagrant violation of the right not to be forced into marriage as provided in
the Malawi Constitution.119 This clearly violates the requirement of getting
married with one’s free and full consent. Even if it can be argued that these
young girls do give consent, such arguments would not be legally sustainable.
A girl who is as young as 9 years would not be in a position to appreciate
the effect of her consent.
The discussed practices also show that most girls are married at a very
young age. This conflicts directly with the Malawi Constitution that puts
the marrying age at 18 years.120 Related to the same issue is that girls that
are married at a young age are also at a danger of risking their lives due
to complications of child bearing. This directly conflicts with their right
to life.121 In addition to the above, marrying daughters at a young age
could interfere with their right to education.122 In all likelihood, once young
girls are married, they are considered adults, and therefore not liable to go
to school. Even if it can be argued that these young girls are given the
opportunity to go to school whilst they are married, such arguments would
not take away the fact that, as a married person, the demands of doing
household chores will interfere with their education.
119Section 22 (4) of the Malawi Constitution.
120Section 22 (6) of the Malawi Constitution.
121Section 16 of the Malawi Constitution.
122Section 23 (4) of the Malawi Constitution.
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According to the CRC123 and the Charter124 a child is defined to be a person
who is below the age of 18 years.125 The age limit is only for the purposes
of enjoying rights enshrined in the CRC and the Charter. As rightly argued
by Bennett,126 neither of the two instruments obliges states to enact laws
specifying an age of majority. However, it could be argued that countries
that are parties to these Conventions would be expected to comply with
the CRC and the Charter’s age limit and therefore enact laws to reflect
this.127 This line of thinking is buttressed in the recommendation by the
CRC Committee on the report submitted by Malawi in 2002.128 Malawi, a
party to the CRC, has, interestingly, defined a child to be a person who is
under 16 years,129 while Section 28 (3) of the South African Constitution,
1996 has defined a child to be a person under 18 years.
It is submitted that, by defining a child as a person under the age of
18 years, the drafters of both the Charter and CRC were cognizant of the
123The CRC was ratified by Malawi on 2 January 1991.
124The Charter was ratified by Malawi on 16 September 1999.
125See Art. 1 and 2 of the CRC and the Charter respectively.
126Bennett (n 79) 304 - 305.
127The basis of this argument is that State Parties to these Conventions will be expected
to implement the rights contained therein.
128See www1.umn.edu/humanrts/crc/malawi2002.html,
(accessed on 5/13/04) where the Committee recommended that State Parties take the
necessary legislative measures to establish a clear definition of “child” in accordance with
Art. 1 of the CRC and other related principles and provisions of the Convention.
129Section 23 (5) of the Malawi Constitution.
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challenges of modern life. The age of 18, it is argued, is considered sufficient
age by which one can develop both mentally and physically into an adult,
complete a basic education that is fundamental to adult life survival and
generally enjoy youth. Whilst bearing in mind the fact that some children
do finish school before they are 18, it has been argued that the CRC and
the Charter provide general standards for the protection of children. They
protect all children, inclusive of slow learners who, due to either economic
hardships or intellectual incapacities, may not finish school quickly.130
From the above discussion it is my submission that the practice of marry-
ing a girl at puberty can conflict with several of her rights in the following
ways. First, biologically a girl can reach puberty at a very young age. This,
obviously, renders her a minor who cannot give a proper consent to the mar-
riage. In such a situation it can be argued that there is a possibility that
such marriage would be entered into without her free and full consent. A
child who is as young as 9 years, for example, would not be in a position to
appreciate the effect of her consent. This would be in conflict with Section
22 (4) of the Malawi Constitution that requires that one must enter into
marriage with one’s free consent.
Secondly, if a girl reaches puberty at a very young age, being married at
that age conflicts with the Malawi Constitution that puts the marrying age
at 18 years.131 Thirdly, in the face of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, marrying
130Koyana, Mwambene and Bekker (n 11) 13-14.
131Section 22 (6) of the Malawi Constitution.
185
 
 
 
 
girls at a tender age would highly expose them to the dangers of contracting
HIV/AIDS. HIV/AIDS is one of the biggest causes of the high mortality
rate in Malawi, with an estimated 940 000 people living with HIV in 2005.132
Obviously, if young girls are exposed to HIV/AIDS it would interfere with
their right to life as provided for in the Malawi Constitution.133 This is not,
however, to suggest that all married women in Malawi are HIV positive. The
point that is being advanced is that, because they may be found to be in a
polygamous union, the chances of them contracting the disease are high.
Fourthly, once a girl gets married she loses, in the eyes of society, the priv-
ilege of being treated as a child. She automatically becomes an adult. As
a married woman, she is expected to bear children. With the many compli-
cations that can come with childbearing, such a girl’s right to life, provided
for by the Malawi Constitution, could also be compromised.134 Fifthly, as
a married woman, it could be argued, society does not expect her to go to
school. This position conflicts with her right to education.135 Lastly, Section
23 (4) of the Malawi Constitution provides:
‘Children are entitled to be protected from economic exploitation
or any treatment, work or punishment that is, or is likely to:
be hazardous; interfere with their education; or be harmful to
132UNICEF 2007; See also NHP 1999-2004.
133Section 16 of the Malawi Constitution.
134As above.
135In the Malawi Constitution, the right to education is provided for by Section 25.
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their health or to their physical, mental or spiritual or social
development’.
If girls are married at a young age, this provision is also violated.
To sum up, we see that the dictates of the Malawi Constitution and inter-
national human rights standards conflict with customary family laws in that
what is used as a measure of adulthood in international law is incompatible
with what customary laws look at. We also see that several rights of girls
married at a young age could be violated as a result of defining and fixing
the age of majority at puberty.
4.4.5 Choice of spouse
Interlinked with consent there is the question of choice of a spouse. In both
the matrilineal and patrilineal customary marriage systems, a decision on
whom to marry is made primarily by the man concerned or such a man in
consultation with his kin. A woman, under customary laws, is not expected
to make a move and propose marriage. A woman who actively makes such
a proposal is considered to have loose morals.136 So her choice of whom to
marry is squarely dependent on who becomes interested in her and makes
a proposal. With such beliefs, arguably, the choice of a spouse is severely
compromised for a woman.
136Ntata and Sinoya (n 12) 15.
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Useful expressions, found in the vernacular languages of Malawi, can help
shed light on the issue of choice.137 In the vernacular it is only a man who can
‘marry’ a woman: kukwatira138 or kutola.139 A woman ‘gets to be married’:
kukwatiwa140 or kutoleka.141 Thus, clues to the difficulties that women face
in realising their right to choose whom to marry can, arguably, be found
in the above vernacular usage.142 This position can be contrasted to the
English position, for example, where both men and women ‘get married’ to
each other.
The cultural practice that only men are expected to make a spousal choice,
and not women, is a human rights issue on the basis that it goes against
women’s rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Malawi Constitution, as well
as against international standards. It does not rhyme well with Section 22
(3) of the Malawi Constitution which provides that ‘all men and women have
the right to marry and found a family’. It should be noted that this provision
does not mention the issue of choice. However, it can be argued that it grants
all men and women the right to marry someone of their choice. Moreover, a
woman’s right to choose whom to marry is guaranteed by the international
instruments to which Malawi is a party. Art. 16(1)(b) of CEDAW states that
137As above.
138This word is used in the matrilineal systems.
139This word is used in the patrilineal systems.
140This word is used in the matrilineal systems.
141This word is used in the patrilineal systems and literally means ‘taken by’.
142Ntata and Sinoya (n 12) 14.
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that ‘women should also enjoy the right to freely choose a spouse and enter
into marriage only with their free and full consent’.143
Therefore, it is submitted, that the customary law tradition which only
gives the right to propose marriage to men, and not to women, is incompatible
with the Bill of Rights and international standards for the protection of
women’s rights.
4.5 Other forms of validating customary mar-
riages
In the preceding section we discussed how some principles and rules govern-
ing a customary marriage conflict with the Bill of Rights and international
standards. This section outlines some of the cultural practices144 relating
to sex and sex rituals, practiced in various parts of Malawi, and shows how
these practices are incompatible with the Bill of Rights and international
standards.
143See also Art. 1 of the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage
and Registration of Marriages, 1962, GA Res.1763A (XVIII) of 7 November 1962.
144These cultural practices will be mainly based on the research findings compiled by
MHRC (n 47).
189
 
 
 
 
4.5.1 Widow inheritance
This is a practice whereby a widow is inherited after the death of a hus-
band.145 A widow can be inherited by a deceased husband’s brother, cousin,
or nephew.146 It should, however, be noted that Malawi is not the only coun-
try that practices widow inheritance. In Zimbabwe, for example, customary
marriage recognises levirate unions as valid marriages if they are solemnised
in terms of the Act.147
It should be acknowledged that in a traditional society widow inheritance
provided a woman with the right to remain married, to have legitimate chil-
dren and a sense of security.148 These, agreeing with Dlamini, were very
important considerations if one bears in mind the fact that in traditional
society, especially in patrilineal customary marriages, if the widow left her
late husband’s village, she could forfeit her children, her house, property and
support.149 She would not also easily find a partner in order to marry again.
However, in the modern setting, these considerations may not be relevant.
It should, however, be noted that the same conclusion would not be true for
145Widow inheritance is also referred to as levirate unions.
146Moyo v Chipeta, Civil Appeal Case No. 107 of 1974, NTAC (Unreported). See also
Banda (n 1) 119.
147Section 3 (1) of Customary Marriages Act 5:07, as cited by Banda (n 1) 119.
148Dlamini CRM ‘The role of customary law in meeting social needs’ (1991) Acta Juridica
71 at 80.
149As above. See also Armstrong (n 22) 355; and White (n 7) 75.
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matrilineal customary marriages. A woman in a matrilineal customary mar-
riage is at an advantage with regard to her rights to the children, house, and
property that was accumulated during the lifetime of her husband, because
after the institution of a valid marriage, as previously noted, residence is in
the woman’s village. The institution of widow inheritance is heavily criti-
cized and is generally on the decrease in the matrilineal societies in Malawi.150
The criticisms are largely based on the fact that women are forced into these
marriages and, therefore, do not have the right to choose whom to marry.151
On the other hand, Section 22 of the Malawi Constitution, as previously
discussed, guarantees the right to choose whom to marry152, the right not to
be forced to enter into marriage153 and the right to give free and full consent
as provided for by several international instruments.154
The institution of widow inheritance is generally at variance with the Bill
of Rights. This view is supported by the following responses that the MHRC
got from their interviewees. First, some widows responded that they entered
into such marriages because the husband’s family forced them.155 Secondly,
some widows responded that they became party to these unions because
150See the report by the MHRC (n 47) 20 which shows that the practice is generally
decreasing in the matrilineal societies.
151Section 22 of the Malawi Constitution.
152Section 22 (3) of the Malawi Constitution
153Section 22 (4) of the Malawi Constitution.
154See, for example, Art. 16 of CEDAW.
155MHRC (n 47) 20.
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of threats to the effect that they would lose their property and children or
suffer from certain illnesses that could lead to their death if they refused.156
Thirdly, in areas where ordinarily widows live in their husband’s home, when
a bereaved widow refuses to be inherited, she can be allowed to stay in her
matrimonial home so long as she does not associate with men outside her
husband’s family.157 This practice, arguably, violates the widow’s right to
marry and found a family of her choice. Related to the same point, if a widow
who so refused to be inherited by her deceased husband’s relative is found
to associate with any other relative of her husband, she is forced to marry
that relative.158 Fourthly, if the widow wants to marry someone outside the
husband’s family, she has to leave the village and often lobola and children
have to be returned to the husband’s family. In a situation in which the
children are very young, she could be allowed to take them with her for a
while and later return them to the husband’s family. Lastly, the practice
makes it possible for the deceased’s relative(s) to inherit his property if he is
believed to have amassed property.
From the above responses a number of conclusions can be drawn. First,
they show that widow inheritance is, in most cases, done without a woman’s
consent. This is clearly incompatible with section 22 (4) of the Malawi Con-
stitution. As previously noted, when the issue of consent was discussed, lack
156As above.
157As above, 21.
158As above.
192
 
 
 
 
of consent to a marriage is a violation of the woman’s rights. Secondly, it is
noted that most widows whom are inherited are denied their right to choose
who to marry after their husband’s death. This position, as earlier discussed,
is incompatible with international standards and the Malawi Constitution.
Thirdly, the responses also show that a widow’s right to property and cus-
tody of children are violated. This, obviously, conflicts with Sections 24 and
28 of the Malawi Constitution.
It should, however, be noted that among the Yao, the Lomwe, and the
various ethnic groups in the south, widow inheritance is usually entered
into after kusudzula.159 If there is more than one man interested in inher-
iting the surviving widow, in most areas the men are requested to present
their luphatho,160 or any symbolic gift, to the widow. She then chooses the
luphatho, or any such gift, presented by the man that impresses her most.
He thereafter becomes her husband. In the northern part of the Chitipa
district, it was established that at times a husband and his wife would agree
in advance on who would inherit her when he died. This arrangement is
called chilongo. In the event that the husband dies leaving behind a preg-
nant widow, the chosen brother is expected to take the pregnant sister-in-law
as his wife. In such a scenario, it can be argued, that a widow is given a
chance to choose whom to marry. Therefore, not every widow inheritance
practicw is a violation of a woman’s rights.
159Formal dissolution of marriage after a husband’s death.
160Sena term for gifts.
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4.5.2 Marriage by proxy
In some parts of the Mzimba district, the MHRC found that many young
men leave for South Africa a few months after entering into marriage.161
During their absence the husbands’ brothers are asked by elders to look after
their sisters-in-law, including having conjugal relations with them.162 These
relatives end up producing children with the wives concerned and the children
are forced upon the husbands when they return. The wives are not given a
chance to refuse since they are in a new environment and usually young and
naive.163 It was also established that sometimes it is the father-in-law that
assumes the responsibility of a proxy husband.164 This practice is similarly
observed in Zimbabwe as Onoria 165 has noted:
‘No wonder a Zimbabwean woman was willing to go to prison for
arson in burning up her father-in-law’s hut rather than agree to
his sexual demands on her on the grounds that while his son was
away, he had a duty to look after his son’s “property”’.
161MHRC (n 47) 25.
162As above.
163As above.
164As above.
165Onoria H ‘Introduction to the African System of Protection of Human Rights and the
Draft Protocol’ in Wolfgang B, Kisaakye EM and Oberleitner G (eds) Human Rights of
Women: international instruments and African experiences (2002) 231 at 235.
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It is, however, argued that marriage by proxy is a human rights issue on the
basis that it is practised against a woman’s rights and freedom and, arguably,
demeans her dignity and freedom.166 It violates not only the international
conventions to which Malawi is a party but, also, is against what the Malawi
Constitution provides, particularly in Section 19 on the right to dignity and
personal freedom,167 and Section 22 (2) that each member of the family shall
enjoy full and equal respect and shall be protected by law against all forms
of neglect, cruelty or exploitation.
4.5.3 Exchanging of wives
This is a practice in which very close friends make temporary arrangements
for the men to exchange their wives for a short period of time. Men discuss
their intent to swap wives and on reaching some common understanding
each undertakes to convince his respective wife. The MHRC study found
that after the wives have subscribed to the arrangement, the men, usually
under the cover of darkness and at a specifically agreed time, go to make
love to their friend’s wife. The reason men engage in this practice is to afford
couples different sex experiences. This practice was mentioned particularly
166Section 19 of the Malawi Constitution.
167Section 19 (1) of the Malawi Constitution provides that ‘the dignity of all persons
shall be inviolable’.
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in the Mulanje district, which, as earlier noted, is a matrilineal society.168
It is submitted that exchanging of wives is at variance with the Bill of
Rights in the following respects. First, it would appear that the arrangement
is made by men without involving their wives. According to Sections 20 and
24 of the Malawi Constitution such arrangements are discriminatory against
women. Secondly, because the arrangement is made by men, we see that a
woman’s right to dignity and personal freedom is infringed upon.169 Lastly,
in a country where HIV/AIDS prevalence is high, such a practice infringes
on a woman’s right to life.170
4.5.4 Kutwala
This is a practice whereby a girl/woman, found to be pregnant is taken by
her relatives to the boy’s/man’s family to force them into a marriage. If the
boy/man wants to marry the girl/woman, he can proceed to pay lobola or
whatever charges are usually demanded in formalizing customary law mar-
riages. If he is not interested, he can pledge to only maintain and support
the child, and end his relationship with the girl/woman. The MHRC study
found that kutwala takes place in all the areas covered by the study.171
168MHRC (n 47).
169Section 19 of the Malawi Constitution.
170Section 16 of the Malawi Constitution.
171See MHRC (n 47) for the areas that were covered in this study.
196
 
 
 
 
What is important to note is that in some areas young people merely
caught in a sexual act can be forced into a marriage to avoid embarrassing the
morality of their parents. It is also interesting to note that most respondents
said that forcing a young woman to marry after a boy/man has impregnated
her should be maintained. They reasoned that it helps expose men who
often refuse to marry women for whose pregnancy they are responsible. They
argued that it helps to bring social order.
From the foregoing, a number of conclusions can be made. First, it is
noted that a girl/woman once found to be pregnant is forced into marriage.
This, obviously, conflicts with CEDAW172 and Section 22 (4) of the Malawi
Constitution which provides that ‘no person shall be forced to enter into
marriage’. Secondly, the fact that young girls caught in a sexual act are forced
into marriage, it could be argued that it conflicts with Section 22 (6) which,
generally, prohibits child marriages. The practice is also in conflict with
Section 23 of the Malawi Constitution which protects children from treatment
that would interfere with their education. Thirdly, since a woman’s entry into
the marriage is dependent on whether the man that impregnated her is willing
to marry her, this, arguably, conflicts with Section 22 (4) of the Malawi
Constitution. Lastly, a woman’s right to personal dignity and freedom is
also violated.173 Once found to be pregnant, it could be argued, the practice
seems to take away her liberty to make decisions that will affect her life. The
172See Art. 16 (1) of CEDAW.
173Section 19 of the Malawi Constitution
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choice is exercised by her parents and the man who has impregnated her.
4.6 Rights and obligations arising from cus-
tomary marriages
In this section, we examine how the rights and obligations arising from a
customary marriage conflict with the Bill of Rights and international human
rights standards for the protection of women’s rights.
4.6.1 Property rights
Section 24 of the Constitution provides:
‘(1) Women have the right to full and equal protection by the law,
and have the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of
their marital status which includes the right- (a) to be accorded
the same rights as men in civil law, including equal capacity· · ·
(ii) to acquire and maintain rights in property, indepen-
dently or in association with others, regardless of their
marital status; (b) on dissolution of marriage- (i) to a fair
disposition of property that is held jointly with a hus-
band; and (2) Any law that discriminates against women
on the basis of gender or marital status shall be invalid
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and legislation shall be passed to eliminate customs and
practices that discriminate against women, particularly
practices such as- (iii) deprivation of property, including
property obtained by inheritance’.
Similar provisions are included in international human rights law. The
UDHR states that ‘men and women of full age · · · are entitled to equal
rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution’.174
We see that the norm, at both national law as well as international law
levels is that spouses must have equal property rights. On the other hand,
in matrilineal customary law marriages, household property, acquired by the
spouses, constitutes matrimonial property.175 This, of course, excludes per-
sonal belongings which are exclusively for the spouse in possession of them.
Any other chattel, personal or real, is the property of the couple and is sub-
ject to the joint control of both spouses. The only qualification to this basic
rule is, that where it is shown that a particular chattel, personal or real, was
acquired by the individual effort of one spouse only, that spouse has ultimate
control over it.176
174Art. 16 (1) of the UDHR.
175Ibik (n 8) 192.
176Chigawa (n 5) 20.
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There is one exception to these rules. The matrimonial home built by the
husband at the wife’s village belongs to her as of right.177 The rule stems
from the fact that the matrimonial residence for the married couple in this
system is uxorilocal.178 Here we see an instance where the customary rule
works to benefit women at the expense of men.
Unlike the position in matrilineal systems, where a wife has more control
over property rights, in the patrilineal system of marriages the husband has
greater control over the matrimonial property than the wife, except for odd
items of personal property.179 In fact, the control and ownership of all prop-
erty vests in him as the family head.180 Wives do not even have the right to
control their own earnings.181 This would obviously lead us to expect that
wives, upon dissolution of a marriage, do not get anything. It is further said
that upon the death of a husband, this control of the property is with his
eldest son of his first wife. A wife has little, if any, say in the administration
of the property, as she is, herself, regarded as an ‘asset’.182
177See Poya v Poya, Civil Appeal Case No. 38 of 1979, NTAC (Unreported).
178This means that residence is at the wife’s village.
179White (n 7) 59. See also Bennett TW A sourcebook of African customary law for
Southern Africa 327 as cited by Bronstein V ‘Reconceptualizing the customary law debate
in South Africa’ (1998) Southern African Journal on Human Rights 388 at 390.
180Bekker (n 11) 126.
181See Bronstein (n 179).
182Bekker (n 11) 126.
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However, in both patrilineal and matrilineal systems, recent studies shows
that property is generally labeled as belonging to a man.183
This position obviously conflicts with Section 24 of the Malawi Constitu-
tion, as discussed above.
4.6.2 Affiliation and custody of children
At both international and regional levels, children’s rights are to be exercised
and enjoyed without discrimination on the basis of sex.184 Children’s rights
have received constitutional recognition in Malawi.185 Included in the recog-
nition of the notion that children have rights is the understanding that both
parents, without discrimination, are under an obligation to provide care for
the children in equal measure.186
Additionally, Art. 16 (1) (d) of CEDAW provides for the equal rights and
responsibilities of parents toward their children. This provision, it has been
noted, addresses the historical inequities in every legal system as to the dis-
tribution of rights and responsibilities between parents of minor children.187
183See research study findings done by White (n 7) 57.
184Art. 2 (1) of the CRC and Art. 3 of the Charter.
185Section 23 of the Malawi Constitution.
186Art. 18 (1) of the CRC; Art. 20 (1) (a) (c) of the Charter; and Art. 6 (1) and & 7 (c)
of the Protocol.
187Freeman MA ‘The Human Rights of Women in the Family: Issues and Recommenda-
tions for Implementation of the Women’s Convention’ in Peters J and Wolper A Women’s
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In most systems, it has further been noted, when children were born to mar-
ried couples, fathers traditionally had sole rights to make decisions concerning
them although the day to day care for those children rested on the mother.188
As earlier noted, under matrilineal customary law, children born out of mar-
riage are affiliated to the clan of the female spouse.189 This is probably the
most important feature of the matrilineal customary marriage.190 Contrary
to the matrilineal system where the children of a family are affiliated to
the mother, in the patrilineal system, provided lobola obligations have been
complied with, the husband and his family have full parental rights to any
children born to a wife during marriage.191 The right of a father to custody of
his children is absolute. In contrast to the matrilineal system, we see that in
the patrilineal system mothers have no rights to their children. Howsoever,
just as in the matrilineal system, in the patrilineal system customary laws
may also conflict with the best interest of the child.192
rights, human rights: International feminist perspectives (1995) 149 at 158.
188As above.
189Chakhumbira v Chakhumbira Civil Appeal Case No. 39 of 1979, NTAC (Unreported).
190Chigawa (n 5) 10.
191Von Benda-Beckmann (n 4) 88. See also the discussion by Amstrong (n 22) 348.
192Burman S ‘Illegitimacy and the African Family on a Changing South Africa’ (1991)
Acta Juridica 36 at 41.
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4.7 Divorce in customary marriages in Malawi
This section briefly summarises divorce in a customary marriage.193 With
most customary marriages starting off as customary law unions, it is impor-
tant to consider how these types of marriages are ended.194 There are no
formal grounds for divorce per se. Thus, Armstrong et al note that grounds
for divorce at customary law are no more than reasons given by men and
women in seeking to convince the family councils that the marriage is no
longer practicable.195
Marriage in both the matrilineal and patrilineal customary law systems
may be terminated either by a divorce decree pronounced by a court of
competent jurisdiction196 or by the death of either spouse or both.197 In
the case of death, in a matrilineal system, the demise of a spouse does not
terminate the marriage bond.198 The marriage will subsist until formally
terminated at the hair-shaving ceremony, followed by msudzulo199 that will
193For a full discussion, see, for example, Chigawa (n 5) and Ibik (n 8).
194Banda (n 1) 127.
195Armstrong et al ‘Uncovering Reality: Excavating Women’s Rights in the African Fam-
ily’ as cited by Banda (n 1) 127.
196As noted in Chapter 3, MC in Malawi have, under the Courts (Amendment) Act 2000,
original jurisdiction to dissolve marriages contracted under customary laws.
197Chigawa (n 5) 9-11.
198Ibik (n 8) 198.
199Meaning the actual divorce.
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officially terminate it.200 On the other hand, termination by divorce is not
complicated under customary law.201
In patrilineal marriages, if the female spouse dies, the marriage ends with
the hair-shaving ceremony.202 On the other hand, if the male spouse dies, the
200Chigawa (n 5) 9.
201Any reason is a good ground to end a marriage. This is contrasted to civil marriages
where there are specific grounds for divorce. Section 5 of the Divorce Act, Chapter 25:04
provides:
‘A petition for divorce may be presented to the Court either by the husband
or the wife on the ground that the respondent- (a) has since the celebration
of marriage committed adultery; or (b) has deserted the petitioner without
cause for the period of at least three years immediately preceding the pre-
sentation of the petition; or (c) has since the celebration of the marriage
treated the petitioner with cruelty; or (d) is incurably of unsound mind and
has been continuously under care and treatment for a period of at least five
years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition, and by the wife
on the ground that her husband has, since the celebration of the marriage,
been guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality. For the purpose of this section a
person of unsound mind shall be deemed to be under the care and treatment
while he is detained, whether in Malawi or elsewhere, in an institution duly
recognised by the Government of Malawi as an institution for the care and
treatment of insane persons, lunatics or mental defectives, or is detained as
a criminal lunatic under any law for the time being in force in Malawi. A
certificate under the hand of the Minister that any place is a duly recognised
institution for the purpose of this section shall be receivable in all courts as
conclusive evidence of that fact’.
202Chigawa (n 5) 11.
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female spouse may continue to live with the relatives of her late husband until
she is freed by them.203 In fact, the death of the husband does not dissolve
a marriage. This position is similar to South Africa where Koyana204 has
also noted that the death of the husband does not entitle his people to a
refund of ikhazi because the marriage is not thereby dissolved. On the other
hand, we see an instance where under the patrilineal marriages a widow
and a widower are treated differently. This is contrary to Sections 20 and
24 of the Malawi Constitution. The widow may sometimes be inherited by
her deceased husband’s relatives without her consent. As earlier discussed,
widow inheritance conflicts with several constitutional rights of a woman.
The virtually total authority of the relatives of the husband over the widow
in patrilineal marriage systems is fundamentally at odds with the guarantees
of equality205 and dignity206 under the Malawi Constitution. Indeed, by de-
priving a wife of her prerogative, inter alia, to decide whether to marry and
whether to remain in a marriage after the death of her husband, custom-
ary family laws violates the constitutional right of women to experience ‘the
full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms’.207 In addition, it de-
203See also Venter T and Nel J ‘African customary law of intestate succession and gender
(in)equality’ (2005) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse 86 at 90 in respect of South Africa.
The same rule is applicable in Malawi.
204Koyana DS Customary Law in a Changing Society (1980) 43.
205Section 20 of the Malawi Constitution.
206Section 19 (1) of the Malawi Constitution.
207Section 24 of the Malawi Constitution.
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prives women of the right to have their ‘dignity respected and protected’ as
guaranteed under the Malawi Constitution.208
4.7.1 Grounds for divorce under customary laws
From the preceding discussion, it has been noted that there are no fixed
grounds of divorce in customary law. Various grounds may be advanced and
supported. These include: adultery; failure by the husband to provide a
house for the wife (under a matrilineal system); 209 or the wife disobeying
her husband (in a matrilineal system).210
However, in both matrilineal and patrilineal customary family laws of
Malawi, some grounds of divorce seem to favour men more than women.
In matrilineal customary marriages, if a woman disobeys her husband, he is
entitled to divorce her.211 The same does not arise as a ground for divorce
if it is a husband disobeying a wife.212 This position clearly discriminates
against women.213
Adultery is another ground of divorce for either spouse to a customary
208Section 19 (1) of the Malawi Constitution.
209Mwanza v Shaba, Civil Appeal Case No. 82 of 1974, NTAC (Unreported).
210Kamwendo v Kamwendo, Civil Appeal Case No. 154 of 1978, NTAC (Unreported).
211As above.
212As above.
213See Sections 20 and 24 of the Malawi Constitution.
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marriage under the customary marriages in Malawi. As a contrast to this
rule, in South Africa, it was stated that adultery on the part of the wife is
not sufficient cause for the dissolution of the marriage but that the husband
may, if he wishes, repudiate his wife. If he does so, he is not entitled to the
ikhazi paid by him.214 Having said that, however, the customary practice
of a male spouse recovering compensation in respect of his wife’s adultery
discriminates against women.215 In contrast, a wife is not entitled to recover
compensation from either her husband or the woman with whom he has
committed adultery.216
Desertion of one spouse by the other, for an unreasonable period of time,
constitutes sufficient cause for divorce under matrilineal customary laws.217
What constitutes an unreasonable period of time is a question of fact in each
case, but usually varies between one to two years for the man’s absence, and
one to three months in the case of a wife’s.218 It is, however, noted that
in determining such unreasonable time, women are treated differently from
men. This is also in violation of Section 20 of the Malawi Constitution.
214Conana v Dungulu, 1 NAC (1894-1909) as cited by Koyana (n 204) 37.
215Mwale v Lukhere, Civil Appeal Case No. 96 of 1978, NTAC (Unreported).
216Kamchedzera (n 43) 374.
217Menasi v Balakasi, Civil Appeal Case No. 98 of 1979, NTAC (Unreported).
218Ibik (n 8) 198.
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4.7.2 Who can initiate divorce
As earlier stated, in matrilineal societies residence is with the wife’s family.
It is, therefore, easy for women to chase husbands out of their village after
becoming frustrated with them. Obviously, this position leads to the con-
clusion that in matrilineal customary marriages women would initiate more
divorce proceedings than men. In fact, it has been noted by some researchers
that, comparatively, there are more divorces in matrilineal systems than they
are in patrilineal systems.219 It should, however, be noted that under the
matrilineal customary marriages either spouse has the right to dissolve the
marriage.220
Similarly, since residence in the patrilineal system is at the husband’s family
home, it has been noted by scholars that husbands sometimes dissolve their
customary marriage by simply ejecting the wife from his family home or
abandoning her.221 Obviously, this leads us to the expectation that in the
patrilineal systems, husbands initiate more divorce proceedings than wives.
In fact, some scholars have noted that it is far more difficult for women than
men to obtain a divorce in a patrilineal system.222 On the other hand, in
219Reniers G Divorce and remarriage in rural Malawi Demographic Research Special
Collection 1 Art. 6 published on 19th September, 2003 accessed at
www.demographic-research.org on 14/01/06.
220Ntata and Sinoya (n 12) 18.
221Bekker (n 11) 180.
222Kaganas and Murray (n 57) 129.
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a matrilineal customary marriage, either spouse may seek divorce from the
other. No outside person can initiate divorce proceedings without the consent
or approval of one of the spouses.223
As earlier noted, the consent of marriage guardians in matrilineal systems
is important for the validity of the marriage; it is then expected that the
same consent would be important when one of the spouses would be seek-
ing divorce. However, we see that it is actually the spouse’s consent which
matters in initiating divorce proceedings.
Unlike in a matrilineal customary marriage, where both spouses have ca-
pacity to initiate divorce proceedings, in a patrilineal customary marriage, a
wife has no right to dissolve her customary marriage without referring the
matter to her guardian.224 A wife is, in most cases, entirely dependent upon
him to take the necessary steps to effect dissolution.225 On the other hand, a
husband is permitted to dissolve his customary marriage extra-judicially by
unilateral act at his pleasure and for no reason other than his desire to termi-
nate it,226 without him being required to get the permission of his guardian.
We see here an instance where men and women are accorded different op-
portunities.
223Ibik (n 8) 197.
224Bekker (n 11) 187.
225As above.
226As above, 177.
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4.7.3 Effects of terminating customary marriages
In the preceding section we discussed the grounds of divorce under both
matrilineal and patrilineal customary law marriages and highlighted areas
that are incompatible with women’s rights. In this subsection an examination
of the effect of terminating a customary marriage is made. This will be in the
areas of children born from the relationship, property and maintenance. The
focus will be to show how customary values implicit in these areas conflict
with women’s rights as provided in the Bill of Rights and international law.
Custody of children after divorce
Section 24 of the Constitution provides:
‘(1) · · · women have the right to full and equal protection by the
law, and have the right not to be discriminated against on the
basis of their marital status which includes the right· · · (a) to
be accorded the same rights as men in civil law, including equal
capacity- · · · (iii) to acquire and retain custody, guardianship and
care of children and to have an equal right in the making of deci-
sions that affect their upbringing; and · · ·’ [Emphasis added]
In addition to the above, Section 24 (1) (b) of the Malawi Constitution
provides that on the dissolution of marriage women have the right not to be
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discriminated against on the basis of their gender. It is submitted that this
section would be relevant to secure a woman’s right to her children when
issues of custody are being decided by courts.
At the international level, both the CRC and the Charter dictate that the
principle of the best interests of the child must guide those in the decision
making process concerning the custody of children.227 The Charter puts it
more forcefully, providing that the child’s best interests “shall be the primary
consideration”, thus making it paramount. It is, therefore, expected that in
considering the issue of who must have custody of a child after divorce of a
customary marriage, due regard must be given to this principle. Additionally,
Art. 16 (1) (c) of CEDAW provides that women have the same rights as men
on dissolution of a marriage. With regard to custody of children, it could
be argued that CEDAW also advocates that men and women will be at par
when the best interests of the child will be decided on the dissolution of a
marriage.
It should, however, be noted that the best interests of the child principle
is conspicuously missing from Section 23 of the Malawi Constitution.228 It
is submitted that the absence of this general standard for the protection of
children’s rights in Malawi creates a constitutional vacuum in the review of
all proceedings in which decisions are taken regarding children. This, how-
227See Art. 3 and 4 of the CRC and Charter, respectively.
228As earlier noted in this Chapter, Section 23 of the Malawi Constitution provides for
the rights of children.
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ever, does not relieve the Malawi courts from using this principle. Section 11
(2) (c) of the Malawi Constitution mandates courts to use rules of interna-
tional law in their interpretation of constitutional rights, including children’s
rights. Therefore, even if the Malawi Constitution does not expressly provide
for this principle, courts should widely interpret the constitutional provision
on the rights of children, and use this principle to safeguard other rights.
Furthermore, the Malawi Constitution enjoins courts to consider comparable
foreign case law in interpreting it.229 Therefore, even if the courts of Malawi
have not produced some jurisprudence on the matter, they may be compelled
by the Malawi Constitution to use foreign case law.
In addition to the above, Malawi courts are obliged, when interpreting any
legislation and developing any law, including customary laws, to promote
the values which underlie an open and democratic society.230 Therefore,
despite the absence of the best interests of the child principle in the Malawi
Constitution, the values which underlie an open and democratic society must
also be considered in the development of customary laws relating to children.
The absence of the best interests principle in the Malawi Constitution is
contrasted with Section 28 (2) of the South African Constitution.231
229Section 11 (2) (c) of the Malawi Constitution.
230Section 11 (2) (a) of the Malawi Constitution.
231Section 28 (2) of the South African Constitution states: ‘A child’s best interests are
of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child.’
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Contrary to the dictates of the CRC, the Charter and CEDAW, in matri-
lineal and patrilineal customary marriages, however, the right of a mother or
father, respectively, to custody of the children is absolute. In terms of these,
this right cannot be taken away merely because the child might do better
if left in the care of another relative.232 As noted earlier when the issue of
lobola was discussed, in patrilineal customary marriages this right stems from
the father fulfilling his obligation under the lobola agreement.233 This then
entitles the father and his family to have rights to any children born to the
wife during the marriage. Mothers had no rights to their children.234 The
best interests of a child, or the wishes of the mother, as a general rule, do
not play a part in determining custody under patrilineal customary marriage
laws.235
On the other hand, under matrilineal customary laws, all children born out
of a marriage are affiliated to the clan of the female spouse.236 After divorce
custody of the children is granted to the mother.
232See also Bekker (n 11) 227 for a comparative analysis with South Africa. See also
Armstrong (n 22) 349.
233See Kamcaca v Nkhota, 1968 MLR 190.
234See also similar views as expressed by the SALC Project 90 Report on Customary
Marriages, (1998) 137 with regard to patrilineal customary marriages in South Africa.
See also Armstrong (n 22) 349.
235Burman (n 192) 41.
236See n 166 above.
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Both systems, it is submitted, violate the principle of equality. This is
incompatible with the Malawi Constitution that requires that on dissolution
of a marriage both men and women should enjoy equal rights.237 It is also a
violation of the international conventions to which Malawi is a party, which
require that the best interests of the child are of paramount importance in
all matters concerning the welfare of the child.238
To sum up: we see that the customary laws that favour the interests of the
child’s family and not those of the child are in principle incompatible with
the Bill of Rights for it does not consider the best interests of the child.
Matrimonial home and land
As earlier stated, with matrilineal descent systems, matrilocal residence after
marriage is often the prescription.239 After the dissolution of their marriage,
it is obviously expected that the male spouse leave the uxorilocal matrilineal
home, after which the house belongs to the woman as of right.240 He is
only entitled to remove all doors, windows, and other valuable fixtures not
affecting the main structure. It should, however, be noted that this right
to remove fixtures is only implicit where the husband has provided them.241
237Section 24 of the Malawi Constitution.
238See Art. 3 and 4 of the of CRC and Charter, respectively.
239Chigawa (n 5) 6.
240As above, 20. See also Armstrong (n 22) 347.
241Ibik (n 8) 200.
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Here we see that a husband is deprived of the house that he himself may
have built. This is, obviously, contrary to the constitutional and international
standards that require that no one shall be deprived of their property.242 One
would, obviously, think that the most equitable solution upon dissolution of
marriage would probably be to sell the house and share the proceeds.
Similarly, in the patrilineal systems, a wife who has moved to the husband’s
home is expected to return to her parent’s family home after the dissolution of
the marriage.243 However, unlike in the matrilineal system where a husband
is obliged to provide a house to the wife even after the decree of divorce has
been granted,244 in the patrilineal systems, after the dissolution of marriage,
the wife is not entitled to be provided with accommodation by her erstwhile
husband. This position is similar to that in South Africa.245
In the matrilineal system, rights over land allocated to husband by the
family of the wife by virtue of the marriage cease upon divorce.246 The
land which the spouses used to cultivate will remain the property of the
female spouse when the male spouse leave the village, since he had no right
of his own to such land.247 It should, however, be noted that under the
242Sections 24 and 28 of the Malawi Constitution.
243See also Armstrong (n 22) 347.
244Dorothy Joswa v Preston Joswa, Civil Cause No. 113 of 2003, Zomba MC (Unre-
ported).
245Malaza v Mndaweni 1974 BAC (C) 45 as cited by Bekker (n 11) 199.
246Ibik (n 8) 200. See also Armstrong (n 22) 347.
247Chigawa (n 5) 21.
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matrilineal system, just like in the patrilineal system, land does not belong
to an individual. It belongs to the family of a wife or husband respectively.
As such, if the marriage is dissolved, it makes sense that the land should go
back to the owner, the family.
Traditional movable household property and personal belongings
In dividing property, human rights norms enjoin courts to divide it equally.248
Indeed, the Protocol249 provides:
‘in the case of separation, divorce or annulment of marriage,
women and men shall have the right to an equitable sharing of
joint property deriving from the marriage’.
In the customary family marriage laws of Malawi, the division of prop-
erty on divorce is linked to the marriage system under which a woman is
married. Generally, the statutory redistributive powers of the courts do not
apply to unregistered customary law unions due to their non-registration.
Under matrilineal customary laws, each spouse is entitled, on divorce, to
retain all personal belongings, including livestock and gifts of a traditional
248See for example Art. 23 (4) of the CCPR; paras 20 and 26 of the Human Rights
Committee General Comment No. 28; Art. 16 (1) (h) of CEDAW; paras 25-33 of CEDAW
General Comment No. 21 and Art. 18 (3) of the ACHPR.
249Art. 7 (d) of the Protocol. See also Section 24 (1) (b) (i) of the Malawi Constitution.
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kind received from the other spouse. The traditional household property is
divisible between the spouses, the lesser share going to that spouse adjudged
responsible for the divorce.250 However, it has been noted251 that among the
districts that are matrilineal there are local variations with regard to how this
property is handled after divorce. In some areas252 the traditional property
is equally divided between the spouses irrespective of who is at fault.
Lobola
In patrilineal marriages the lobola is returnable upon the dissolution of a
marriage. What is returnable is also dependent on who is at fault. It is
also dependent on the duration of the marriage and the number of children
born from the relationship.253 However, most interestingly, if the lobola is
not paid back by the wife’s guardian, children born subsequently to the wife
by another man belong to the divorced man. This is so because, if lobola
is not returned, the marriage in principle still subsists. This position, it is
submitted, interferes with the woman’s right to found a family.254 It is also
a violation of her right to dignity and freedom.255
250Ibik (n 8) 200. See also Armstrong (n 22) 347.
251Notably, Ibik (as above) and Chigawa (n 5) 20.
252For example, in the districts of Dedza, Kasungu and Lilongwe.
253Armstrong (n 22) 348.
254Section 22 (3) of the Malawi Constitution.
255Section 19 of the Malawi Constitution.
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Maintenance
Art. 16 (1) (c) of CEDAW provides that men and women shall have ‘the
same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution.’ At
the national level, the Malawi Constitution provides that, on the dissolution
of her marriage, a woman has the right to fair maintenance, taking into
consideration all the circumstances, in particular, the means of the former
husband and the needs of any children.256 It is, therefore, expected that
upon dissolution of a marriage, provision for her maintenance will be made.
Under the matrilineal system, there used to be no provision that a husband
had a duty to maintain his wife after divorce. However, this position seems to
have changed. Courts, as it will be noted in Chapter 7, are being influenced
by the constitutional and international standards that dictate that on the
dissolution of a marriage, women have a right to maintenance. For instance,
in the case of Mwandida Saiti v Charles Pemba257 the Court ordered that the
husband should maintain the wife after the divorce by paying her a reasonable
amount of money monthly until she found a job.
Similarly, in the patrilineal system, there is no duty placed on the husband
to maintain his wife once the marriage has been dissolved. In theory, the
divorcee is to be absorbed back into her own family.
256Section 24 (1) (b) (ii) of the Malawi Constitution.
257Civil Cause No. 28 of 2004, Zomba district MC (Unreported).
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Matrimonial property
In the southern region of Malawi there is a narrative that a man is supposed
to ‘leave with his blanket’, meaning that he is not only expected to leave the
matrimonial home, ordinarily situated in the village of his wife after divorce,
that he cannot claim any material goods from the household - except for his
blanket.258 This logic would obviously lead us to expect that women take all
the matrimonial property after divorce in the matrilineal systems of Malawi.
It also leads us to expect that women’s right to property is not violated.
Of course, on the other hand, we see the inequality, on the basis of gender,
between men and women. Men’s right to property seems to be violated upon
the dissolution of a marriage.259
Contrary to the above position, in patrilineal customary marriages men
seem to be at an advantage over women. The rule that wives have no propri-
258Zulu E., ‘Social and cultural factors affecting reproductive behaviour in Malawi,’ 1996
as cited by Reniers (n 219).
259Section 24 of the Constitution provides:
(1) Women have the right to full and equal protection by the law, and have
the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of their marital status
which includes the right- · · · (b) on dissolution of marriage- (i) to a fair
disposition of property that is held jointly with a husband; · · · and (2)
Any law that discriminates against women on the basis of gender or marital
status shall be invalid and legislation shall be passed to eliminate customs and
practices that discriminate against women, particularly practices such as-
· · · (iii) deprivation of property, including property obtained by inheritance.
[Emphasis added]
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etary capacity obviously leads us to expect that women lose all their property
when the marriage ends.260
4.8 Inheritance under African customary laws
of Malawi
4.8.1 Introduction
In this section, I discuss laws that are applicable to a deceased intestate
estate governed by customary family laws. The section is divided into two
subsections. First, I discuss the customary family laws governing inheritance
during the precolonial period. Secondly, I discuss the current position of
distribution of a deceased intestate estate as regulated by the WIA.
4.8.2 Customary rules of inheritance
In patrilineal systems, the administrator of the deceased estate is the father
of the deceased, or, if he is already dead, a brother of the father. The estate
of a woman is administered by her husband.261 On the other hand, women
are not given a chance to administer their deceased husband’s property. This
260Bennett (n 30) 123.
261Von Benda-Beckmann (n 4) 114.
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practice, it could be argued, conflicts with the right to equality. Furthermore,
as a general rule, in most patrilineal systems a married man’s estate is in-
herited by his eldest son from the first wife. If there are no heirs from the
first wife, children from the second wife can inherit. In this instance we see
that daughters are not included as heirs. This customary rule is in conflict
with the right to equality.262 The research by the MHRC found that women
strongly felt that the practice of girls not inheriting valuable property, like
land, should be abolished.263
On the other hand, in matrilineal systems the administrator of the de-
ceased estate of a husband is either a brother to the wife, the eldest son
of the eldest sister, or the maternal uncle. As a general rule, these males
are also the principal heirs of the deceased man. 264 As previously noted,
children in matrilineal system do not belong to their father’s lineage but to
their mother’s. This means that they do not access or inherit their father’s
property or position after his death.265
In both patrilineal and matrilineal systems, we see that the administrators
and heirs are always males. This position, it is submitted, conflicts with
the right to equality since women are not given the same privileges and
responsibilities as men.
262Section 20 of the Malawi Constitution.
263MHRC (n 47).
264Von Benda-Beckmann (n 4) 114.
265Armstrong (n 22) 357.
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4.8.3 Customary inheritance under Wills and Inheri-
tance Act (WIA)
After 1967, the inheritance law is now regulated by WIA.266
Section 3 of the WIA, it is submitted, amends the customary laws relating
to inheritance. This provision provides:
‘Except as provided for in this Act, no person shall be entitled,
under customary law, to take by inheritance any of the property
to which a deceased person was entitled at the date of his death’.
The above provision seems to be all embracing and suggests that inheri-
tance at customary law is now determined by WIA. To that end, Section 16
(2) (a) and (b) provides:
‘if a marriage was arranged in an area described in the Schedule,
the persons entitled under such intestate property shall be- (i)
as to the half share, the persons entitled upon a fair distribution
in accordance with section 17 of the Act. Persons entitled under
such fair distribution are the wife, issue and dependants of the
intestate; (ii) as to the other half share, the heirs in accordance
with customary law’. If the marriage was arranged in any other
266Chapter 10:02.
222
 
 
 
 
area of Malawi the persons entitled to such intestate property
shall be- (i) as to three-fifths share, the heirs in accordance with
customary law; (ii) as to the remaining two-fifths share, the per-
sons entitled upon fair distribution under section 17 of the Act’.
From the foregoing WIA provision, it should be noted that the areas de-
scribed under the Schedule are: Chitipa, Karonga, Rumphi, Nkhatabay, Mz-
imba and Nsanje. It should also be noted that persons entitled upon a ‘fair
distribution’ are the wife, issue and dependants of the deceased intestate
estate. Several conclusions can, however, be drawn from Section 16 (2) of
WIA. Whilst acknowledging that WIA makes provision for the distribution
of property that belongs to a male person who has died without leaving a will
and is survived by widow, issue and dependants, this provision discriminates
against women. In the first place, it is noted that a similar position has not
been adopted in respect of the intestate estate of a deceased woman.267 Sec-
ondly, women in matrilineal and patrilineal societies are treated differently.
It is surprisely peculiar that in matrilineal systems a wife and children acquire
two-fifth share of the estate and customary heirs get a three-fifth share of
the estate; in patrilineal systems the wife and children get half of the estate.
Thus, the law favours one category of beneficiaries of the intestate against
the other category.
In addition, under Section 16 (4) of WIA268 the law does not make a like
267See also White (n 7) 35.
268Section 16 (4) of WIA provides that where a deceased man left no wife, issue or
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provision for a deceased man as it does for a deceased woman survived by
children. On that score, the law is discriminatory as between a man and a
woman who are both survived by children.
Furthermore, Section 16 (5) of WIA provides that:
‘A widow shall hold her share of her deceased husband’s estate
upon the condition that if she re-marries any portion thereof
which still subsists at the date of such re-marriage shall become
divisible between her children by the deceased upon a fair distri-
bution in accordance with section 17 of the Act.’
From the foregoing, we see that a widow loses her share of the estate upon re-
marriage. This provision, arguably, discriminates against women on the basis
of marital status as the widow loses her share of the estate upon re-marriage.
It is also important to note that Section 17 (i) (a) of the WIA provides
that before any prescribed share is distributed amongst the widow, issue
and dependants, provision should first be made for dependants.269 On the
dependant surviving him and also in the case of a deceased woman the persons entitled to
the property shall be ascertained in accordance with customary law. However, the proviso
to this subsection provides that where the deceased woman leaves children, such children
shall be solely entitled.
269According to Section 2 of the WIA, a dependant is defined as ‘a person who was
maintained by that deceased person immediately prior to his death who was a child,
issue, wife, parent, any other person living with that deceased person or a minor whose
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one hand, we see that this position, unfortunately, does not give the widow
priority over the property of her deceased husband to which, in all likelihood,
she contributed toward acquiring. She is treated like any other dependant.
On the other hand, we see that the widow has a chance to benefit twice, both
as a dependant and as a surviving spouse.
4.9 Conclusion
This Chapter has depicted the impact of the Bill of Rights on African cus-
tomary family laws affecting women’s rights in Malawi to the ongoing debate
about the universalism and cultural relativism from a grounded and situa-
tional women’s law perspective. African customary family laws that are in
conflict with women’s rights are located at the cutting edge of cultural rel-
ativists values and women’s different shifting and complex legal needs as
individuals and as members of family group.
Overall, the Chapter has highlighted some of the major rules and practices
of African customary laws that potentially offend against the Bill of Rights
and international human rights standards aimed at protecting women’s rights.
These include: polygamy, which entitles a man but not a woman to marry
more than one spouse; the rule that entitles a husband the right to own the
property acquired by his wife during the subsistence of the marriage, but not
education was being provided for by that person, and who is incapable, wholly or in part,
of maintaining himself’.
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vice versa; the rule that only a husband in patrilineal customary marriages
and a wife’s guardian in matrilineal marriages can terminate the marriage;
the principle of male primogeniture, which entitles males and not females
to inherit from a deceased person; not requiring a woman’s consent to en-
ter into a marriage; while the practice of lobola, symbolising a husband’s
marital power over his wife, also denies a woman’s right to equality. The
highlighted customary rules that are incompatible with the Bill of Rights
and international standards will further be discussed in Chapter 6 when we
will be considering how law reformers have sought to transform some of these
features of customary family laws in the field of marriage.
What has been evident from the analysis undertaken in this Chapter is
that some features of African customary family laws governing marriage, di-
vorce and inheritance effectively discriminate against women on the basis of
their gender, and, accordingly, are in direct conflict with the Bill of Rights,
especially Sections 20 and 24 of the Malawi Constitution. Moreover, this
discrimination not only deprives women of the capacity to exercise their con-
stitutional rights, but, weakens their overall status in society by not treating
them with the human dignity afforded to men.
Malawi has an obligation under both the Malawi Constitution and the
international instruments that it has ratified to do all within its powers to
stop discriminatory cultural practices against women. The question there-
fore should be how this should be done. By recognising the power of cultural
influences on the acts of both men and women, I intended to show that any
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efforts to eradicate these practices, however well meaning, must be under-
taken with a very high level of cultural sensitivity.
227
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5
The Bill of Rights and
application of African
customary family laws in
Malawi
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2 we saw that after Independence the 1964 Constitution of Malawi
had an entrenched Bill of Rights.1 Unlike the 1964 Constitution, the 1966
Constitution did not have a comprehensive Bill of Rights. Reference was
1See Sections 11-27 of the Constitution of 1964.
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only made in Section 2(1)(iii) of the 1966 Constitution to the fact that the
Government and people of Malawi ‘shall continue to recognise the sanctity of
the personal liberties enshrined in the United Nations Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), and adherence to the law’.
The major milestone in the constitutional history of Malawi came in 1994
when the 1966 Constitution was replaced. Given Malawi’s history of violation
of human rights during Dr Banda’s autocratic rule, the Malawi Constitution,
understandably, has its focus on human rights concerns and grants broader
protection to individuals.2 In terms of Section 196 its Bill of Rights is con-
sidered one of the most entrenched chapters in the Malawi Constitution.3
Substantial amendment to it can only be made through a referendum, while
minor amendments can be made by a majority of at least two-thirds of the
total number of the members of the National Assembly. The Bill of Rights
recognises a range of rights.4
2Banda J ‘The Constitutional Change Debate of 1993-1995’ in Phiri KM and Ross KR
(eds) Democratisation in Malawi: A Stocktaking (1998) 316 at 319.
3Chirwa DM ‘Upholding the sanctity of rights: A principled approach to limitations
and derogations under the Malawi Constitution’ (2007) 1 Malawi Law Journal 3 at 3.
4These are: protection of human rights and freedom (sec. 15); right to life (sec. 16);
prohibition of acts of genocide (sec. 17); right to liberty (sec. 18); right to human dignity
and personal freedom (sec. 19); right to equality (sec. 20); right to privacy (sec. 21);
right to family and marriage (sec. 22); rights of children (sec. 23); rights of women (sec.
24); right to education (sec. 25); right to culture (sec. 26); prohibition of slavery and
forced labour (sec. 27); right to property (sec. 28); right to economic activity (sec. 29);
right to development (sec. 30); labour rights (sec. 31); right to freedom of association
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Of particular relevance to this thesis are the right to culture and women’s
rights. The right to culture is recognised without expressly subordinating
it to any other right.5 At the same time the Bill of Rights recognises the
rights of women to equality and special protection from the state.6 This
position is also similar to that in South Africa.7 These two rights, as noted
in the preceding Chapter, often come into confrontation because most African
customary law practices are inconsistent with the modern rights of women.8
In this Chapter, therefore, I address the problem that has been raised by
the dichotomy of Malawi’s dual constitutional commitment to the principles
of equality and non-discrimination and respect for cultural rights. This will
be done by examining the application, interpretation, enforcement and lim-
(sec. 32); right to freedom of conscience (sec. 33); right to freedom of opinion (sec. 34);
right to freedom of expression (sec. 35); right to freedom of the press (sec. 36); right to
access information (sec. 37); right to freedom of assembly (sec. 38); right to freedom of
movement and residence (sec. 39); political rights (sec. 40); right of access to justice and
legal remedies (sec. 41); arrest, detention and fair trial rights (sec. 42); and administrative
justice (sec. 43).
5See Section 26 of the Malawi Constitution. This position, arguably, is a mockery of
the constitutional protection of women’s rights since most customary practices conflicts
with women’s right to equality.
6See, for example, Sections 20 and 24 of the Malawi Constitution
7The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 also recognises the right to
culture in Sections 30 and 31 and has a non-discrimination clause in Section 9.
8See also Mwambene L ‘Reconciling African customary law with women’s rights in
Malawi: The proposed marriage, divorce and family relations Bill’ (2007) Malawi Law
Journal 113 at 113.
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itation of the Bill of Rights to African customary laws. It will be argued
that the courts’ application, interpretation and enforcement of the Bill of
Rights in relation to African customary laws has significant implications for
the impact that such the Bill of Rights can have on African customary laws
in Malawi.9 Among the crucial questions that are asked is: what can a
court do when a cultural practice conflicts with the right to equality? This
question, however, is part of the bigger question which this thesis is trying to
address, namely, the impact that the Bill of Rights has on African customary
family laws in Malawi. Secondly, it will look at how socio-economic factors
influence the measure and application of human rights, especially in so far as
they relate to women married under customary family laws in Malawi. This
serves to highlight the fact that socio-economic factors are some of the main
impediments to the practical application of human rights and instruments to
most women married under customary family laws.
An appreciation of the events leading to the Bill of Rights is helpful in
understanding and predicting how courts will apply and interpret African
customary laws in a constitutional framework. Accordingly, this Chapter
will first discuss the background leading to the Bill of Rights in the Malawi
Constitution. Then the Chapter will look at the application of such the Bill
of Rights to African customary laws. The question that is being addressed
is: whether the Malawi Bill of Rights applies to African customary laws or
9According to Section 9 of the Malawi Constitution, courts are responsible for inter-
preting, protecting and enforcing the Constitution and all laws.
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not. Thereafter, there is a discussion of the effect of applying such the Bill of
Rights to African customary laws. This will be followed by an examination of
how such the Bill of Rights limits the application of African customary laws.
Reference will be made to cases, both from Malawi and foreign jurisdictions,
to illustrate the points under discussion. Before concluding the Chapter, a
discussion on socio-economic factors that may limit the application of the
Bill of Rights to women married under customary law is undertaken. The
last section contains a conclusion.
5.2 Background to the Bill of Rights in the
Malawi Constitution
As previously noted in Chapter 3, Malawi attained its Independence in 1964.
The 1964 Constitution contained the Bill of Rights and installed a parlia-
mentary system of government following the British Westminster model.10
Although there was a multiparty system in principle, in practice there was
the overall dominance of the Malawi Congress Party under the autocratic
leadership of Dr Banda.11 As early as 1965 some cabinet ministers, espe-
cially from the northern region, rebelled against Dr Banda’s autocratic and
repressive leadership and some of his key political decisions. This challenge
10Chirwa V ‘What we fought for’ in Immink B et al (eds) From freedom to empowerment:
Ten years of democratisation in Malawi (2003) 49 at 50.
11Meinhardt H and Patel N Malawi’s process of democratic transition (2003) 3.
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was perceived by Dr Banda as a potential threat to his power. In order to nip
the threat in the bud, as it were, he consequently consolidated his authori-
tarian leadership system. As a first step, he introduced a new constitution
in 1966 which abolished the parliamentary system as well as the multi-party
system.12 In addition, Parliament in 1971 passed a law that made Dr Banda
the life president of Malawi13 He was sworn in as the Life President of Malawi
on 6 July 1971.14
Under the leadership of Dr Banda, Malawi was subjected to a one-party
dictatorship15 supported over the years by the West because of its anti-
communist stand.16 The hallmark of the office of the President was the
centralization of power and authority in the executive arm of the govern-
ment, and, more particularly, in its chief, the President, Dr Banda himself.17
The legislature and the judiciary were used as rubber stamps for the deci-
sions of the executive.18 More important is the fact that the judiciary was
12Section 4 (2) of the 1966 Malawi Constitution (Amended).
13Act No. 35 of 1970.
14Dzimbiri LB ‘Competitive Politics and Chameleon-like Leaders’ in Phiri KM and Ross
KR Democratsation in Malawi: A Stocktaking (1998) 87 at 88.
15Kanyongolo FE Malawi: Justice Sector and the Rule of Law (2006) 34.
16Mutharika P ‘The 1995 Democratic Constitution of Malawi’ (1996) Journal of African
Law 205.
17Chirwa (n 10) 50. See also Kanyongolo FE ‘The Limits of Liberal Democratic Con-
stitutionalism in Malawi’ in Phiri KM and Ross KR (eds) Democratisation in Malawi: A
Stocktaking (1998) 353 at 359.
18A distinction needs to be made between the HC (Western) system and TC. The HC
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not independent.19 It was, in most cases, acting on the orders of Dr Banda,
with the result that the so called TCs which were supposed to be administer-
ing customary justice were not doing so. The regime was also characterised
by human rights violations. While most accounts of human rights abuses
committed by Dr Banda’s regime focussed mostly on violations of civil and
political rights,20 it is important to note that many violations of women rights
were also committed. For example, it was a criminal offence for a woman
to wear trousers or mini-skirts because these styles of dress were considered
inimical to Malawian cultural values.21
The general dissatisfaction with Dr Banda’s regime contributed tremen-
maintained its independence throughout Dr Banda’s rule, although in some areas, its
protective role of human rights was severely restricted, especially in the application of
the Preventive Act and the Forfeiture Act. It was because of the increased jurisdiction
conferred on TC by Dr Banda in 1969 that the whole HC bench of white judges resigned.
19WLSA In search of justice: women and the administration of justice in Malawi (2000)
79.
20See, for example, Meinhardt and Patel (n 11) 5 who, among others, states that during
Dr Banda’s regime the police force became notorious for making arbitrary arrests, partic-
ularly of intellectuals and anyone they suspected of being a threat to the political system.
They further state that imprisonment of political opponents without trial, restriction of
rights of political organisations, trials conducted in TCs without legal representation, and
fabricated ‘car accidents’ were also among the human rights violations of Dr Banda’s
regime.
21Section 2-3 of the Decency in Dress Act, Chapter 7:04 also as cited by by Chirwa DM
‘A Full Loaf is better than Half: The Constitutional Protection of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights in Malawi’ (2005) Journal of African Law 207 at 210.
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dously to the renewed call for respect of human rights. It created the mo-
mentum to fight for change. The most notable event that marked the genesis
of the fight for change was the publication of the “Living Our Faith”, the
Lenten Pastoral Letter of 8 March 1992 by the Catholic Bishops.22 The
church emphasized the need for unity, and the dignity of human beings, and
that these could be achieved by allowing people the right to freedom, among
others. The decision of the international donor community to promote a
more clearly defined path of capitalist development which also led to sus-
pension of donor funds after the Cold War made it impossible to preserve
despotism in Malawi.23 The combined effect of all of these factors was a
referendum on 14 June 1993 to enquire from the people of Malawi whether
they wanted a change in government from one-party dictatorship to a return
to a multi-party democracy.24 The latter prevailed. The positive referendum
results indicated that the majority of Malawians were ready to change the
government of the day. In addition, the collapse of communism ensured that
the international community shifted its policy. It was no longer interested
in pursuing anti-communist support. It shifted its attention to human rights
and good governance.25
22Chirwa (n 10) 52; Dzimbiri (n 14) 90.
23Ngalande EE, Nankhuni FS and Chirwa EW ‘Economy and Democracy: Background,
current situation and future prospects’ in Phiri KM and Ross KR, Democratization in
Malawi: A stocktaking (1998) 70 at 73. See also Kanyongolo (n 17) 361 and Dzimbiri (n
14) 90.
24See also Chirwa (n 20) 210
25Chirwa (n 10) 52.
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Following the referendum the date for general elections was set. As ear-
lier noted, the 1966 Constitution contained no substantial recognition of or
respect for human rights. It was, therefore, essential that there be a new
constitution within which a viable Bill of Rights would be entrenched. Thus,
during the period between the referendum and the general elections, a new
constitution was drafted. In preparation for the new constitution, a Consti-
tutional Symposium was organised under the auspices of the Legal Resources
Centre.26 The Symposium was well attended by people from all sectors.27
Of greater importance to this thesis, women and traditional leaders also at-
tended. Some of the issues discussed were the Bill of Rights and women’s
rights. All resolutions passed at the Symposium formed the basis of the offi-
cial Constitutional Drafting Conference in Blantyre that was held in Febru-
ary 1994. The product of this Conference was a draft constitution which was
adopted by Parliament on 16 May 1994 and came into force provisionally on
18 May 1994.
It is against this constitutional background that the application of the Bill
of Rights to African customary laws in Malawi is examined.
26Banda (n 2) 321.
27Chirwa (n 10) 53.
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5.3 The Bill of Rights
5.3.1 Preliminary remarks
Malawi, like many countries in Africa,28 has sought to entrench the Bill of
Rights in its constitution. This has been done also as a way of addressing
discriminatory customary laws,29 by proscribing discrimination generally,30
and by providing for both gender equality and the application of custom-
ary laws.31 Customary family laws, just like any other applicable law of the
land, are subjected to the non-discrimination provisions contained within
the Bill of Rights.32 Arguably, Malawi adopted the ‘universalist’ position,
28See, for instance, chapter 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992,
accessed at http://www.ghanareview.com/Gconst.html, on 23/02/07 and chapter 4 of
the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995, accessed at
http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/constit/Constitu/constit/uganda/uganda-e.htm on
23/02/07 that also provide for fundamental rights, and chapter 2 of the Constitu-
tion of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
29See chapter 4 of the Malawi Constitution.
30See for instance, Section 20 of the Malawi Constitution, Section 9 of the Constitution
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Section 17 of the Republic of Ghana Constitution,
1992, and Section 21 of the Republic of Uganda Constitution, 1995. Arguably, Malawi has
thus fulfilled its first obligation to CEDAW, which requires states ‘to embody the principle
of equality of men and women in their national Constitutions’ in Art. 2 (a).
31Kamei-Mbote P Gender issues in land tenure under customary law
accessed at http://www.capri.cgiar.org/wp/..5Cpdf5Cbrief-land-05.pdf on 26/06/06.
32See Section 10 (2) of the Malawi Constitution which states that ‘in the application
and formulation of of any Act of Parliament and in the application and development of
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which, whilst recognising customary laws and a right to culture, make both
subject to the tests of non-discrimination and equality before the law.33 In
addition to the above, Malawi has shown its commitment to international
human rights by ratifying a range of international and regional human rights
instruments for the protection of women’s rights. These include the CCPR,
1966;34 CEDAW, 1979;35 CRC, 1989;36 and the Charter, 1990.37 This posi-
tion, however, should be contrasted with a ‘cultural relativist’ stance which
allows customary laws to continue unfettered by provisions relating to non-
discrimination or equality before the law.38
Having submitted that Malawi adopts the universalist position with regard
to the application of customary laws, in the following subsection we examine
common law and customary law, the relevant organs of the State shall have due regard
to the principles and provisions of this Constitution’. Similarly, Section 211 (3) of the
South African Constitution provides that ‘a court must apply customary law when that
law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals
with customary law’.
33See the discussion in Chapter 3. See also Grant E ‘Human rights, cultural diversity
and customary law in South Africa’ (2006) Journal of African Law 2 at 3.
34Ratified in 1993.
35Ratified in 1987.
36Ratified in 1991.
37Ratified in 1999.
38For example, see Section 23 (4) of the Zambian Constitution and Art. 15 (4)(c) of the
1966 Botswana Constitution, as cited by Banda F Women, Law and Human Rights: An
African Perspective (2005) 34. See also a discussion in Chapter 3.
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provisions of the Malawi Constitution that support this view.
5.3.2 Provisions for the Bill of Rights application to
African customary laws in Malawi
The application of the Bill of Rights to African customary laws under the
Malawi Constitution is governed by Section 10(2), which states:
‘In the application and formulation of any Act of Parliament and
in the application and development of the common law and cus-
tomary law, the relevant organs of the State shall have due
regard to the principles and provisions of this Constitution’. [Em-
phasis added]
It is important to note that the above provision is significant for two rea-
sons. First, it seems to place a limit on the applicability of customary laws:
‘due regard to the principles and provisions of this Constitution’ (My
emphasis). This, arguably, may lead to contradictions. The question that
can be asked is: is promoting cultural rights not having due regard to the
principles and provisions of this Constitution as envisaged by Section 10 (2)
above? What if such protection conflicts with the right to equality? Obvi-
ously these are some of the difficult questions that courts and law reformers
are likely to face. Secondly, the above provision suggests that courts have
jurisdiction over customary law, giving them the ability to apply and develop
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customary law. The question that can be asked is: are courts in Malawi bet-
ter placed to apply and develop customary laws? The answer to this question
is discussed in Chapter 7 when a discussion of the problems that courts face
in trying to resolve the conflict between customary laws and right to equality
is ensued.
That said, however, the above constitutional provision clearly obligates
courts39 to apply customary law. This duty, it is submitted, seems to be sub-
ject to several conditions. First, the Malawi Constitution mandates courts
to apply customary laws. But the provision, just like its South African coun-
terpart,40 does not give guidance to courts as to when customary law should
or should not be applied.41 Courts are then left with the dilemma of choice
of laws. The dilemma is further compounded by the fact that application of
customary laws may yield the result of denying women their human rights.42
This prompts some authors to say that common law should be applied in-
39According to Section 9 of the Malawi Constitution, courts have been mandated to
apply and interpret laws.
40Section 39 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides that:
‘When · · · developing common law or customary law, every court · · · must promote the
spirit, purport or objects of the Bill of Rights’.
41This has been similarly observed with respect to South Africa by Lehnert W ‘The role
of courts in the conflict between African customary laws and human rights’ (2005) South
African Journal of Human Rights 241 at 244.
42As above.
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stead.43 This position, agreeing with Himonga,44 is in total disregard of those
people who have chosen to live according to their cultural life. In addition to
this, such a position lacks a constitutional justification that makes it a good
part of a well designed constitutional approach that had obviously to take to
account of the fact that the majority of Malawian women live according to
customary family laws.45
The absence of a provision in the Malawi Constitution directing courts
when to apply customary laws gives a discretion to the courts to determine
when customary family laws could be applied. Factors that have been sug-
gested to determine applicability are the lifestyle and intention of the par-
ties.46 For example, if the parties before a court of law were married under
customary law, it should be assumed by it that customary law would be
applicable.47 With respect to South Africa, where there is only a patrilineal
43See South African Law Reform Project 90 (1998) Harmonisation of the Common Law
and Indigenous Law Report on Customary Marriages 16 as cited by Himonga C ‘The
advancement of African women’s rights in the first decade of democracy in South Africa:
The reform of the customary law of marriage and succession’ (2005) Acta Juridica 82 at
86 .
44As above.
45See n 13 in Chapter 1.
46Responses from the interviewed magistrates and judges. See also Bennett TW Human
Rights and African Customary Law under the South African Constitution (1995) 52 in
respect of South Africa.
47Responses from the interviewed magistrates and judges. See also Lehnert (n 41) 245
in respect of South Africa.
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customary marriage system, with of course some differences amongst tribes,
this would be an easy pointer to the adjudicating officers. The same would
not be true for Malawi where there is dualism in the customary marriage
system.48
A review of case files in courts that I visited supports Bennett’s suggestion
that the lifestyle of the parties should direct a court to the law which is
applicable to the parties before it. It has been noted that in most cases the
determination of what law to apply in a matrimonial dispute was dependent
on evidence that showed that either of the parties was married according to
a matrilineal or patrilineal customary law system.49 The court then would
either apply matrilineal or patrilineal customary rules.50 This approach,
arguably, is consonant with Section 26 of the Malawi Constitution which
states that ‘every person shall have the right to participate in the cultural
life of his or her choice’. In such a scenario courts simply give effect to the
agreement that the parties had made that such a cultural practice should
48In Malawi, as noted in Chapter 4, customary law marriages are matrilineal or patri-
lineal.
49See, for instance, the cases of Bennings Manda v Jane Mpata, Civil Appeal Case No. 59
of 2005, HC, Mzuzu District Registry (Unreported); Temwanani Nkhonjera v Sebesian
Gwengweya Civil Appeal Case No. 9 of 2004, HC, Mzuzu District Registry (Unreported);
and Lauren Pereira Kamangira v Jones B Kamangira, Civil Cause No. 266 of 2004, HC,
Lilongwe District Registry (Unreported).
50This is true for all the case files that I looked at and all the cases that I observed in
court.
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guide them.51 It also brings to rest the issue of what law is applicable in a
given matrimonial case.
On the other hand, on reading Section 26 of the Malawi Constitution closely
one gets the impression that it is immaterial whether a marriage was, for
example, contracted according to matrilineal customary law. However, a
party may be married according to a matrilineal customary law but choose
to live according to a patrilineal customary law. Section 26 of the Malawi
Constitution states: ‘Every person shall have the right to ‘participate in the
cultural life of his or her choice.’ Therefore, in Malawi, the fact that one
was married according to a particular customary law, it is submitted, should
not be a determinative factor. What should, arguably, direct the courts is:
in what type of cultural life are the parties before it participating. Kinason
Tembo v Lucy Tembo52 illustrates this. It was an appeal from a MC. One
of the grounds of appeal was that the marriage was celebrated under the
lobola system, and the appellant could not see why he should be subjected to
the chikamwini system where a wife is entitled, as of right, to a matrimonial
house as from the day of the marriage. The Judge ruled that there was no
irregularity on the part of the lower court in awarding the respondent the
matrimonial house. By doing so, the HC Judge said the appellant was not
subjected to the chikamwini system for the said order had nothing to do with
51Bennett (n 46) 52.
52Kinason Tembo v Lucy Tembo, Civil Appeal Case No. 11 of 2004, HC, Lilongwe
District Registry (Unreported).
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any particular marriage system. However, if, for example, the parties had
chosen to live according to a matrilineal system, the magistrate would not
have been wrong to subject the man to the chikamwini system if their way
of life had indicated that they were living according to that custom.
It is extremely difficult to determine people’s ‘way of life’. Nothing has
been developed in this direction.
Furthermore, Section 10 (2) of the Malawi Constitution mandates courts to
have due regard to the principles and provisions of the Malawi Constitution
in the excercise of their duty to apply and develop any laws (Emphasis
added). This section is also similar to Section 39 (2) of the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa, 1996.53 On the one hand, Section 10 (2) of
the Malawi Constitution seems to put all laws, including customary family
laws, on the same footing. This puts to rest the issue of whether the Malawi
Constitution ranks the laws to be applied and developed by the courts. On
the other hand, since in the area of women’s rights the generally patriarchal
nature of customary family laws, as discussed in Chapter 4, are at odds
with the Malawi Constitution, customary family laws would not enjoy the
same position as other laws when it comes to applicability.54 This view is
supported, arguably, by few customary law cases that were found lodged in
53As previously noted, Section 39 (2) of the South African Constitution provides that
‘When · · · developing common law or customary law, every court · · · must promote the
spirit, purport or objects of the Bill of Rights’.
54See also Lehnert (n 41) 243, who also noted this point with respect to South Africa.
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the HC of Malawi.
From the research that I conducted, I found that there were very few cases
involving a customary marriage that were originally instituted in the HC of
Malawi.55 Most cases56 came to the court in the form of appeals from the
MC. It was also observed that all customary marriage disputes are instituted
in the MC, whilst all marriage disputes in respect of marriages contracted
under the Marriage Act57 are instituted in the HC.
During the interviews, reasons that were given by some judges for this
divergence were: firstly, magistrates have no jurisdiction over marriages con-
tracted under the Marriage Act58 therefore they cannot adjudicate in dis-
putes relating to those marriages; secondly, most litigants whose marriages
are contracted under customary laws cannot finance the HC proceedings;
and thirdly, instituting proceedings in the MC leaves the litigants room for
appeal.
55See, for example, Mungomo v Mungomo, Matrimonial Cause No. 6 of 1996, HC,
Principal Registry (Unreported), and Likaku v Likaku, Matrimonial Cause No. 10 of 1999,
HC, Principal Registry (Unreported).
56For example, Grevazio Moyo v Elizabeth Moyo, Civil Appeal Case No. 55 of 2004, HC,
Lilongwe District Registry (Unreported); Kinason Tembo v Lucy Tembo (n 55); Zione
Chitete v Alex Chitete, Civil Appeal Case No. 59 of 2004, HC, Lilongwe District Registry
(Unreported); George Kadambo v Catherine Kadambo, Civil Appeal Case No. 22 of 2002,
HC, Lilongwe District Registry (Unreported).
57Chapter 25:01.
58Interviews at the three HC visited.
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It is submitted that, on the face of it, customary law marriages are left
with enough room for appeal, and therefore preferred over marriages con-
tracted according to the Marriage Act. However, considering that most MC
in Malawi are manned by lay magistrates, it leads one to conclude that the
court system regards marriages contracted under customary laws as less im-
portant than marriages contracted under the Marriage Act.59 This is, how-
ever, not to imply that lay magistrates are not important in Malawi. Lack
of jurisdiction of MC to test the validity of customary rules against the Con-
stitution makes the HC, which has such constitutional jurisdiction that can
protect the constitutional rights of these women, a better court than that
of the the magistrates. Moreover, the disadvantages that women married
under the Marriage Act are subjected to are far less than those the majority
of Malawian women married under customary laws (see Chapter 4).
As regards developing this branch of the law so that it is in line with the
Malawi Constitution, one wonders, with due respect, how the MC would
approach this issue. In the first place, these courts do not have the power
to determine the constitutional validity of a particular rule. Secondly, they
are mostly manned by lay magistrates, whose legal expertise is not up to
the required standard to be able to resolve the conflicts that arise between
the Constitution and the customary family laws governing customary mar-
59This position is unfortunately regrettable considering the fact that statistics show
that almost all marriages in Malawi, as indicated in Chapter 4, are contracted according
to customary laws.
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riages.60 As earlier noted, in Malawi, on the basis of interviews that I con-
ducted, what is alarming is that this incapacity also extends to some pro-
fessional magistrates, as well as judges. Most of them are not so conversant
with African customary marriage laws.61 This position, as noted by some
judges, was as a result of Dr Banda’s dual court system, of TCs and HC,
which did not give a chance to judges of the HC to improve their knowledge
of customary laws.62 As noted in Chapter 3, all cases in which customary
law was to be applied were handled by the TC system.
So, on the one hand, we find that the lay magistrates would be conversant
with customary marriage laws, but not with constitutional and international
principles, to enable them to resolve constitutional conflicts. On the other,
we find that professional magistrates and judges are well equipped with con-
stitutional principles, but not conversant with customary family rules. This
scenario, obviously, is a challenge to the application and development of cus-
tomary laws in a constitutional environment.
60This point has also been noted by Chirwa DM ‘Reclaiming (Wo)manity: The Merits
and Demerits of African Protocol on Women’s Rights’ (2006) Netherlands International
Law Review 63 at 75 who, in commending the Protocol, stated: ‘The undertaking to ensure
that law enforcement organs at all levels are equipped to effectively interpret and enforce
gender rights is particularly relevant to the protection of women disputes involving African
customary laws. In most legal systems in Africa, disputes concerning customary law are
resolved by magistrate’s courts, which are mostly staffed by lay persons’.
61See Appendix 3 that presents the responses that I was given during the interviews.
62These views were expressed during an interview that I conducted with two Judges of
the HC in Blantyre on 10 May 2006.
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5.3.3 Effect of the application of the Bill of Rights to
African customary laws
The Malawi Constitution contains general provisions which are relevant to
women’s rights, such as the right to equality,63 right to family and marriage,64
and right to property.65 It also contains a provision aimed specifically at
the protection of women’s rights, namely, the rights of women.66 These
provisions, it is argued, bring about profound changes in the application of
customary family laws under the Malawi Constitution.
For example, Section 20(1) of the Malawi Constitution prohibits discrim-
ination on certain specified grounds, including sex. The prohibition of dis-
crimination on the ground of sex is, arguably, intended to protect women
more than men.67 It should, however, be noted that some constitutions do
not include sex as one of the grounds on which discrimination is prohibited
in its non-discrimination clause.68 Section 20 (1) of the Malawi Constitution,
however, leaves no doubt that discrimination based on being a woman will
63Section 20 of the Malawi Constitution.
64Section 22 of the Malawi Constitution.
65Section 28 of the Malawi Constitution.
66Section 24 of the Malawi Constitution.
67This provision is also similar to Section 9 (3) of the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa, 1996.
68See, for example, Section 13(5) of the Constitution of Tanzania as cited by Banda (n
37) 35.
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not be tolerated.
Furthermore, the above provision states that ‘all persons are, under any
law, guaranteed equal and effective protection against discrimination · · ·’. It
is interesting to note the reference to ‘any law’. It is, therefore, no defence
to discriminate because of customary laws. As will be shown later, in some
cases courts seem to apply laws that are discriminatory toward women and
men.
In addition, Section 20(2) of the Malawi Constitution specifically states
that:
‘[l]egislation may be passed addressing inequalities in society and
prohibiting discriminatory practices and the propagation of such
practices and may render such practices criminally punishable by
the courts’.
The right to protection against discrimination is buttressed by Section 20
of the Malawi Constitution, which includes gender as a prohibited ground
of discrimination. In addition, Section 24(2) of the Malawi Constitution ex-
pressly states that ‘[a]ny law that discriminates against women on the basis of
gender or marital status shall be invalid’. It also obligates the state to adopt
legislative measures that eliminate customs and practices that discriminate
against women including practices such as sexual abuse, harassment and vio-
lence, and deprivation of property including property obtained by customary
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inheritance.69
Therefore, reading Sections 20(2) and 24(2) of the Malawi Constitution
together, one gets the impression that the right to culture does not enjoy the
same status as the right to equality.70 As noted in the preceding subsection,
Section 10 (2) of the Malawi Constitution provides that ‘in the application
and development of customary law, the relevant organs of the state should
have due regard to the principles and provisions of the Constitution’. Thus,
customary law, just like any other law, is subject to the provisions of the
Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Consti-
tution is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency.71
On the face of it, therefore, any provision of African customary family law
that contravenes any provision of the Bill of Rights may be declared to be
unconstitutional. However, courts will not lightly declare African customary
family laws to be unconstitutional for being inconsistent with any other right,
including the right of women to equality. This is so because any legislation
that varies, alters or abrogates any rule of African customary law72 must not
constitute an unjustifiable infringement on the right to culture. This means
that Parliament does not have a free hand to overrule African customary
69Mwambene (n 8) 115.
70As above.
71Section 5 of the Constitution.
72According to Section 48 (2) of the Malawi Constitution, ‘An Act of parliament shall
have primacy over other forms of law, but shall be subject to the Constitution’.
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family laws. It can do so only to the extent that it does not unjustifiably limit
the right to culture. Essentially this means that any legislation that seeks
to advance and protect women’s rights must strike an appropriate balance
between many interests and rights, especially the right of women to equality,
and the right of individuals and groups of people to culture.73
5.3.4 How does the Bill of Rights affect the application
of African customary family laws?
the Bill of Rights affects the application of African customary family laws in
a number of ways. First, some rights within the Bill of Rights are capable
of being directly invoked in the day to day application of customary family
laws in the courts. For example, on the dissolution of a marriage Section 24
(1) (b) of the Malawi Constitution imposes a duty on courts to fairly dispose
of property held jointly with a husband, among other issues. Since marriages
by custom, as previously noted in Chapter 2, have been recognised by the
Malawi Constitution, this duty, therefore, extends to customary marriages as
well.74 In Willie Malilo v Maltina Malilo75 the appellant and the respondent
were married under matrilineal customary laws. On 24 October 1997 the
MC dissolved the marriage and ordered the appellant to pay K3,020.00 by
73Mwambene (n 8) 115.
74Section 22 (5) of the Malawi Constitution.
75Civil Appeal Case No. 8 of 1997, HC, Lilongwe District Registry (Unreported).
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way of compensation to the respondent. The appellant was also ordered to
build a house for his wife and their five children. The Court further ordered
that their matrimonial properties be shared equally. It is against this order
that the unhappy husband appealed. In upholding the lower court’s decision,
Judge Kumange said:
‘If the husband is found to have built no house for his wife, the
court must grant the decree of divorce, but subject to his building
the woman a reasonable house for her to live in. That is the
customary law requirement, and forcifully operative in matrilocal
societies like from Southern Region. Where property is in bulk,
courts have power to order that it be shared equitably between
the wife and the husband’.76
From the above decision, two issues are worth some comment. The Court
upheld the matrilineal customary law rule that a husband has a duty to build
a house for his wife even after the decree of divorce has been granted. This
is a good development, because customary law rules are being used by the
courts to enforce a socio-economic right of women, ie the right to housing.
On the other hand, it is noted that the above decision departs from the
customary law rule that there is no duty of equitable distribution of property
76As above, 10.
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and maintenance of a spouse after the dissolution of a customary marriage.77
Such a decision, however, is in conformity with the constitutional requirement
of the fair distribution of property after the dissolution of a marriage.78
Secondly, other rights within the Bill of Rights set broad standards of
constitutionality against which any legislation or rule of customary laws is
to be measured, and any law or conduct inconsistent with these standards
is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency.79 Any differentiation in the
treatment of women and men, amply provided for in legislation, must meet
the broad standard of not being discriminatory.80 Likewise, the customary
77See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the customary law rules of maintenance and distri-
bution of property after dissolution of a customary marriage.
78Section 24 (2) of the Malawi Constitution.
79See Section 20 of the Malawi Constitution. Similarly, see also Section 9 of the Re-
public of South Africa Constitution, 1996. In the South African case of Bhe and others
v Magistrate Khayelitsha and others, Shibi v Sithole and others, South African Human
Rights Commission and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another
(2005(1) BCLR 1 (CC); 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC)) for example, the Court was faced with
African women challenging the patriarchal construction of customary law that favoured
the inheritance rights of men over women. The Court ruled that the Constitution guar-
anteed equal rights to women and was premised upon the principle of non-discrimination,
including sex. The rule of male primogeniture was declared unconstitutional as it contra-
vened the right to equality.
80Section 20 (1) of the Malawi Constitution provides that:
‘Discrimination of persons in any form is prohibited and all persons are,
under any law, guaranteed equal and effective protection against discrim-
ination on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
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rules pertaining to who can initiate divorce proceedings in court must be
judged against the constitutional norms of equality before the law.81
Furthermore, it can be argued that Section 20 of the Malawi Constitution
sets a broad standard on the legislature. In that regard, it precludes the
legislature in Malawi from enacting laws that apply differently to or confer
different rights and obligations on persons on the basis of their external
attributes such as race, sex or tribe. It also imposes a duty on the legislature
and the executive to repeal and abrogate all laws that have the effect of
treating persons in like situations differently. This is probably one of the
reasons why the Malawi Law Commission is proposing a unified law that
would govern all types of marriage in Malawi.82
Drawing upon the example of the different marriage laws applicable in
Malawi, Section 20 of the Malawi Constitution, it is further argued, requires
that courts refrain from applying laws to women that would yield discrimi-
natory results. Under the Malawi Constitution discrimination in law is not
opinion, nationality, ethnic or social origin, disability, property, birth or other
status’.
[Emphasis added] It is proposed that Section 20 should be read together with Section 11
of the Malawi Constitution.
81Section 41 of the Malawi Constitution.
82A full discussion of the the proposed law is undertaken in Chapter 6. This proposed
law, if passed, will ultimately confer the same legal rights on married couples irrespective
of the type of marriage. The different types of marriages referred to here are customary,
Christian, Asiatic and common law marriages.
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permissible. The provisions of Section 5 of the Malawi Constitution,83 which
make the Constitution supreme over any other law, is to the effect that any
law that negates the essence of equality in law cannot be enforced by the
courts.84
However, before these rights can be applied in practice the courts must
give content to the standards they contain.85
Thirdly, the Bill of Rights applies also indirectly to the ordinary rules of
the court which may be interpreting a customary law in relation to women’s
rights. Section 11 (2) (b) of the Malawi Constitution provides that ‘· · · in
interpreting the provisions of this Constitution a court of law shall take full
account of the provisions of Chapter III and Chapter IV’.
From the above constitutional provision it can be argued that, where the
language of the legislation permits, the court must interpret, for example, the
WIA86 in conformity with the Bill of Rights. Furthermore, where legislation
gives the court a wide discretion, for example, to give a meaning to the broad
use of the gender terms “male” or “female” when they relate to a deceased
83Any act of government or any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of this
Constitution shall to the extent of such inconsistence be invalid.
84Similarly, see Section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
85A full discussion of how a court might do this takes place later in this Chapter.
However, at this point, it suffices to state that the ‘content’ refers to: what does the right
mean; to whom does it apply; who is bound by it - just to mention a few.
86Chapter 10:02.
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estate, it should be exercised in conformity with the Bill of Rights. This
would, arguably, require that courts insert “female” where the word “male”
appears and vice versa. Such an interpretation would also be in conformity
with Section 2 (2) of the General Interpretation Act87 which states that in
‘every written law, unless a contrary intention appears, words and expressions
importing a masculine gender include females and words and expressions
importing the feminine gender include males’.
It should, however, be noted that Section 11 (2) (b) of the Malawi Consti-
tution can be contrasted with Section 39 (2) of the South African Constitu-
tion,88 which latter provides that any forum must promote the objects of the
Bill of Rights. On the other hand, in Malawi the fact that Section 11 (2) (b)
seems to be limited to courts of law is very unfortunate. [My emphasis].
As previously noted in Chapter 3, most disputes are resolved by informal
courts that have not been recognised by the formal court system. The effect
of Section 11 (2) (b) (1), it is submitted, limits the application of the Bill
of Rights to those forums that are adjudicating over disputes in a formal
court system. It is, therefore, proposed that Section 110 (3) of the Malawi
Constitution, that empowers Parliament to make provision for traditional or
local courts presided over by lay persons or chiefs, be implemented so that
87Chapter 1:01.
88Section 39 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides that
‘when interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law,
every court, tribunal or forum must, inter alia, promote the spirit, purport and objects of
the Bill of Rights’.
256
 
 
 
 
local courts can also be constitutionally empowered to promote the spirit of
the Bill of Rights.
Having said that, however, it is important for us to look at a practical
example of how a rule of customary law can be interpreted so as to bring it
in conformity with the Bill of Rights. In the South African case of Mabena
v Letsoalo,89 one of the issues before the court concerned the validity of the
marriage between a woman (the applicant) and her deceased husband. The
mother of the applicant, rather than her father, had negotiated the marriage
with regard to lobola and consented to the marriage. The deceased husband’s
father denied the existence of the marriage between his late son and the
applicant. He argued that, according to customary law, a female, in this case
the applicants’s mother, could not be a guardian of her child for the purposes
of negotiating the child’s marriage. Only a male, the father, could play this
role. The Court held that the marriage was valid. While acknowledging the
official customary law position that was presented by the deceased’s father,
the Court noted that there had been instances where mothers have negotiated
for, and received, lobola and consented to the marriage of their daughters. In
this case the court thus allowed a customary marriage to be valid where the
negotiations for the payment of lobola had been done by the mother instead
of the father.
This case is important for two reasons. First, it shows how a court can
interpret a customary rule so that it is in conformity with the constitutional
891998 (2) SA 1068 (T).
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principles of equality between men and women without taking away the cus-
tomary rule of lobola. Secondly, it balances the customary rule of lobola and
the right to equality by allowing both men and women to have negotiating
powers.
In summary, we see that the decision, arguably, enforced the principles
of equality and non-discrimination between men and women with regard to
negotiating and consenting to marriages of daughters under customary family
laws. It could further be argued that the customary law that only fathers
should negotiate their daughters’ marriages, was developed to a level where
the offending part of the rule was changed by the court. The case forms a
precedent upon which future conduct could be regulated with regard to who
can negotiate a customary marriage.
Lastly, apart from constitutional rights that can be applied directly to
women, it can further be argued that ordinary customary rules will continue
to be administered in respect of women who come before a court of law.
The constitutional standards set by the Bill of Rights serve, then, only as
a safety net and as an interpretative norm.90 While the Bill of Rights sets
the foundational norms in the application of customary laws, it is submit-
ted that it is no substitute for, or replacement of, the ordinary rules and
principles governing customary marriages. It is, therefore, suggested that
courts must apply the usual rules and principles, interpreted in the light of
the Bill of Rights, and only if the former do not vindicate a person’s claim
90See Section 10 of the Malawi Constitution.
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does the Bill of Rights come into play. The converse is also true; because
the Bill of Rights constitutes a minimum set of guarantees, ordinary rules
of governing customary marriages could provide more protection than what
the constitution demands.91
5.3.5 Limitations on application of African customary
family laws in Malawi
While substantive issues before the court will be important, it is a question of
how the limitation sections within the Malawi Constitution operates that will
set the tone of future cases before the court. The application of customary
laws, just as any other law in force in Malawi, is, arguably, first limited by
Section 5 of the Malawi Constitution.92
The principle of the supremacy of the national constitution ensures that,
in legal interpretation, human rights guarantees take precedence over any
other laws or customary rules.93
91See Willie Malilo v Maltina Malilo, (n 104).
92Section 5 of the Malawi Constitution provides that:
‘any act of Government or any law that is inconsistent with the provisions
of this Constitution shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be invalid’.
93Ibhawoh B ‘Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural legitimacy of
Human Rights in the African State’ (2000) Human Rights Quarterly 838 at 847. Similar
provisions of constitutional supremacy exists in the constitutions of other African countries
for instance, Section 26 (1) of the Republic of Ghana Constitution; Section 37 of the
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The wording of Section 5 of the Malawi Constitution seems to suggest
that if customary law is inconsistent with the Constitution it would be in-
validated.94 Commenting on Section 2 of the South African Constitution,
as read with Section 39, Rautenbach95 observed that ‘the wording of these
provisions is to the effect that the application of customary law is subjected
to the provisions of the Bill of Rights and the Constitution’.
It is, therefore, argued that Section 5 of the Malawi Constitution places
limitations on the application of customary law since any customary law that
is inconsistent with the Constitution would be invalid. However, as earlier
noted in this Chapter, courts do not have a free hand to declare customary
laws invalid, since these laws could be justified on the basis of the enjoyment
of the right to culture.
A further limitation on the application of customary laws is seen in Section
10 (2) of the Malawi Constitution which provides that: ‘· · · in the application
and development of customary law, the relevant organs of the State shall have
due regard to the principles and provisions of the Constitution’.
Furthermore, Section 44 (1) of the Malawi Constitution places the right to
Republic of the Uganda Constitution.
94This position is similar to Section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa, 1996 which provides: ‘This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law
or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid and obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.’
95Rautenbach C ‘Some comments on the status of customary law in relation to the Bill
of Rights’ (2003) Stellenbosch Law Review 107.
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culture among the rights in respect of which a limitation is permitted. As
rightly argued by Chirwa,96 the limitation clause, as provided by Section 44
(1), has application to all rights in the Bill of Rights. Therefore, even though
Section 26 does not have an internal limiting clause within it, the general
limitation clause applied under Section 44 (1) of the Malawi Constitution
would be applicable. This position, however, is to be contrasted with Section
30 of the South African Constitution,97 which subjects the enjoyment of the
right to culture to the other provisions of the Bill of Rights.98 It is, however,
submitted that in Malawi, the absence of a limiting provision under Section
26 implies that the above argument would not be applicable.
On the other hand, it can be argued that in both situations, whether a
right is limited by a general limiting provision or an internal limiting clause
the effect ultimately is that they both restrict the application of the right.
In this particular case they restrict the enjoyment of cultural rights.
Having said that, it is, however, important to note that in terms of Sections
44 (1) and (2) of the Malawi Constitution limitations on a constitutional
right, including the right to culture, may be permitted only where they are
96Chirwa (n 3) 3.
97Section 30 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides: ‘Every-
one has the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life of their choice,
but no one exercising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision
of the Bill of Rights’.
98Grant (n 33) 7.
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‘prescribed by law, which are reasonable, recognized by international human
rights standards and necessary in an open and democratic society’.99
Section 44 (2) as quoted above sets a number of tests which courts have
to meet if it is to be constitutional notwithstanding its restriction of a right
or rights contained in the Chapter IV of the Malawi Constitution. The first
hurdle that must be met in terms of Section 44 (2) is that the rights contained
may be limited by prescription of law. While this may be interpreted in a
number of ways, a court will at least have to determine that the ‘prescribed
law’ is certain and not vague, or lacking in precision. Those affected by the
law must be able to know what is expected of them. Should they be unable
to do so, then the law would fall foul of this test.100 The question that can
be asked is: if a limitation is affected by a constitutional right and not law,
99Section 44 (2) of the Malawi Constitution provides that:
‘Without prejudice to subsection (1), no restrictions or limitations may be
placed on the exercise of any rights and freedoms provided for in this Consti-
tution other than those prescribed by law, which are reasonable, recognised
by international human rights standards and necessary in an open and demo-
cratic society’.
See also Hansen TT ‘Implementation of International Human Rights Standards through
the National Courts in Malawi’ (2002) Journal of African Law 31 at 34 who points out the
difference between the limitation clause that was in the 1966 Constitution and the Malawi
Constitution. In the Malawi Constitution, he noted that apart from the limitation to be
prescribed by law and reasonable, it also has to be recognised by international human
rights standards.
100Sieghardt P The International Law of Human Rights (1983) 92.
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would this provision also apply? Obviously, such are some of the difficult
questions that courts are likely to be faced with.
Furthermore, Section 44 (2) further demands that a law, when it impinges
on a right, must meet the test of being ‘reasonable’ and ‘recognised by inter-
national human rights standards and necessary in an open and democratic
society’. The terms ‘reasonable’ and ‘necessary’ in an open and democratic
society are vague and will need to be interpreted within the Malawian con-
text. Such interpretation will obviously play a significant role as far as dis-
criminatory customary family laws against women are concerned, where one
of the questions will be whether enjoying one’s right to culture can be jus-
tified as a limitation on the right to equality? While this will, probably be
answered in the affirmative, the real dilemma for a court will be to determine
how far this limitation should be permitted to provide for the enjoyment of
the right to culture.
The trend internationally in determining the meaning of terms such as
‘open’, ‘democratic’, ‘necessary’, and ‘reasonable’ will obviously have a bear-
ing on the interpretive endeavors of Malawian courts.101 Sieghardt102 states,
in the European context, that to evaluate a democratic society one must
consider:
‘· · · the needs or objectives of a democratic society in relation to
101See a discussion of the role of international law in Malawi in Chapter 6.
102Sieghardt (n 100) 93.
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the right or freedom concerned; without a notion of such needs,
the limitations essential to support them cannot be evaluated.
The aim is to have a pluralist, open, tolerant society. This nec-
essarily involves a delicate balance between the wishes of the in-
dividual and the utilitarian ‘greater good of the majority’. But
democratic societies approach this problem from the standpoint
of the importance of the individual, and the undesirability of re-
stricting his or her freedom.’
In addition to the above, Section 44 (3) of the Malawi Constitution provides
that laws providing for the limitation should not negate the essential content
of the right or freedom in question and should be of general application.
This means that a limitation of a right that falls short of these requirements
cannot pass the constitutional test.
The interpretation of the limitation section will thus play a large part
in constitutional adjudication. The manner in which it restricts rights will
probably be used to justify customary family laws.
5.3.6 Enforcement procedure under the Bill of Rights
All rights recognised in the Bill of Rights are enforceable in courts of law in
Malawi.103 It is important to note that the enforcement procedure provided
103Section 15 (2) of the Malawi Constitution.
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in the Malawi Constitution, has a big role to play in the enjoyment of rights
contained in the Bill of Rights. There is no purpose in having a well con-
structed and phrased Bill of Rights as a legal document whose fruits cannot
be enjoyed. For this reason, therefore, this section examines the enforcement
mechanism for the rights and freedoms provided for in the Bill of Rights. The
aim is to show how the enforcement mechanisms, available within the Bill
Rights, can impact on the application and protection of the right to culture.
Section 15 (2) of the Malawi Constitution provides:
‘Any person or group of persons with sufficient interest in the
protection and enforcement of rights under this Chapter shall
be entitled to the assistance of the courts, the Ombudsman, the
Human Rights Commission and other organs of Government to
ensure the promotion, protection and redress of grievance in re-
spect of those rights’. [Emphasis added]
The language of the above provision, it is submitted, strongly suggests that
any claimant must have a genuine reason for approaching the above bodies if a
particular right is to be protected or enforced. On a broad interpretation the
phrase ‘any person’ clearly suggests that the claimant’s own constitutional
rights need not have been infringed.104 When it comes to the enforcement
of the women’s rights of those women married under customary family laws,
104See also similar arguments by Chirwa (n 20) 237.
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this provision is important for two reasons. First, the majority of women
whose rights continue to be affected by customary family laws are unaware
that they can approach the courts and assert their rights.105 Secondly, since
the jurisdiction to declare a customary law or any other law invalid rests in
the HC, not so many claimants can afford the complicated procedure and
the expenses of HC cases.106
In addition to the above section, Section 46 (2) (a) provides:
‘Any person who claims that a fundamental right or freedom guar-
anteed by this Constitution has been infringed or threatened shall
be entitled · · · to make an application to a competent court to
enforce or protect such right or freedom’. [Emphasis added]
Just like Section 15 (2), discussed above, this section also allows any person to
bring a claim to a court of law. Therefore, the advantages for the protection
of women married under customary family laws are the same as discussed
above. However, the words ‘competent court’ seem to suggest that not all
courts are able to grant constitutional remedies. Indeed, according to section
108 (2) of the Malawi Constitution, the HC has:
105On the general public awareness of the rights contained in the Bill of Rights, see
Centre for Advice, Research and Education in Rights Needs Assessment Survey 1998 as
cited by Kanyongolo (n 15) 131.
106Kanyongolo (n 15) 135.
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‘· · · original jurisdiction to review any law, and any action or de-
cision of the Government, for conformity with this Constitution,
save as otherwise provided by this Constitution and shall have
such other jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred on it by
this Constitution or any other law’.
Therefore, the competent court envisaged under section 46 (2) is the HC.
Having noted that sections 15 (2) and 46 (2) of the Malawi Constitution
grant an expansive application to claimants of a constitutional violation,
it is, however, disappointing to find that a decision of the SCA adopts a
narrow interpretation of these sections.107 According to the SCA a litigant
must have a direct interest in the case. This position, arguably, greatly
disadvantages most Malawian women married under customary family laws
because these women may, among other reasons, not be able to finance the
expensive HC proceedings. It is my argument that they would have been
protected adequately if the above sections were interpreted widely.
Moreover, as rightly noted by others,108 this position also affects the type
of cases that can be litigated in Malawi, preventing test cases that could
have a potentially greater transformative potential than the narrow individ-
107See Press Trust Case as cited by Chirwa (n 20) 237.
108Grippen S and Kanyongolo FE ‘Courts and the poor in Malawi: Economics, Marginal-
isation, Vulnerability and the Law’ (2007) International Journal of Constitutional Law 258
at 276.
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ual claims. An example of a test case is Bhe Case109 where (in addition to to
appellants Bhe and Shibi) the SAHRC applied for direct access to the CC to
have Section 23 of the Black Administration Act and the regulations promul-
gated thereunder declared unconstitutional on the ground that its provisions
infringed the rights to equality and human dignity. The Court granted direct
access to the applicants, hearing all three cases simultaneaously.
It is also submitted that the narrow interpretation adopted by the courts
in Malawi offers little chance for the Bill of Rights to make a noticeable
impact on African customary family laws since, as it will be discussed in the
following section, most women married under customary laws are unable to
enforce their rights. On the other hand, the decision in Kachere and others v
Attorney General,110 which had adopted the wide interpretation of Sections
15 (2) and 46 (2) of the Malawi Constitution, is to be preferred. With
such an interpretation more women’s rights violations would be litigated by
organisations acting on behalf of women whose rights have been or are being
violated but who cannot enforce them on their own.
109Bhe and others v Magistrate Khayelitsha and others, Shibi v Sithole and others, South
African Human Rights Commission and Another v President of the Republic of South
Africa and Another 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC); 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC). This case concerned
the customary law of succession embodied in the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 and
the constitutionality of the principle of male primogeniture.
110Civil Cause No. 2187 of 1994, HC, Principal Registry (Unreported).
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5.4 Socio-economic factors and the applica-
tion of Bill of Rights in Malawi
The dialogue on women’s rights mainly focus on the condemnation of cus-
tomary family laws and practices governing customary marriages that have
failed to satisfy the demands of international human rights law on gender
equality.111 In Malawi, such condemnation has led to gender sensitive pro-
grams and policies,112 and hieghtened the demand for the repeal of unjust
legislation in order to achieve gender equality.113
However, it should be recalled that the Malawi Constitution can accommo-
date both rights to gender equality and the practising of culture.114 To a large
extent, some international scholars have sought ways of doing this. Sachs,
111See White S et al Dispossessing the widow: Gender based violence in Malawi (2002);
Ntata P and Sinoya C Customary law and the UN conventions on women and children
(Unpublished) (1999); and MHRC Cultural practices and their impact on the enjoyment
of human rights, particularly women and children (Unpublished)(2005). See also similar
views with regard to Kenya by Juma L ‘Reconciling African Customary law and Human
rights in Kenya: Making a case for Institutional Reformation and revitalization of cus-
tomary adjudication processes’ (2002) St Thomas Law Review 459 at 493.
112See Malawi Government National Gender Policy (2000-2005) and Malawi Government
Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2002).
113See, for example, Malawi Law Commission Report on the Review of Marriage and
Divorce laws (2005); and Malawi Law Commission Report No. 12 on the Review of Wills
and Inheritance Act (2004).
114Sections 20 and 26 of the Malawi Constitution, respectively.
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for example, argued for consultation to ensure that distortions of traditional
customary practices were corrected and that positive aspects of customary
systems were emphasised and developed.115 Chanock pointed to the erro-
neous assumptions underlying the association of customary family laws with
gender inequality. To support this view, Chanock showed that in the past
both civil and customary law failed African women by restricting the rights
of women and children.116
Despite this, it should be recalled that in Malawi socio-economic factors
limits the application of the Bill of Rights more than the inhibitions imposed
by African customary family laws. 117 For example, most customary fam-
ily rules that were discriminatory against women are changing due to social
change and yet customary family laws are still blamed for the disadvan-
tages that women face. This section, therefore, examines these limitations
with a view to showing how the complex interrelations of the various fac-
tors in Malawi, place limitations on the application of the Bill of Rights to
African customary family laws which would ultimately benefit the enjoyment
115Sachs ‘Towards the Bill of Rights in a Democratic South Africa’ 1990 as cited by
Mbatha L, Moosa N and Bonthuys E ‘Culture and religion’, in Bonthuys E and Albertyn
C (eds), Gender, Law and Justice (2007) 158 at 167.
116Chanock ‘Law, State and Culture: Thinking about “Customary Law” after Apartheid’
1991 as cited by Mbatha, Moosa and Bonthuys (as above) 167.
117See also similar views by Grippen S and Kanyongolo FE ‘Courts and the poor in
Malawi: Economics, Marginalisation, Vulnerability and the Law’ (2007) International
Journal of Constitutional Law 258 at 259.
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of women’s rights.
The limitations placed on the application of the Bill of Rights to African
customary family laws in Malawi can be seen from a number of perspectives.
First, there are those that are related to poverty and the marginalisation
of women. Secondly, there are those related to the economy of the country.
Thirdly, there are those related to high levels of illiteracy of women. Fourthly,
there is an added complication resulting from lack of knowledge of the resolu-
tion of conflict between African customary laws and women’s rights. Lastly,
the judicial system has its own limitations. In practice, however, these lim-
itational dimensions do not operate in isolation. All these limitations have
serious implications for the application of the Bill of Rights to African cus-
tomary laws. They define the extent to which the Bill of Rights can have
an impact on African customary family laws that are discriminatory against
women.
5.4.1 Poverty and marginalisation of women
Malawi is one of the world’s least developed countries in Southern Africa.118
Poverty and the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS reduced life expectancy at
birth, in Malawi, to an estimated 39.8 years in 2006.119 The average house-
hold income in Malawi is around 50,000 Malawi Kwacha (US $400) per year.
118UNDP Malawi in Human Development Report (2006).
119As above.
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The median per capita income of the richest 10 percent of the population is
eight times greater than that of the poorest 10 percent.120 The majority of
the Malawian population are poor. Fifty two percent of the population is
poor, with 22 percent unable to meet the minimum standard for their daily
recommended food requirement.121 International measures of poverty and
development confirm the picture. UNDP’s 2006 Human Poverty Index for
Least Developed Countries ranks Malawi at 83 out of 102 developing coun-
tries, and the 2006 Human Development Index places it at 166 out of 177
countries.122 In addition to the above, in Malawi the condition of poverty is
characterised by lack of productive means to attain basic needs such as food,
water, shelter, education and health. In absolute terms, poverty is associated
with starvation and hunger.123
Historically women have been susceptible to exploitation, and have been
shunted to the periphery of economic power by laws and policies that pro-
moted the interests of men, urban elites, and colonial and post-colonial
landowners and employers.124 Women, children, and rural peasants are par-
ticularly affected by poverty. The average yearly income for male-headed
households is US $415 and that of female-headed households is US $250.
120Malawi Government Malawi Growth and Development Strategy: From poverty to Pros-
perity (2006-2010) xiii.
121As above.
122See also Grippen and Kanyongolo (n 117) 261.
123White (n 111) 27.
124Grippen and Kanyongolo (n 117) 261.
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Ninety percent of poor people live in rural areas. Households in urban areas
have an income almost three times higher than that of rural households and,
while 25 percent of urban dwellers live in poverty, 56 percent in the rural
population are considered impoverished.125
Malawian women operate from a disadvantaged position. Women form
51 percent of the population. A third of Malawian households are female-
headed.126 The marginalisation of women is both a result and a cause of
their political weakness. As rightly noted by Grippen and Kanyongolo127
‘· · · the involvement of women was critical during the campaigns
for decolonisation and democratisation, power has now been ceded
to a ruling class of men whose interests coincided with those of
the landowners, employers, and the emerging urban middle class.
The latter’s interests had displaced those of other groups, who
were subsequently excluded from decisions on the distribution of
resources and power. Political weakness re-inforces marginalisa-
tion, causing further political weakness’.
Thus, it could be argued that the web of maginalisation and poverty in which
125As above (n 7) 263.
126White (n 111) 27. See also Liebenberg S ‘Social and economic rights; A critical chal-
lenge’ in Liebenberg S (ed) The Constitution of South Africa from a Gender Perspective
(1995) 79 at 87 with respect to South Africa.
127Grippen and Kanyongolo (n 117) 262-263.
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women are trapped negatively impacts on what impact the Bill of Rights
would have on African customary family laws. Few women are in a position
to enforce or challenge discriminatory laws against them.
5.4.2 Economic limitations
This section examines the performance of the Malawi economy and how it
places limitations on the application of the Bill of Rights to African custom-
ary laws, and which ultimately defines the extent to which the Bill of Rights
can have an impact on women married under customary family laws.
Malawi’s economy is largely based on agriculture which accounts for 90
percent of its export earnings and 45 percent of its gross domestic product
(GDP). The main export crops are tea and tobacco. Maize is an important
food crop. More than 80 percent of the population, located in the small-
holder sector, depend on agriculture for their livelihood.128 The majority of
women are found in the smallholder agriculture sector that is characterised
by low incomes due to low productivity and unfavourable input/output price
ratios.129 The result is that 65.3 percent of the population lives on less than
20 US cents per day. Of these, more than 70 percent are women. Numerous
accounts have also shown how women and children bear the greatest bur-
den of poor economic conditions and how they suffer discrimination in the
128WLSA Malawi and SARDC WIDSAA Beyond inequalities (2005) 6.
129As above.
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allocation of resources.130
Good economic conditions are important because they determine a govern-
ment’s ability to better the living conditions of its people. Heightened by the
implementation of structural adjustment programs emphasising ‘economic
liberalisation, deregulation of prices of all commodities, factors and services,
large scale privatisation of public enterprise, cutbacks in government expen-
ditures on social services and employment,’131 the inability of government to
spur economic development, it is argued, negatively impacts on what impact
the Bill of Rights could have on the practice and enjoyment of human rights
by women married under customary laws. The ability to file suit and seek
recovery for violations of human rights, as discussed, often depends on one’s
ability to pay exorbitant legal fees. To that end, it has been rightly observed
that ‘it is reasonable to assume that the vast majority of Malawians who live
on less than US$ 1 per day cannot afford to pay the fees that are required
to commence judicial proceedings, let alone pursue them to a satisfactory
conclusion’.132
In Malawi seeing that rural women depend on their agriculture, it is also
obvious that the impact of poor economic performance in the rural areas
could be because of droughts that impact on agricultural productivity. This
obviously causes rural women to be especially vulnerable. Good nutrition
130As above, 6-10.
131As above, 7.
132Kanyongolo FE Malawi: Justice Sector and the Rule of Law (2006) 134.
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and income are also directly related to the ability to successfully complete an
education. An education is essential for sustained and effective participation
in political and economic decision making, and for the effective enjoyment
of civil and political rights.133 Without effective economic power, women
are unable to enforce their political rights. This demonstrates that human
rights are interdependent and indivisible, and that the denial of social rights
as human rights reinforces the maginalisation of women in society.134
Therefore, if the Bill of Rights is to have any impact on the lives of women
married under customary laws, it is suggested that there is need for the
government to address the immediate socio-economic concerns of the rural
women who are mostly farmers.
The importance of economic factors to people at the international level is
reinforced under the CESCR.135 Under the CESCR, States have an obligation
to take steps ‘individually or through international assistance’ to ensure that
the rights provided by the Covenant are realised.136
133Liebenberg (n 126) 87-88.
134As above, 88.
135CESCR, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, entered into force Jan. 3 1976, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
136Art. 2 of CESCR.
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5.4.3 Literacy levels
The relationship between a high literacy level and how it can enable one to
assert one’s rights cannot be over emphasised. High levels of literacy locate
people at the centre of cultural, economic, social and political activity.137
Unfortunately, in Malawi there are significant differences regarding literacy
and formal education between women and men. The literacy rate of women
is 50 percent against 76 percent for men.138 In urban areas 86 percent of the
population is literate, compared with 61 percent of rural dwellers.139 In addi-
tion, only 31.4 percent and 40.2 percent of women and men respectively have
completed primary education. The completion rates for secondary schooling
are 11.1 percent and 19.9 percent respectively.140
The discussion in the preceding paragraph suggests that there is a signifi-
cant link between high levels of literacy and the positive impact that the Bill
of Rights can have on discriminatory customary family laws. The extent to
which a woman is able to assert her rights, it could be argued, depends on her
level of understanding of the rights in question. Therefore, higher illiteracy
levels among most Malawian women as shown by the above statistics mean
lower chances of women asserting their rights.
137See also Grippen and Kanyongolo (n 117).
138Government of Malawi (n 2).
139As above. It is important to note that in Malawi most women governed by customary
family laws live in rural areas.
140NSO/ Macro (2001).
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5.4.4 Judicial limitations
As it will be noted in Chapter 7, the jurisprudence emanating from the HC
of Malawi shows that the courts have narrowly interpreted the Constitution
when seeking to confer the benefits of the Bill of Rights or of rights under
international instruments on women married under customary family laws.
The relationship between the Bill of Rights and African customary laws
presents a great challenge to the Malawi judiciary. As it will be discussed
in Chapter 7, individual magistrates and judges interpret the rights in the
Malawi Constitution differently, with the result that there are inconsistencies
in the application of the Bill of Rights to African customary family laws. It
is, however, important to note that how magistrates and judges interpret
rights contained in the Bill of Rights determines the impact that the Bill
of Rights can have on customary family laws. However, the question that
should be asked is: what shapes judicial interpretation?
From the interviews that I conducted, it would appear that the following
circumstances seem to shape judicial interpretation. They are: the personal
value placed by individual magistrates or judges on the importance of enforc-
ing cultural rights or not; and the understanding of what is the appropriate
way to deal with the conflict between cultural rights and women’s rights.
The responsiveness of magistrates and judges in dealing with the conflicting
claims of rights depends on how they understand the relationship between
278
 
 
 
 
them. As Grippen and Kanyongolo141 have correctly noted:
‘The Malawi Constitution is ambiguous. Sections 13 and 14 re-
quire the judiciary to take into account the principles of national
policy in its interpretation of the law, suggesting that judges
should not delink law from politics. On the other hand, Section
9 seems to require a stricter dichotomisation, providing that the
judiciary shall have the responsibility of interpreting, protecting
and enforcing this Constitution and all laws in accordance with
this Constitution in an independent manner with regard only to
legally relevant facts and the prescriptions of law’.
Among Malawian magistrates and judges, it was noted that some emphasise
the importance of customary family laws and are reluctant to regard them
as violating the rights of women. Others welcome the Bill of Rights and
use it to replace customary rules. In effect, therefore, the application of
the Bill of Rights to customary family laws has become subject to varying
interpretations by individual courts based on the sketchy guidelines provided
by the Malawi Constitution.
141Grippen and Kanyongolo (n 117) 287.
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5.5 Conclusion
This Chapter set out to look at first, how the application of the Bill of Rights
can impact on African customary laws. Among others, it has been noted that
certain rights within the Bill of Rights can directly or indirectly affect the
application of African customary family laws. These rights are provided in
Sections 20 and 24 of the Malawi Constitution.
The Chapter has also looked at some provisions that place limitations on
the application of African customary family laws. To that end, the Chapter
has outlined several provisions in the Malawi Constitution that potentially
limit the application of African customary family laws. However, several
factors need to be satisfied before a right can be limited.142
In conclusion, this Chapter looked at how socio-economic factors place lim-
itations on the application of the Bill of Rights to African customary family
laws. In this regard, the Chapter has demonstrated that the limitations
placed on the application of the Bill of Rights to African customary family
laws in Malawi stems from a myriad of conditions, some of which are pred-
icated upon the weakness of court structures. These limitations, and the
prevalence of incongruent customary practices sanctioned by African cus-
tomary family laws as discussed in Chapter 4, form part of a mammoth
infra-structural deficiencies which the legal system must surmount before
142Section 44 (3) of the Malawi Constitution.
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any meaningful change can occur.143 In order for the Malawi legal system to
evolve, the approach taken must incorporate mechanisms or responses that
are holistic and all encompassing. As rightly pointed out by Juma,144 ‘re-
sponses that are aimed at eliminating incongruence on aspects of personal
law may be justified only on account of their overall effect in stimulating
change in the legal system as a whole’.145 However, agreeing with Juma,
the mere adjustment of law to conform to standards established under in-
ternational law146 as will be demonstrated in Chapter 6 without offering a
concurrent process of resolving the conflict between customary family laws
and women’s rights may evoke criticisms.
143see also Juma (n 111) 501 in relation to Kenya.
144As above.
145As above.
146As above.
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Chapter 6
Law reform: Reconciling
African customary family laws
with modern women’s rights
6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4, African customary family laws that are in conflict with the
Bill of Rights and international standards, and how the conflicts emanate,
were briefly examined. In this Chapter an examination will be undertaken of
how the legislature is using the Bill of Rights and international standards to
reconcile some customary family laws that have been noted to be at variance
with women’s rights. The aim is to discuss the approach that the legislature
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in Malawi, through the Malawi Law Commission, has taken to advance the
rights of women married under customary family laws and bring this system
of law in line with the Bill of Rights and international standards on the
protection of women’s rights.1 It also aims at considering factors that may
affect the implementation of these laws.
This Chapter is divided into five sections. First, the Chapter looks at the
role and relevance of international law on law reform of customary family
laws in Malawi. The aim is to assess how reform of customary family laws
in Malawi seek to incorporate the relevant international standards for the
protection of women’s rights. It then examines the proposed Marriage, Di-
vorce and Family Relations Bill, hereinafter called ‘the Bill’.2 The aim is
to discuss the law reforms that have been proposed to the institutions of
African customary marriage and divorce. It then examines the Deceased
Estates (Wills, Inheritance and Protection) Act, hereinafter called ‘DEPA’.3
1It should be noted that the legislature, of course, bears the principal duty to advance
human rights, a responsibility that may well entail legislation to change customary laws
in Malawi. This duty stems from Section 8 of the Malawi Constitution: ‘The legislature
when enacting laws shall reflect in its deliberations the interests of all people of Malawi and
shall further the values explicit or implicit in this Constitution.’ However, the legislature
is assisted by the Malawi Law Commission which has the general mandate of reviewing
and making recommendations regarding any matter pertaining to the laws of Malawi, and
preparing reports. This is in accordance with Sections 132-135 of the Malawi Constitution.
2The Bill is attached to the Malawi Law Commission Report on the Review of Marriage
and Divorce Laws in Malawi (2005).
3DEPA is attached to Malawi Law Commission Report No. 12 on the Review of the
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The fourth section briefly discusses factors that may affect the implementa-
tion of the proposed laws. The last section is a conclusion.
6.2 International law and law reform on women
rights in Malawi
International law is of special relevance to Malawi women’s rights law reform
in view of the fact that the constitutional drafting process was premised on
guaranteeing a human rights based democracy, in sharp contrast to the one
party dictatorial rule of Late Dr H.K Banda which had resulted into total
denial of human rights.4 As Chirwa5 points out:
‘The institutional set up of Dr Banda’s regime could not, however,
ensure the efficient and effective observance of good governance
and respect for human rights’.
Wills and Inheritance Act (2004).
4Chirwa V ‘What we fought for’ in Immink et al (eds) From freedom to empowerment:
Ten years of democratisation in Malawi Forum for Dialogue and Peace (2003) 49 at 52.
5Chirwa as above.
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6.2.1 Justification of use of international law
There are two central reasons why international law plays an important role
in law reform in Malawi. The first emanates from the fact that some in-
ternational law norms in the women’s rights sphere have been elevated to
constitutional status in the Malawi Constitution, which renders them jus-
ticiable in Malawian courts.6 The second rationale derives from the legal
status of international law in Malawian municipal law. According to section
211 (2) of the Malawi Constitution7 some international agreements form part
of the laws of Malawi. This position is relevant with respect to ICCPR,8 the
6Section 4 of the provides that:
the Constitution shall bind all executive, legislative and judicial organs of the
State at all levels of Government and all the peoples of Malawi are entitled
to equal protection of this Constitution, and laws made under it’.
7Section 211 (2) of the Malawi Constitution provides:
‘International agreements entered into before the commencement of this Con-
stitution and binding on the Republic shall form part of the law of the Re-
public, unless Parliament subsequently provides otherwise or the agreement
otherwise lapses.
8Ratified by Malawi in 1993.
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CRC,9 the ICESCR10, the CEDAW11 and the ACHPR.12 All these inter-
national agreements, as can be seen from their date of ratification, became
part of domestic law in Malawi by virtue of section 211 (2) of the Malawi
Constitution and they are, therefore, enforceable as part of domestic law.
Therefore, the justification for considering international law in relation to
women’s rights reform is the elevation of international law in Malawian do-
mestic law. This is through a direct incorporation of some international law
standards pertinent to women’s rights in the Malawi Constitution.13 Thus
a key principle of CEDAW and other international instruments, namely, the
non-discrimination clause has been enshrined in the Malawi Constitution.
This principle, as discussed in Chapter 3, has significance for a substantial
area of according women equal rights in all cycles.
However, in addition to these general points, the socio- political justifica-
tion for considering international law’s influence on legislation dealing with
women in Malawi, and the significance of the incorporation of certain inter-
national law principles in Malawi’s Bill of Rights, as discussed above, there
are two further reasons why, in the legal sense, international law has par-
ticular implications for women legislation reform here. These are first, that
9Ratified by Malawi in 1991.
10Ratified by Malawi in 1993.
11Ratified by Malawi in 1987.
12Ratified by Malawi in 1990.
13An example would be section 20 of the Malawi Constitution on the right to equality.
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having ratified CEDAW, as a treaty, it enjoys binding status.14 Second, in-
ternational law has been granted enhanced status in the Constitution, not
only in relation to the interpretation of constitutional provisions, but also
as a relevant factor in the development of the customary family laws and
in the interpretation of municipal statutes by the judiciary.15 Consequently,
international law assumes a position of importance in relation to two as-
pects of legal development in this sphere, namely in respect of the drafting
of legislation, and in respect of law reform via judicial interpretation.
The impact of these justifications for taking international law into account
in a descriptive analysis of women’s rights reform in Malawi can be explained
from a number of reasons. First, from 1994 onwards, women’s rights re-
form processes have unfolded during a period of escalating violence16 against
women that have, in most cases been justified by customary family laws.
For example, it has also been reported that women are grabbed of their
husband’s deceased intestate estate because of customary family laws which
regard women as perpetual minors without capacity to own property.17 These
14Art. 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 obligates State Par-
ties to international instruments to ‘refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of the treaty’.
15See Section 11 of the Malawi Constitution.
16Sevenier A ‘Life-skills education for girls helps end the cycle of abuse in Malawi’
Nyasatimes, 12 March 2008 accessed at http://www.nyasatimes.com. See also the ‘Chron-
icle newspaper’ 20 July 2004’ in which traditional cultures were reported to be among the
demand for early marriages of young girls, among other cultural practices.
17White S et al Dispossessing the widow: Gender based violence in Malawi (2002) 53.
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are some of the facts that have occasioned raging debates about how to deal
with the discriminatory customary family laws and the problems accompa-
nying it. One response to these pressures has been the enactment of the
Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, 2006 (PDVA) which, among others,
seeks to prevent incidents of domestic violence in Malawi within the general
framework of the Constitution, the National Gender Policy and the National
Strategy on Gender-Based Violence.18
A consequence of these, therefore, has been that the international standards
on the protection of women’s rights have competed with local influences in
shaping the process of women’s rights reform, and, more specifically, the
proposals for new legislation contained in the reports.19
6.2.2 Relevance of international law principles concern-
ing women’s rights reform in the Malawi Consti-
tution
An international law regime may add weight to scrutiny of domestic women’s
rights legislation,20 practices and decisions of courts in a numbers of ways.
18Memorandum to the PDVA.
19Report of the Malawi Law Commission (n 2) and Report of the Malawi Law Commis-
sion on the Review of Wills and Inheritance Act. These will be discussed in Chapter 6.
20See, for example, the report of the Law Commission (n 2). In this report, it is stated,
inter alia, that Malawi has an obligation to meet international standards in its municipal
laws.
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International law may be used to resolve ambiguities and gaps, as well as in
areas where judges may have to exercise a discretion in relation to any mat-
ter.21 As a general proposition, international law may be important in the
women’s rights field precisely because it invokes an external normative stan-
dard of review, to some degree detached from politics, social contingencies
and the changing shape of looking at women’s rights in general. International
law may also give guidance to legislative drafters as to the standards that
municipal legislation is required to meet.22
Having seen the justification and significance of international law in law
reform, in the following sections an examination of how international law has
influenced law reform in Malawi is made. This is by looking at the manner
in which law reformers seek to reconcile African customary family laws and
women’s rights in the Bill and DEPA.
6.3 Bill
The reform of customary marriage laws in Malawi is planned to be effected
through the Bill. Responding to the new and emerging socio-political en-
21See, for example, the Botswana case of AG vs Dow case as it will be discussed in
Chapter 7.
22See Report by Malawi Law Commission on Marriage and Divorce (n 2).
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vironment in Malawi,23 the Malawi Government, in pursuit of its policy to
promote the principles equality and non-discrimination and empowerment
of women in all spheres of life in Malawi, in September 2001, through the
Malawi Law Commission, constituted a special law commission to undertake
a review of the marriage and divorce laws of Malawi.
With that end in view, the special law commission produced a Report.24
This has, however, not been translated into law yet. The discussion will
therefore center on the draft of legislation for the enactment of the recom-
mendations of the Malawi Law Commission attached to the abovementioned
Report. However, in order to appreciate the changes that are proposed to
the area of customary marriages, it is important to understand the marriage
laws that are applicable in Malawi. For this reason, the following subsection
gives an overview of the marriage laws in Malawi.
6.3.1 Marriage laws in Malawi
There is no comprehensive Act that deals with rights pertaining to marriage
in Malawi. Separate laws apply, depending on the marriage regime that a
person belongs to. In general, there are four marriage regimes. The first deals
23Malawi Law Commission Overview and Issues of Gender-Based Law Reform in Malawi
(2003) (hereinafter called ‘The Gender Overview’).
24See n 2 above.
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with marriages contracted under the Marriage Act.25 These are monogamous
marriages contracted in terms of the rites of civil marriages in England. The
rights and obligation of the parties to this marriage type are defined in the
said Marriage Act, the Divorce Act,26 the Married Women (Maintenance)
Act27 and the common law.
The second regime embraces customary law marriages. As earlier noted
in Chapter 4, customary marriages are potentially polygamous marriages
contracted by anyone according to the customary law applicable to him or
her. The rights and obligations of the parties to this type of marriage are
embodied in the customary law applicable to that at marriage. The majority
in Malawi marry according to this type of marriage.28
Christian marriages constitute the third marriage regime. These are con-
tracted in accordance with Christian rites in terms of the African Marriages
(Christian Rites) Registration Act.29 This Act merely makes provision for
the celebration of African marriages in accordance with Christian rites but
the marriage remains a customary one in every respect.30 It does not lay
down any rights and obligations which the parties to this marriage have.
25Chapter 25:01.
26Chapter 25:04.
27Chapter 25:05.
28See n 15 in Chapter 1 where it has been noted that 77 percent of respondents opt for
customary officiation of their marriage.
29Chapter 25:02.
30See Section 3 of the African Marriages (Christian Rites) Registration Act.
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The fourth type is Asiatic marriages. These are marriages contracted and
regulated by the Asiatic (Marriage, Divorce and Succession) Act.31 The
rights and obligations of parties to these are defined in the relevant customs
applicable to these marriages.
The division of marriages into these separate regimes has meant that
women involved in these marriages have received different legal protection.
For example, the Married Women (Maintenance) Act,32 which is an Act for
the protection and maintenance of married women and their children, does
not apply to cases in which the parties are married solely under customary
law.33 On the other hand, women married under the Marriage Act have
enjoyed greater protection than those under the other regimes as the latter
have not been provided for any minimum legal rights which their customs
must guarantee.34
The Bill represents an effort to adopt a comprehensive piece of legislation
protecting women’s rights during marriage, upon divorce and on the death
of a spouse.35 It is through this Bill that the Malawi Law Commission
31Chapter 25:03.
32See n 8.
33Section 1 of the Married Women (Maintenance) Act (n 8).
34For example, right to property, right to custody of children after divorce, right to
maintenance, among others.
35According to its extended title ‘the Bill aims to make provision for marriage, divorce
and family relations between spouses and between unmarried couples, their welfare and
maintenance and that of their children and for connected matters’.
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seeks to reconcile the intricate relationship between African customary family
laws (cultural rights) and modern women’s rights. As aptly noted in the
introduction to the Bill:
‘The country has since evolved from a legal system based on par-
liamentary supremacy to one based on constitutional supremacy
with an entrenched Bill of Rights. Such a paradigm shift has
consequences on the rights and obligations of persons, let alone
parties in a marriage contract’.36
The Bill proposes a unified law that will govern all systems of marriage37
with all having the same rights and obligations.38
Essentially, the Bill purports to create the same legal status for all.39 This
position, it is argued, complies with the Malawi Constitution, as discussed
in Chapter 5.40
36See n 2 above.
37Section 12 of the Bill states that marriages recognised by the Act shall be either a
civil marriage, a customary marriage, a religious marriage, or a marriage by repute or
permanent cohabitation.
38Part IX of the Bill provides for the rights and obligations of parties to a marriage. This
position is to be contrasted with that in South Africa. In South Africa, the Recognition
of Customary Marriages Act (RCMA), Act No. 120 of 1998 applies only to customary
marriages, but puts customary marriages on the same legal footing as civil marriages.
39See Section 12 (3) of the Bill.
40See Section 20 of the Malawi Constitution.
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The Bill represents, to some extent, limited legislative reform addressing
some of the salient issues relating to how customary family laws disadvantage
women. However, the Bill can be faulted for its lack of wholesale application
to existing customary marriages.41 In the following subsection, an exami-
nation of the manner in which the Bill has addressed some of these salient
issues is undertaken.
6.3.2 Lobola
It should be recalled that in patrilineal systems payment of lobola by a bride-
groom is a prerequisite for a valid marriage under African customary law.42
Failure to institute lobola negotiations renders the marriage void.
It was also noted in Chapter 4 that the concept of lobola is often criticised
on the ground that it amounts to the purchase of women.43 The fact that
women are ‘bought’, the argument proceeds, renders them vulnerable to
abuse as they are treated as property of their husbands.44 It has therefore
41See Section 3 of the Bill.
42See the discussion in Chapter 4.
43White (n 17) 53. See also The Centre for Reproductive Law and Policy and FIDA-(K),
Women of the World: Laws and Policies Affecting their Reproductive Lives - Anglophone
Africa as cited Kisaakye EM ‘Women, Culture and Human Rights: Female Genital Muti-
lation, Polygamy and Bride Price’ in Wolfgang B, Kisaakye EM and Oberleitner G (eds)
Human Rights of Women: international instruments and African experiences (2002) 268
at 281.
44As above.
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been argued that lobola undermines the status and dignity of women, and the
right of every member of the family to full and equal respect and protection
against all forms of neglect, cruelty and exploitation.
The Bill makes provision for African marriages solemnised in accordance
with African customs. Section 27 provides:
‘Subject to Sections 15, 16, 17 and 18, the procedures preceding
the celebration of a religious or customary marriage shall be gov-
erned by the rules and customs or rites which are usual among
the ethnic group, religion or sect under which the marriage is
celebrated’.
The above provision is not clear on whether lobola is a legal prerequisite
for the formation of a customary marriage. It is, however, submitted that
when determining what ‘the rules and customs under which the marriage is
celebrated are’,45 one must conclude that the lobola agreement is in fact a
silent requirement procedure preceding the celebration of a customary mar-
riage in a patrilineal customary marriage in Malawi. Thus, it can be argued
that this section impliedly recognises lobola as a valid requirement for a pa-
trilineal customary marriage. This position has been similarly noticed with
regard to the RCMA of South Africa. Just like the Bill, the RCMA does not
prescribe lobola as a requirement for the validity of a customary marriage.
45Section 27 of the Bill.
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However, it has been argued that Section 3 (1) (b) of the RCMA46 may be
interpreted as meaning that negotiations preceding the entering into of a
customary marriage are regarded as requirements in respect of lobola.47
However, this does not mean that the rights and obligations of the parties
to the marriage will be defined solely by reference to lobola. As a departure
from the rules of customary law, Section 96 of the Bill, for example, states
that with respect to the custody of children the court shall treat the welfare
of the child as paramount. It should be recalled that in patrilineal customary
marriage systems the right of a father to custody of his children is absolute.
The right stems from fulfilling his obligation under the lobola agreement.48
This, then, entitles the father and his family to have rights to any children
born to the wife during the marriage. The rights and obligations that arise
from fulfilling the customary requirements of a customary marriage or, in
case there is no marriage, the requirements for obtaining such a child,49
characterise the customary family social arrangement of who is responsible
for the welfare of the child. This is irrespective of whether the marriage
46Section 3 (1) of the RCMA provides that: ‘For a customary marriage entered into
after the commencement of this Act to be valid- · · · (b) the marriage must be negotiated
and entered into or celebrated in accordance with customary law’.
47See Mofokeng LL ‘The lobola agreement as the silent prerequisite for the validity of
a customary marriage in terms of the Recognition of Customary Marriage Act’ (2005)
Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins Hollandse Reg 277 at 278.
48See Kamcaca v Nkhota 1968 MLR 190.
49For example, through the customary requirement of giving a beast to the family of a
woman so that the father can take over the responsibilities of taking care of such a child.
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subsists or not. The position adopted by the Bill is a departure from the
customary rule that lobola begets children. The lobola institution, though
impliedly recognised in the Bill, is not a measure of determining who gets
custody of a child. This, obviously, puts women in the same position as men
in respect of issues of custody of children. This is quite a positive departure.
The modern continuation of the practice of the lobola institution, however,
is likely to be persuasive to the courts of Malawi when they will be inter-
preting Section 27 of the Bill. During my field research it was noted that
the need for fulfilling the customary procedures, including lobola, preceding
customary marriages, were among the requirements that courts considered
whenever a determination of whether a marriage was valid or not was being
made.50
It is, therefore, argued that the customary concept of lobola intersects with
another important area of the right of women - the right to marry and found a
family51 that underpins all other rights of the woman in a customary marriage
50See, for instance, the cases of Charity Msuku v Lloyd Phiri, Civil Cause No. 117 of
2004, Mzuzu MC (Unreported), Florence Mwale v Gervazio Phiri, Civil Cause No. 4 of
2004, Mzuzu MC (Unreported) and Joshua Kumwenda v Angela Kachali, Civil Cause
No. 34 of 2004, Mzuzu MC, (Unreported) where the courts ruled that they could not
adjudicate over a marriage that was not valid under any law since the requirement of
lobola was not met. Similarly, in Uganda, it has been noted by Kisaakye (n 13) 280 that
the courts have unanimously held that lobola should have been paid in full before they can
recognise a customary marriage as having been contracted.
51Section 22 (3) of the Malawi Constitution.
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system.
6.3.3 Requirements of customary marriages
According to Section 2 of the Bill a customary marriage means:
‘· · · a marriage celebrated in accordance with rites under the cus-
tomary law of one or both of the parties to the marriage’.
This definition, arguably, makes no changes to the customary requirements
for celebrating a customary marriage. Obviously, in view of such a definition
one is led to the conclusion that the Bill retains all the requirements for
contracting a customary marriage that are in accordance with customary
family laws.52
It is, however, noted that, although the customary requirements for con-
tracting a customary marriage are retained, the Bill introduces new concepts
to a customary marriage that are not known to strict customary marriages
rules. For example, under Section 15 of the Bill the parties to a marriage
must be at least 18 years. It provides that:
‘Two persons of opposite sex who are both not below the age of
eighteen years and are of sound mind may enter into marriage
52See discussion on the requirements for contracting a customary marriage briefly dis-
cussed in Chapter 4.
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with each other.’
From the foregoing, we see that the influence of the Bill of Rights and
international standards that determine the majority age at 18 years might
have played a role in setting the age of entering into marriage at eighteen.53
We also find that the customary rule that marriage is entered into after
puberty is being replaced by the requirement that one has to be 18 years.
The position to adopt a minimum age for marrying for all persons in the
Bill is commendable as it may ensure that the spouses consent to such a
marriage is properly informed. To avoid discrimination on the ground of sex,
the minimum age is for both sexes.
However, it should be recalled that under the CRC and the Malawi Con-
stitution a provision is made for the underage children to get married with
their parents’ consent.54 Of course such power to consent to marriage must
be exercised only in the child’s best interests.55 Accordingly, a parent may
not unreasonably prevent a child’s marriage. Instead, consent of a guardian
should be deemed necessary to remedy deficiencies in the judgment of a mi-
nor. Thus, according to the CRC and the Malawi Constitution marriages by
children below age, where such consent was not supplied, should be voidable
at the instance of a spouse or the parent concerned.
53See discussion in Chapter 4.
54See Section 22 of the Malawi Constitution. See also Section 3 of the RCMA that
allows for marriages under eighteen years, with minimum permission.
55This is a guiding principle in all matters affecting the welfare of the child.
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Thus, in this situation we see that the proposed law is inconsistent with the
Malawi Constitution and international standards in that it does not provide
for underage children to get married with their parental consent. Since the
Malawi Constitution is the supreme law of the land56 the position adopted
in the Bill directly conflicts with the Malawi Constitution and to the extent
of such inconsistency, it may be invalidated by courts.
6.3.4 Marriage by permanent cohabitation and repute
Section 22 (5) of the Malawi Constitution provides for the recognition of mar-
riages by repute or permanent cohabitation. This provision has significant
implications for African customary family laws relating to the recognition of
a valid customary marriage.
In Malawi, as earlier noted in Chapter 4, a valid customary marriage is
contracted either when lobola57 has been negotiated or by the chinkhoswe.58
Absence of the lobola or chinkhoswe renders such a union invalid. No mat-
ter how long they live together, and whether or not they have children, the
56See Section 5 of the Malawi Constitution.
57This is in respect of a patrilineal customary marriage and the term has already been
defined earlier in the discussion.
58This is done in respect of a matrilineal customary marriage. Chinkhoswe means the
ceremony at which the marriage guardians from both the man and the woman’s sides
to the matrilineal marriage meet and exchange chickens as a symbol of validating the
marriage.
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parties cannot subsequently institute divorce proceedings to dissolve the mar-
riage, for it is inconsistent with common sense to dissolve a marriage that
never existed.59 Such is the strict custom.
Section 22 (5) of the Malawi Constitution alters this custom in that it
recognises marriages in which customary formalities, such as the lobola and
chinkhoswe, aimed at validating a customary marriage have not been fol-
lowed. This section, however, does not state when a marriage by repute and
permanent cohabitation could validly be recognised. Courts are left to decide
according to the circumstances of each case. The result is inconsistencies in
the protection afforded to women.
If enacted, however, Section 14 of the Bill is going to provide guidelines on
how these marriages will be validly recognised. Section 14 provides:
‘ 1. A marriage by repute or permanent cohabitation shall only
be recognised under this Act if there is evidence of- (a)mutual
consent; and (b)capacity to enter into marriage as provided under
this Act.
2. Before making a finding that a marriage by repute or perma-
nent cohabitation exists, a court shall consider- (a) the length of
the relationship; (b) the fact of cohabitation; (c) the existence
59Christina Mhango v Amani Ali, Civil Appeal Case (TC) No. 15 of 1970 as cited by
Chimango LJ Women without Ankhoswe in Malawi: A discussion of a legal position of
women who enter into informal marital relations’ (Unpublished)(Undated).
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of a conjugal relationship; (d) the degree of financial dependence
or interdependence and any agreement for financial support be-
tween the parties; (e) ownership, use and aquisition of property;
(f) the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life; (g) whether
the parties mutually care for and support children; (h) the rep-
utation of the parties and the public display of aspects of their
shared relation: and (i) any other factors that the court considers
fit.’
The above guidelines are precisely important to courts when recognising
as valid marriages by repute and permanent cohabitation. In Chapter 7,
it will be shown how different courts, due to lack of such guidelines, have
inconsistently interpreted Section 22 (5) of the Malawi Constitution. Due
to such inconsistencies, women involved in such relationships have received
different protection from courts.
6.3.5 Maintenance of unmarried women
African customary laws make provision for the payment of damages by a
man in a patrilineal marriage who impregnates a woman outside wedlock.
This customary practice is also part of the rules for the affiliation of children
born outside wedlock. An unmarried biological father acquires full parental
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responsibilities and rights if he pays damages in terms of customary law.60
This customary practice ensures that the child’s right to the father’s care is
achieved by giving the father full parental responsibilities and rights.
The Affiliation Act61 provides for the maintenance of a child born out of
wedlock.62 The Married Women (Maintenance) Act63 only provides for the
protection and maintenance of married women and their children. As earlier
noted, this Act does not apply to customary marriages. However, these Acts
did not make any provision for the maintenance of the mother of the child
during and after pregnancy. The Bill seeks to rectify this gap by providing
thus:
‘Where a woman is pregnant and the alleged father does not dis-
pute responsibility for the pregnancy and is a adjudged by the
court to be responsible for pregnancy, he shall be liable to main-
tain the woman during the period of the pregnancy and to pay for
or reimburse the attendant costs of delivery and the court may
make an order for enforcement as may be deemed appropriate’.64
This provision, interestingly, assumes that the woman is in a weaker position
60Based on my own experience, in most patrilineal systems in Malawi, one cow, payable
to the parents of the mother of the child, suffices.
61Chapter 26:02.
62Section 3 of the Affiliation Act.
63See n 8 above.
64Section 97 (1) of the Bill.
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and must get protection from the law.
Curiously, the Bill also provides that where the alleged father is a mi-
nor, ‘liability will lie against his parent or guardian’ until he ceases to be
a minor.65 This too reflects the customary law practice in Malawi. These
provisions are vital to securing the rights of women to human dignity66 and
to be protected against all forms of neglect, cruelty and exploitation.67 They
are also significant in that they can facilitate the realisation of the rights of
the child to know and be raised by his or her parents.68 In this particular
instance, customary laws and modern human rights are in tandem.
However, the Bill does not provide for the rights and obligations that accrue
to the father of the child after it is born. Without any such provision it
cannot be assumed that the father will have rights and obligations over the
child. It is, therefore, suggested that the Bill should have incorporated the
customary practice of the payment of damages to ensure that the child’s
right to the father’s care is achieved. The incorporation of this customary
practice would ensure that the child’s right to the father’s care is achieved
by giving the father full parental responsibilities and rights, along with the
child’s mother.69
65Section 97 (3) of the Bill.
66See Section 19 (1) of the Malawi Constitution.
67See Section 22 (2) of the Malawi Constitution.
68See Section 23 (2) of the Malawi Constitution.
69Mwambene L ‘Reconciling African customary law with women’s rights in Malawi: The
proposed marriage, divorce and family relations Bill’ (2007) Malawi Law Journal 113 at
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6.3.6 Maintenance of spouses and children after disso-
lution of customary marriages
Section 93 of the Bill proposes a change in the customary law of maintenance
of spouses after the dissolution of marriage.
It should be recalled that according to both matrilineal and patrilineal cus-
tomary laws, a spouse is not entitled to maintenance from the other spouse
after the dissolution of the marriage. In the matrilineal system, for example,
the original intent of chikamwini was to provide cheap labour to the wife’s
family, and not only to the wife.70 As such, where a husband wished to do
chitengwa, the nkhoswe had to be satisfied that not only would his sister’s
child be well taken care of by the husband, but that there was also an as-
surance that the husband will be able to take care of his wife’s family at
home. Therefore, when such a marriage is dissolved, it is obviously expected
that the cheap labourer would stop providing his services. In the patrilineal
system, wives and children were an economic asset of the family, and rules
that developed around them were part of a group’s survival strategy.71 It is
120.
70Mandala E ‘Work and control in a peasant economy: a history of lower Tchiri valley
in Malawi’ as cited by Miller D Matriliny and social change: How are the women of rural
Malawi managing presented to CASID on 2nd June 1996, accessed at
http://www.ca.encarta.msu.com/encuet/refpages/search.aspx?q=chewa
on 05/03/05.
71Nhlapo RT ‘The African Family and Women’s Rights: Friends or Foes’ (1991) Acta
Juridica 135 at 137; See also Nhlapo RT ‘African customary law in the interim Consti-
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submitted that after divorce, since the wife will not be performing her duties
for the group’s survival, a husband is not expected to maintain her.
The Bill proposes a change to the above scenario. It empowers courts to
make maintenance orders for spouses following divorce at any stage of the
marriage. Concerning maintenance of a divorced spouse, the Bill72 provides:
‘On the decree absolute declaring a marriage to be dissolved, or
on a decree of judicial separation obtained by applicant, the court
may order the respondent to secure to the applicant such sum of
money as it thinks reasonable, having regard to his/her income
to the ability of the respondent, and the conduct of the parties.
The court may direct the maintenance to be paid either in a lump
sum or in yearly, monthly, or weekly payments for any period not
exceeding the life of a spouse · · ·’
A question arises as to whether the above section contemplates maintenance
orders only for spouses whose divorces are conducted in courts, or also for
spouses divorced out of court. This question is particularly important in
Malawi, since in practice, the majority of customary marriages are dissolved
out of court by the parties’ families. Therefore, if the application of Section
tution’ in Liebenberg S (ed) The Constitution of South Africa from a Gender Perspective
(1995) 157 at 160.
72Section 93 (1) and (2) of the Bill.
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93 is restricted to spouses divorced in court, few spouses would benefit from
the change in the law.
6.3.7 Custody of children on divorce
It is generally accepted that custody and access must be determined accord-
ing to the best interests of the child. This standard, though missing in the
Malawi Constitution, has been argued in Chapter 4 as being of application
in Malawi. However, magistrates’ and judges’ perceptions of the best inter-
ests of the child can be influenced by their social position and their cultural
backgrounds.73
It should be recalled that under patrilineal customary marriage laws fa-
thers are entitled to the custody of the children after divorce. According to
matrilineal marriage laws mothers are entitled to such custody. The Bill de-
termines that a court granting a divorce may make an order determining the
custody or guardianship of a child, but does not stipulate the incorporation
of customary rules in this regard.74 Similar observations exist with respect
to South Africa.75
Thus in this instance the legal consequence of Section 93 (3) of the Bill for
customary law is that the concept of the best interests of the child replaces
73See the discussion in Chapter 7.
74Section 93 (3) of the Bill.
75See Section 8 (4) (d) of the RCMA.
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specific customary law rules governing the custody of children.
6.3.8 Polygamy
Section 17 of the Bill provides that ’[n]o person shall be married to more
than one spouse’. The ban on polygamy is to be enforced by Section 52 of
the Bill.76 Section 17 of the Bill makes a strong statement against polygamy
and is more categorical than that contained in Art. 6 of the Protocol. The
Protocol obliges State Parties to discourage polygamous marriages. It should,
however, be pointed out that the proposal by the Malawi Law Commission
to include Section 17 has been made despite some support for polygamy
displayed by a section of rural women.77 It is, however, submitted that
the battle fought on behalf of some women who had stated that they were
marginalised by this customary rule may be won at the expense of another
equally marginalised and vulnerable group- the illiterate rural women78 who
76Section 52 of the Bill provides:
‘A person who is married or purports to be married to more than one spouse
commits an offence and is liable upon conviction to imprisonment for five
years.’
77As previously noted in Chapter 4, MHRC Cultural practices and their impact on
the enjoyment of human rights, particularly women and children (Unpublished) (2005)
indicated that strong support for the continuation of this practice had been voiced by
women.
78As noted in Chapter 5, these women are demographically in the majority.
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are in support of this practice.79
As earlier noted in Chapter 4, polygamy denotes the practice whereby a
husband is allowed to marry more than one wife,80 whereas a married woman
is barred from contracting further marriages for as long as she remains legally
married.81
On the question of whether Section 17 of the Bill is vital to securing the
rights of women, especially the right to equality, the position adopted in this
thesis is that it is, perhaps, a matter of debate whether women’s equality82
with men will be achieved through legislative prohibition of polygamy or
through a vigorous application or enforcement of Section 24 of the Malawi
Constitution,83 among others. The difficulty of enforcing a ban and the
fact that polygamy appears to be obsolescent, customary marriages should
have been allowed to continue to be potentially polygamous. Seen from
another angle, the concept of polygamy intersects with a number of rights of
women protected by the Malawi Constitution and international instruments,
particularly the right to marry and found a family84 and the right not to be
forced to enter into marriage.85 Section 17 of the Bill, arguably, may interfere
79MHRC (n 77).
80Ibik JO Restatement of African Law: Malawi Vol 1, The Law of Marriage and Divorce
(1970) 191.
81See Msowoya v Milanzi, Civil Appeal Case No. 99 of 1979, NTAC (Unreported).
82See Section 20 of the Malawi Constitution
83Section 24 of the Malawi Constitution provides for rights of women.
84Section 22 (3) of the Malawi Constitution
85Section 22 (4) of the Malawi Constitution.
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with these rights.
However it seems that the Bill may not apply retrospectively to existing
polygamous customary marriages.86 This position is regrettable. The rights
and obligations of parties to these marriages would still remain largely un-
regulated.87
By restricting the application to limited sections of all marriages regard-
less of the date they were celebrated,88 the Bill fails to protect all women,
particularly on issues of divorce. It is therefore suggested that the applica-
tion provision should include all marriages that are in existence when the
Act comes into operation. That would amply protect all women who were
married before it came into operation. Furthermore, in view of the entrench-
ment of polygamy in Malawian society, there is a danger that whilst the law
may forbid it, it may continue to subsist. If this happens, women in these
polygamous unions may find that the law is cruel when it does not offer any
protection.
86See Section 3 of the Bill: ‘This Act shall apply to marriages entered into on or after
the day it comes into operation; but Sections 49, 50 and 51 shall apply to all marriages
regardless of the date they were celebrated.’
87This position can be contrasted with that adopted by the RCMA of South Africa which
recognises customary marriages existing before the coming into effect of the Ac. Section
2 (1) of the RCMA provides: ‘A marriage which is a valid marriage at customary law and
existing at the commencement of this Act is for all purposes recognised as a marriage.’
88See the discussion in the preceding paragraph.
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6.3.9 Child marriages
As earlier discussed in Chapter 4, entry upon customary marriages has no
fixed age requirement and the attainment of puberty tends to be a critical
determinant of capacity to marry. It was also noted that in Malawi there
is a common practice among parents and guardians in many parts of the
country to marry off daughters at very tender ages, sometimes as low as 12
years. The result is teenage mothers who are not physically and mentally
prepared for childbearing, taking care of their children, and, indeed, the
general demands of marital life. Further, such teenage mothers or wives
may encounter multiple problems. For example, they may experience early
divorce.
The problem of childbearing has direct links with maternal and infant
mortality rates, now at 1120 per 1000,000 and 104 per 1,000 live births
respectively.89 These statistics show that, indeed, the younger the woman
the more dangerous is motherhood.
It should also be recalled that the Malawi Constitution has put the age of
18 at which a person can freely enter into marriage.90 The law also stipulates
that persons between the ages of fifteen and eighteen shall only enter marriage
with consent from either parents or guardians.91 In addition the State is
89Malawi Government Malawi Demographic and Health Survey (2000) and UNDP 2006.
90Section 22 (4) of the Malawi Constitution.
91Section 22 (6) of the Malawi Constitution.
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required to discourage marriages of persons under the age of fifteen, as such
marriages put the lives of the parties at risk.
Section 15 of the Bill also puts the marrying age at 18 years. This po-
sition, is a departure from the customary law requirement for a customary
marriage.92 This position, obviously, is compatible with the Bill of Rights.93
6.3.10 Consent
In Chapter 4 we noted that Section 22 (4) of the Constitution provides that no
person shall be forced to enter into marriage. However, in some cases children
below the age of 18 and even adults are forced into arranged marriages.
This practice is widespread in many rural areas of the country, and in some
instances in urban areas, for a number of reasons, including poverty and
culture. This practice, as alluded to in Chapter 4, is a flagrant violation of
the right not to be forced into marriage. Another form of forced marriage is
the practice of widow inheritance, which is common in patrilineal societies
in the country.
The Bill, unfortunately, does not address the above problem head on.
There is no provision that addresses the issue of consent. By failing to make
any provision on the issue of consent, the Bill fails to protect other rights of
women, particularly as regards forced marriages. It is, therefore, suggested
92See also discussion under ‘requirements of a customary marriages’ above.
93Section 22 (6) of the Malawi Constitution.
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that there should be a provision that should directly address the issue of
consent to a marriage. That would amply protect all women who are, due
to several cultural practices, married without their consent.
6.3.11 Widow inheritance
The concept of widow inheritance intersects with a number of women’s rights
protected by human rights instruments, particularly the right to marry and
found a family,94 the right not to be forced to enter into marriage,95 and the
right that each member of the family shall be protected by law against all
forms of neglect, cruelty and exploitation.96
Arguably, the Bill allocates a role to the institution of widow inheritance in
the protection of these rights by providing in Section 16: ‘A person entering
into a marriage under this Act shall first prove, by way of declaration before
a Registrar or Minister, that he or she is single.’
Widow inheritance takes place when a husband dies. This, obviously, ren-
ders the woman single as contemplated by Section 16 of the Bill. It should be
recalled that in some cases, a relative of a young widow’s deceased husband
is the one who inherits her, with her consent.97
94Section 22 (3) of the Malawi Constitution.
95Section 22 (4) of the Malawi Constitution.
96Section 22 (2) of the Malawi Constitution.
97This is contrary to popular belief that women are forced into these relationships. In
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This provision is important as it may be interpreted to protect women
inherited without their consent.
6.3.12 Equal status and capacity of spouses
As previously discussed in Chapter 3, international human rights instruments
specifically prescribe the content of equal rights of spouses in the family.98
It was also observed that the provisions of CEDAW, and in particular the
requirements that states parties modify or amend customary laws that con-
stitute discrimination against women provide a radical challenge to laws that
regulate customary marriages in Malawi, and specifically the equal status of
spouses in the family.99 Similarly, Section 24 of the Malawi Constitution
provides for the equal status of women in marriage and at the dissolution of
such marriage.100
fact, in some cases it is alleged that some women kill their husbands so that they can be
inherited by a relative of the husband whom they find more attractive.
98See, for example, Art. 16 of CEDAW; Art. 16(1) of the UDHR; Art. 23 (1) of the
CCPR, and Art. 10 (1) of the CESCR. See also Human Rights Committee General Com-
ment No. 19 on Protection of the Family, the Right to Marriage and Equality of Spouses,
Art. 18 of the ACHPR; Art. 6 (c) of the Protocol; Art. 17(1) of the American Convention
Human Rights 1969, 1114 UNTS 123; and Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights 1950, 213 UNTS 221.
99See discussion in Chapter 3.
100See discussion in Chapter 4.
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Contrary to the above international standards and the Bill of Rights, in
Chapter 4 it was discussed that a wife to a customary marriage does not
enjoy the same status as the husband. The Bill seeks to rectify this in the
following fashion. Section 49 of the Bill, the pertinent parts of this provision,
provides:
‘(1) A spouse is entitled to equal rights to consortium in marriage.
· · · (5) A spouse may severally, or jointly with the other, exercise
responsibility towards the upbringing, nurture and maintenance
of the children of the marriage. (6) Both spouses have the right
to mutual custody of the children during its subsistence.
This provision is important as it may be interpreted to address the woman’s
right to equal custody of children, among other rights, in which customary
family laws do not provide.101
101See discussion in Chapter 4.
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6.4 DEPA
6.4.1 Historical background to reform of inheritance
laws in Malawi
It should be recalled that a number of well-defined customary systems of
succession were in operation even before Malawi was colonised.102 A broad
division was drawn between patrilineal and matrilineal succession systems.
Of course, it should be pointed out that within these two categories, there was
no uniformity.103 The current administration of deceased estate is governed
by the WIA. In Chapter 4, it was noted that certain aspects of the WIA, with
regard to the distribution of the deceased intestate property under customary
laws, were discriminatory against women.
In view of the fact that the Malawi Constitution embraces the principles
of equality and non-discrimination, the Malawi Law Commission decided to
commence its law reform programme by looking at the core statute on suc-
cession in Malawi, the WIA . The exercise of reviewing the WIA commenced
in February 2003. In January 2004 a Report on the review of the WIA was
produced.104 Attached to this Report is the proposed DEPA which forms
the focus of this discussion.
102See the discussion in Chapter 4.
103This is due to the fact that within the two categories, there exists different tribes.
104See n 3 above.
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If enacted DEPA will represent the most significant attempt at legal reform
of succession rules in Malawi. Its importance lies in the fact that it seeks to
impose uniformity in the area of law which has previously been dominated
by diverse systems of customary laws, and subjected women to an inferior
position.105 However, this piece of legislation is in no sense a codification
or restatement of customary laws. It strikes at the very roots of existing
customary law systems that discriminate against women.106 Although it is
not the first attempt at reforming this area of the law,107 it is novel in its
ambitions, aims and unequivocal implications for policy. For that reason
the degree of success which it will enjoy will be closely followed by those
interested in the legal development of modern Malawi.
6.4.2 Overview of DEPA
The long title of DEPA108 is:
‘An Act to provide for the making of wills and the devolution of
property under a will; the inheritance to the estates of persons
dying without valid wills; the protection of deceased estates; the
105See Section 17 of DEPA.
106As above.
107Previous laws that were enacted include: African Wills and Succession Ordinance,
No. 13 of 1960; and the Wills and Inheritance (Kamuzu Mbumba Protection) Ordinance,
No. 36 of 1964.
108See (n 3) 126.
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administration of deceased estates; the prosecution of offences
relating to deceased estates; the civic education of the public;
and the functions of courts in relation to deceased estates and for
other connected matters’.
This title, it is submitted, divorces itself from the premise that there is a
necessary connection and interaction between the law of succession and the
family structure. This position, unfortunately, limits the scope of the appli-
cation of the Act. There is a need for it to contain a provision that would
provide a frontal attack upon customary rules of succession that discriminate
against women. If this assumption regarding the scope of the Act is correct,
DEPA will have limited application. In this respect, it is far less lacking in
its complete protection of women governed by customary laws.
DEPA has a dual purpose. First, it provides for a system of testamen-
tary succession to be administered by the courts. The formal requirements
of writing a will are similar to the WIA.109 Secondly, it provides mandatory
provisions to be applied on intestacy which pay no regard to pre-existing cus-
tomary rules of succession or the modification that was made in the WIA.110
This is the most radical change that has been introduced by DEPA. What
is particularly important to note is that DEPA discards the approach of the
WIA and abolishes the customary rules of succession. In the following sub-
section, therefore, an examination of the intestacy provisions of DEPA are
109Sections 5-15 of DEPA and compare with Section 5 of the WIA.
110Sections 16-18 of DEPA.
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made. The aim is to assess how DEPA addresses the relationship of African
customary family laws relating to inheritance and women’s rights.
6.4.3 Choice of law governing deceased estate
In Chapter 4, it was noted that under subsection 1 of Section 16 of the
WIA, the choice of law governing the deceased’s estate is determined upon
the area where the marriage was arranged. This is understood to mean the
customary marriage rules of the area forming the basis of the validity of the
marriage.111 However, despite the issue of choice of law, it is also noted that
the law discriminates as between a surviving wife in a patrilineal society who
gets a one-half share (jointly with children and dependants of the intestate)
and the surviving wife in a matrilineal society who gets two-fifths share (also
jointly with children and the dependants of the intestate). One-half being
greater than two-fifths, the law favours women from patrilineal society and
discriminates against women from matrilineal category.
To reconcile the above position with the equality principle, as stipulated in
the Bill of Rights and international standards, Section 17 of DEPA has moved
away from the categorisation of choice of law according to the area where
the marriage was arranged.112 This provision is important as it addresses the
111These would be according to patrilineal and matrilineal customary marriage rules.
112See the difference between the two sections. Section 16 of the WIA, under paragraph
(a) of subsection (2) it is stated that if a marriage was arranged in an area described
in the Shedule (areas deascribed in the schedule are Chitipa, Karonga, Rumphi, Nkata
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inequality in the law that treated women from a matrilineal society differently
from those who were from patrilineal society.
6.4.4 Property rights of a widow
As noted in Chapter 3, Articles 2 and 16 of CEDAW enjoins States Par-
ties to take appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women
in all matters and ensure, on the basis of equality of men and women the
same rights for both spouses in respect of ownership, acquisition and dispo-
sition of property.113 It should be recalled, however, that the dynamics of
both patrilineal and matrilineal systems, as discussed in Chapter 4, mani-
fest patriarchy. The processes of dispossession of a widow begins from the
dynamics of patrilineal and matrilineal societies, which reinforces male su-
periority. The concept of family also recognises the male as having ultimate
authority. Ultimately, when a husband dies, the construction of widowhood
Bay, Mzimba and Nsanje which are predominantly patrilineal), the persons entitled to
such property shall be- ...., under paragraph (b) of subsection (2) it is stated that if the
marriage was arranged in any other area of Malawi the persons entitled to such intestate
property shall be-... Section 17 of DEPA on the other hand, provides:
(1) Upon intestacy the persons entitled to inherit the intestate property shall
be the members of the immediate family and dependants of the intestate
and their shares shall be ascertained upon the following principles of fair
distribution- · · ·
113See, especially Art. 16 (1) (h) of CEDAW.
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is a stepping-stone for relatives of the deceased man to dispossess the widow.
It should further be recalled that according to Section 16 (5) of the WIA a
widow could lose her share of the estate upon re-marriage.114 This position
conflicts with Section 24 (1) of the Malawi Constitution which prohibits
discrimination on the ground of marital status. This provision poses a threat
to and an interference with a widow’s right to marry because of the fear that
she may lose her property.115
Section 17 (4) of DEPA introduces a change to the above scenario by pro-
viding that ‘re-marriage shall not deprive the surviving spouse of property
inherited under intestacy’.116 This is a positive development as the woman’s
right to marry will not be affected because of the fear that she may lose prop-
erty inherited from a deceased husband. Also, very obviously, this provision
protects the widow’s right to property. It is however, observed that this pro-
vision does not limit the number of inheritances that a surviving spouse may
114Section 16 (5) of WIA provides that ‘a widow shall hold her share of her deceased
husband’s estate upon the condition that if she remarries, any portion thereof which still
subsists at the date of remarriage shall become divisible between her children · · · ’
115Section 22 (3) of the Malawi Constitution.
116Section 17 (4) of DEPA provides that:
‘Re-marriage shall not deprive a surviving spouse of property inherited under
intestacy except in the case of property on customary land where title in that
property shall devolve to the children of the spouse by the intestate upon
the re-marriage of the surviving spouse’.
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be entitled to in his/her lifetime. This provision, arguably, may result in
spousal enrichment through serial marriages, and perhaps increase incidents
where spouses kill their spouses in order to inherit a share of their property.
6.4.5 Provision for spouses in polygamous marriages
In Chapter 4 we noted that customary marriages are potentially polygamous
and that some women are indeed found in these polygamous unions.117 It is
obvious, therefore, that upon death of a husband who was married to more
than one wife, his intestate estate should be distributed among all the wives
he was married to. Section 16 of the WIA that deals with the application of
the law of intestate property of a person to whose estate customary law would
apply does not make provision for spouses in a polygamous marriages.118
The use of the word ‘wife’ in both sections 16 (a) (2) (i) and 16 (b) (2) (ii)
of the WIA obviously means that the law denies some women found in a
polygamous relationship the right to inherit from their husbands’ intestate
estate. The difficult with implementing this provision also lies in the fact
117This is based on the study by the MHRC (n ).
118Section 16 (a) (2)(i) of the WIA, states: ‘if the marriage was arranged in an area
described in the Schedule, the persons entitled to such intestate property shall be- (i) as
to the share, the persons entitled upon a fair distribution in accordance with section 17 of
the Act. Persons entitled under such fair distribution are the wife, issue and dependants
of the intesate.’ Similarly Section 16 (b) (2) (ii) provides that ‘as to the remaining two-
fifths share, the persons entitled upon a fair distribution under Section 17 of the Act are
the wife, issue and dependants of the intestate. [Emphasis added]
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that if the husband was married to more than one wife, which wife does the
law envisage to benefit from such an intestate estate, is it the first wife, the
second, or the third wife?
As a move to implement the right to equality before the law to women
found in polygamous marriages, DEPA makes provision for spouses in a
polygamous relationship in the following manner: Section 17 (1) (b) (c) and
(d) of DEPA provides that:
‘Upon intestacy the persons entitled to inherit the intestate prop-
erty shall be the members of the immediate family and depen-
dants of the intestate and their shares shall be ascertained upon
the following principles of fair distribution- (b) every spouse of the
intestate shall be entitled to retain all the household belongings
which belong to his or her household; (c) if any property shall
remain after paragraphs (a) and (b) have been complied with,
the remaining property shall be divided between the surviving
spouse or spouses and children of the intestate; (d) as between
the surviving spouse or spouses and the children of the instate
their shares shall be determined in accordance with all the special
circumstances ...’ [Emphasis added]
More specific, Section 17 (2) of DEPA provides:
‘If the intestate left more than one female spouse surviving him
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each living in a different locality, each spouse and her children by
the intestate shall be entitled to a share of the property of the
intestate in their locality in accordance with this section; but
such spouse and children shall have no claim to any share of the
property of the intestate in the locality where another spouse
lives.’ [Emphasis added]
In addition to the above, Section 17 (3) provides:
‘If the intestate left more than one female spouse surviving
him all living in the same locality, each spouse and her children
by the intestate shall be entitled to a share of the property of the
intestate proportionate to their contribution.’ [Emphasis added]
From the foregoing provisions, we see that DEPA has made good recommen-
dations with regards to protection of widows found in polygamous marriages
from protection from infringement of property rights, thus providing formal
equality.
Having noted that DEPA protects the right of inheritance of all widows
that are in a polygamous relationship, it is interesting to note that the Bill, as
discussed above,119 outlaws polygamy and has made no provision for women
who are already in existing polygamous marriages. The position of the Bill
119See the discussion under 6.2.9. Section 17 of the Bill provides that: ‘No person shall
be married to more than one spouse.’
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and DEPA as quoted above on intestate estate of a husband who was married
to more than one wife is interesting for two reasons. First, when a court is
going to recognise the spouses who are entitled to benefit from the deceased
estate as provided under Section 17 of DEPA, the Bill will also play a ma-
jor role. The question that can be asked is: are courts going to recognise
polygamous marriages for purposes of distribution of a deceased estate? If
the answer is in the affirmative, then a further question would be: Under
what law since the Bill outlaws polygamy and makes it an offence to be in a
polygamous relationship.120
Secondly, we see that there is no harmony in the reform of the laws that
negatively impact on the rights of women. DEPA seems to acknowledge
the harsh realities that come with polygamous marriages to women found in
these unions. In that respect, it reconciles this harshness by making equal
provision for all spouses involved in such unions. However, the implemen-
tation of this provision could be challenged by the fact that the proposed
law on marriage, the Bill, outlaws the institution of polygamy. It is there-
fore proposed that there should be uniformity in the law reforms that are
being proposed, otherwise the protection is rendered illusionary if there will
be difficulties in implementing it due to contradictory law reforms.
120See discussion on polygamy above.
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6.4.6 Deceased woman survived by children
It should be recalled that the norm at international law, as discussed in
Chapter 3, is that both men and women are to be treated equally. The
proviso to Section 16 (4) (a) of the WIA provides that: ‘Where the (deceased)
woman leaves children, such children shall be solely entitled.’121
From the above provision, the following observations can be made: first,
there is no like provision for a deceased man as it does for a deceased woman
survived by children. On that score, the law is discriminatory as between
a man and a woman who are both survived by children; second, men seem
not to be beneficiaries of their wife’s intestate estate. This obviously is
discrimination against men.
To reconcile this position, DEPA uses the words ‘spouse’ which obviously
includes both a man and a woman. For example, Section 17 (1) (b) of DEPA
provides that: ‘... every spouse of the intestate shall be entitled to retain all
the household belongings which belong to his or her household.’122
121“Child” shall have the meaning under paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of Section 17 of
the WIA to include the issue of the deceased child who is entitled upon prescribed trusts
...
122Similar use of the word “spouse” are also to be found in Section 17 (1) (c), (d) and
(f) of DEPA.
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6.4.7 Widow inheritance
A major substantive provision, which is unfortunately missing in DEPA, is
protection against widow inheritance. In was noted in Chapter 4 that this
practice conflicts with several women’s rights as protected under the Bill of
Rights.123 Therefore, a provision to forbid or regulate the practice of widow
inheritance would have amply protected women married under customary
law.
6.5 Problems in implementation of proposed
law
From the above propositions, that are generally in line with the international
human rights standards and the Malawi Constitution, the following observa-
tions are made. First, the proposals contained in the Bill, it is submitted,
do not take into account the fact that customary marriages are different
from civil marriages. Most of the proposals seem to extend the civil law of
marriages onto customary marriages. Secondly, the provisions do not take
into account the fact that the majority of Malawians are still in support of
customary marriages. As such, there would be a lot of resistance against
123For example, the right to consent to a marriage, the right not to be forced to a
marrriage, the right to freely choose who to get married to, and in some cases the right to
property.
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implementation of a law that does not have cultural legitimacy. To illustrate
these points, the following discussion on the distinction between individual
and group rights will help elucidate how certain concerns about customary
marriage laws were not adequately considered by the Malawi Law Commis-
sion.
6.5.1 Individual versus group rights
Customary norms enforcing discrimination against have long been perceived
to be amongst the offenders against human rights.124 Art. 5 of CEDAW, in
cognisance of this fact, obliges State Parties to:
‘· · · take all appropriate measures · · · to modify the social and
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women with a view to
achieving the elimination of prejudices and customs and all other
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority · · · of either
of the sexes’.
Whilst Malawi has ratified CEDAW, ACHPR and the Protocol, and up-
holds the principle of non-discrimination in its Constitution,125 as examined
in Chapter 5, it also provides for the recognition of cultural rights126 to
124Bennett TW ‘The Compatibility of African Customary Law and Human Rights’ (1991)
Acta Juridica 18 at 25.
125See Section 20 of the Malawi Constitution.
126Section 26 of the Malawi Constitution.
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which African people have a right.127 As Bennett128 notes, the idea of in-
dividuals (more so women) enjoying special rights is fundamentally at odds
with African culture. Social life subsisted on the basis of mutual support
and sharing. The claim of individual rights would place the group’s survival,
and ultimately individual survival, at risk. Thus, under customary laws in-
dividual interests are underplayed to mitigate any risks of undermining the
cohesion of the group.129 The emphasis, therefore, is placed on individual
duties rather than rights.130 It may be argued that to capture the spirit
of such dynamics and interpersonal relations, Art. 18 (2) of the ACHPR
obliges State Parties ‘to assist the family which is the custodian of moral
and traditional values recognised by the community’. It should also be noted
that the ACHPR does not make reference to individual rights in marriage.
This could be argued to be a strong commitment to the preservation of the
African culture. Furthermore, as rightly noted by Butegwa,131 women, like
men are cultural beings. They identify themselves and are identifiable by
127Dlamini CRM ‘The Ultimate Recognition of the Customary Marriage in South Africa’
(1999) Obiter 15 at 21.
128Bennett TW Customary Law in South Africa (2004) 296.
129Armstrong A et al ‘Towards a cultural understanding of the interplay between chil-
dren’s and women’s rights: An Eastern and Southern African perspective’ (1995) The
International Journal of Children’s Rights 333 at 363
130Nhlapo RT Family Law and Traditional Values (Unpublished) DPhil thesis (1990) 260.
131Butegwa F ‘Mediating Culture and Human Rights in favour of Land Rights for Women
in Africa: A framework for Community level Action’ in An-Na’im AA (ed) Cultural Trans-
formation and Human Rights in Africa (2002) 108 at 109.
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others within specific cultures and religions. These cultures not only shape
women’s and their communities’ values and norms and practices, but they
also are an intrinsic part of each woman. Women are also human beings with
an identifiable sense of dignity which is rarely understood or acknowledged.132
Coming to the issue of marriage, a customary marriage is said to be based
on the communitarian family ethic which emphasises social solidarity. This
has been marked as a contrast to the individualistic approach of the nuclear
family based on civil marriage.133 In customary marriages the interest of the
particular wife or husband are incidental to family interests that are secured
by institutions such as lobola.134
Whilst it is claimed that international human rights represent a universal
and neutral value system, they betray at every turn their origins in Western
law and philosophy,135 a philosophy that is not premised on the cohesion
of any group and its survival per se, as is the case in Africa. Some writers
have argued that the Western value system is inapplicable in non-Western
societies because of the philosophical cultural differences.136
132As above.
133Nhlapo RT ‘The African Family and Women’s Rights: Friends or Foes’ (1991) Acta
Juridica 135 at 137.
134Kaganas F and Murray C ‘Law, Women and the Family: the Question of Polygyny in
a New South Africa (1991) Acta Juridica 116 at 124.
135Bennett TW Human Rights and the Customary Law under the South African Consti-
tution (1999) 1.
136One such writer, quoted by Nhlapo (n 95) 269, is Dustain Wai.
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Therefore, customary family rules should be evaluated in the light of African
culture rather than other different cultures.137 Bearing in mind that cultures
differ, what may be viewed to be unequal in one society may not be so in
another. Because of this fact, it is inevitable, therefore, that the practice of
polygamy, for example, should not necessarily be seen as being at variance
with women’s rights.
Further, under customary laws, marriage is an alliance between two kinship
groups for purposes of realising goals beyond the immediate interests of a
particular husband or wife. The goals aimed at in this type of marriage have
been summarised to be procreation and survival. Both of these goals can be
seen to have been essential for the well-being of the larger group. Wives and
children were an economic asset, and the rules that developed around them
were part of the survival strategy.138
Because the goals of a customary marriage are procreation and survival,
the institution of polygamy was designed, among other reasons, to lessen the
burden of one wife bearing so many children that it could be detrimental to
her health.
137Dlamini (n 92) 22 also pointed out this fact in his discussion.
138Nhlapo (n 54) 160.
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6.6 Conclusion
This chapter set out to look at how law reform has addressed the intricate
relationship between the right to culture and women’s rights. In general,
it has been observed that most customary family laws that are at variance
with women’s rights, have been replaced by provisions that are in total dis-
regard of customary laws. This approach, it could be argued, will affect the
implementation of these reformed laws as they lack cultural legitimacy.
Having said that, however, the specific findings of this chapter are now
concluded with a summary of the Bill and DEPA.
6.6.1 Concluding remarks on the Bill
The Bill is an interesting development in Malawian law. It is a commend-
able effort, especially as it seeks to provide equal protection for all women
in Malawi irrespective of the marriage regime to which they belong. It is
clear that the Bill goes a long way to addressing formal equality of women
married under customary laws. The Bill has several provisions that directly
or indirectly address aspects of African customary laws. Crucially, it recog-
nises monogamous African marriages and accords them full status in law,
but it redefines the rights and obligations of the parties to these marriages in
ways that depart from African customary family laws. For example, the Bill,
while recognising the significance of lobola or chinkhoswe, provides that these
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are not overriding considerations determining the rights and obligations of
parents in respect of their children. The Bill also incorporates provisions of
African customary laws. A prime example is the provision on damages to
be paid by a person who impregnates a woman to whom he is not married.
The Bill also takes a bold step in prohibiting polygamy. These provisions are
vital to the protection of women’s rights.
However, it has also been pointed out that some areas require further
consideration. Examples include the retroactive application of the Bill. The
Bill should apply to all marriages whether contracted before or after it comes
into force. Otherwise there will be unequal protection under the law. The
rights and obligations of parents in respect of children born out of wedlock
should be clarified. Lastly, the Bill must clarify the legal position of parties
to existing polygamous unions and include protective measures in favour of
women who are parties to these unions.
6.6.2 Concluding remarks on DEPA
The transformation of customary law proposed in DEPA probably shows
the direction in which Malawi is moving in creating a new society and laws.
Reconciling the various systems of law with modern human rights and the
Constitution is an unavoidable process. However, certain aspects of DEPA
also show the practical problems of this process, and how some of the most
important provisions of the new laws are likely to be of little benefit to women
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married according to customary laws for whom transformation is intended.
For example, DEPA essentially aims at extending civil intestate succession
to customary marriages, with some modifications to allow for polygamous
marriages. The problem is that the individualistic basis of the civil law
of intestate succession cannot accommodate the need in customary law to
protect group rights.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider what the alternatives are,
but one question for reflection may be posed: is the simple extension of
the common law and its complexities to the customary laws of inheritance
the way to go in the process of reconciling the inequities of the latter with
women’s rights?
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Chapter 7
The Bill of Rights and courts’
application of African
customary family laws
7.1 Introduction
The Bill of Rights in the Malawi Constitution contains a number of oper-
ational provisions that guide the courts with respect to conflicts between
fundamental rights.1 However, no provision speaks directly to the resolution
1For example, Section 5 of the Malawi Constitution provides: ‘Any act of Government
or any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution shall, to the extent
of such inconsistency, be invalid’. See also Section 11 of the Malawi Constitution.
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of tensions between them. As a result courts have been obliged to develop
doctrines designed to harmonise the demands of fundamental rights with the
dictates of constitutional provisions that engage the exercise of power by var-
ious other branches or spheres of government. It is for this reason that this
Chapter examines how courts go about reconciling substantive provisions in
the Bill of Rights aimed at protecting women’s rights and some African cus-
tomary family laws that appear to conflict with them. In simple terms, the
Chapter aims at discussing the approach that the Malawi courts have taken
to advantage the rights of women married under customary family laws and
to bring them in line with the Bill of Rights and international standards for
the protection of women’s rights. This will include examining some relevant
judgments since 1994.2
This Chapter is divided into four sections. The second section examines
the role that MC have played in reconciling the right to culture and women’s
rights. The third section analyses the approach that HC have taken thus far.
In the fourth section a critical analysis of the challenges that courts face in
the application of customary laws is made. In turn, the analysis, coupled
with research findings, provides the direction which legal and institutional
2These judgments were selected randomly from the courts that I visited during the
period April-May 2006. The criteria for selection were based on a number of factors: first,
whether the case file was a matrimonial case in which customary family law would be
applicable; secondly, the availability of the case file; and thirdly, the court proceedings
that I had attended. The overriding consideration was whether that court was going to
deal with a divorce case in which customary law would be applied or not.
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reforms should take. The last section is a conclusion.
7.2 Examination of role of MC in practice
As previously noted MC do not have jurisdiction in constitutional matters.3
Thus, these courts cannot decide on the constitutionality of rules of African
customary laws. Given that, as pointed out in Chapter 2, almost all cus-
tomary marriage issues are instituted in MC, an examination of how these
courts are handling the conflicting relationship between the right to culture
and women’s rights is very important. In the following discussion, therefore,
I examine how MC are handling the conflicts between customary law and
women’s rights.
7.2.1 Divorce
In Chapter 4 various grounds upon which a customary marriage can be dis-
solved were examined. The customary rules governing who can commence
divorce proceedings in both matrilineal and patrilineal marriages were also
examined. However, from the case files reviewed, it was noted that the major-
ity of divorce claims in the courts that I visited are commenced by women.4
3See the discussion in Chapter 3.
4That is approximately 90 percent of the 135 divorce cases heard by all the courts that
I visited.
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This position was also noted by a senior court clerk in Lilongwe MC who
stated that: ‘previously most divorce cases were brought to court by men.
This position has changed in that more women are having the courage to
commence divorce proceedings.’5
Two reasons were given for this position. First, this was attributed by most
of the magistrates interviewed6 to the fact that it is women who require a
formal divorce, because without it they would have problems in remarrying
since a wife under customary law is not allowed to marry more than one
husband.7 Indeed during the court observation in Mzuzu MC, most women
who wanted their marriage dissolved stated that they want a divorce so that
they can remarry.8
For example, in Ireen Jamson v Blessings Gama,9 a woman had lost her
husband in 2004. According to the patrilineal marriage system, as noted in
Chapter 4, the death of a husband does not dissolve a customary marriage.
Therefore, this woman was not free to remarry. For this reason, the woman
had to ask the Court to formally divorce her from her deceased husband so
that she could go back to her home village and remarry. In granting the
order sought, the magistrate stated that ‘since your husband died, you are
5Interview conducted on 16 May 2006 at Lilongwe MC.
6That is, 12 out of 15 magistrate interviewed.
7See also the discussion in Chapter 4.
8I attended a court session on 3 May 2006. The presiding magistrate was the Chief
Resident Magistrate.
9Civil Cause No. 137 of 2006, Mzuzu MC (Unreported).
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free to go to your family and remarry’.
This decision is striking for three reasons. To begin with, it begs the
question whether after the death of a husband the woman was indeed in law
free to go and marry. What law? That was the very question posed by the
respondent’s (the brother in-law of the applicant) reliance on the patrilineal
customary law. Under that law, the death of a husband does not dissolve
a customary marriage. The magistrate’s decision, without addressing this
question, was based, it is assumed, on the constitutional provision of the
woman’s right to marry,10 which did not take into consideration customary
law rules.
Secondly, in the above decision one does not find any reference to either
the Malawi Constitution or to even the common law. Instead, the patrilineal
customary law is denied enforcement because, arguably, it was incompatible
with the individual’s right to marry. It is, however, noted that such decision
thus makes explicit what can be suggested as an important factor behind
many decisions rejecting the application of specific customary family laws in
favour of rights contained in the Bill of Rights.
Thirdly, the Court did not pay due regard to the intricate customary rule
of lobola and its important implications for granting the woman the right
to marry or not. In the patrilineal system, it must be remembered that
the validity of a customary marriage depends on the lobola contract. This
10Section 22 (3) of the Malawi Constitution that provides for the right to marry.
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contract, as noted in Chapter 4, is between the husband’s family and the
wife’s parents. Consequently, no dissolution of the marriage can be effected
unless the return of lobola by the wife’s parents to the husband’s family is
negotiated. The return of it lobola signifies the termination of the marriage
under customary law. This officially terminates the marriage, and thus frees
the widow to marry. The size of the lobola to be returned11 depends on
whether there were children of the marriage or not. By failing to address
this important customary rule, the Court failed to protect the woman’s right
to marry in its entirety. It is suggested that the Court should have ordered
that, upon the return of lobola, the woman was free to marry, because the
customary rule, that denies a wife the right to marry after the death of
her husband, was a violation of her rights. This position, it is submitted,
would have been a proper reconcilliation of the offending customary rule and
women’s rights. In this particular instance, a woman may still not be able
to marry because of the lobola issue that was left unresolved by the Court.
Such a decision, I am afraid, may be a mere paper judgment.
Secondly, the magistrates interviewed also reasoned that, because of civic
education regarding women’s rights by NGOs in the communities, more
women are now able to know their rights and come to court to seek a remedy.
They are ignoring the customary rule of initiating divorce through their male
guardians.12 However, because of the customary rule that it is the husband
11In the number of head of cattle.
12See the discussion by Ibik JO Restatement of African Law: Malawi Vol 1, The law of
marriage and divorce (1970).
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who has the right to divorce a wife, it was observed that women indirectly ask
the court to dissolve their marriage by use of the Chewa word mundisuzule,
which literally means that a wife is asking the husband to formally divorce
her in court.13
It is also important to note the following: first, that divorce is granted in the
majority of cases.14 This supports the fact that at customary law any reason
is good enough to end a marriage. By dissolving these marriages, courts are,
arguably, fulfilling the right to divorce which automatically comes into the
statutory provision by virtue of Section 22 (4) of the Malawi Constitution
on the right not to be forced to marry.15
Furthermore, in most cases, the case files reviewed and the court observa-
tions made, show that there was little or no discussion by the court of the
facts alleged by the applicant as proof that the marriage had irretrievably
broken down. Magistrates seem not to be concerned about the issue at all.
As a result of this, customary marriages seem to be dissolved quite easily.16
13See, for example, the cases of Elizabeth Maluwasa v Smart Maluwasa, Civil Cause
No. 420 of 2004, Blantyre MC (Unreported); Eunice Makamu v Luka Makamu, Civil Cause
No. 586 of 2005, Mzuzu MC (Unreported); Eliza Kalanjira v Dickson Kalanjira, Civil
Cause No.8 of 2001, Lilongwe MC (Unreported); Thokozire Kalanjira v Darton Kalanjira,
Civil Cause No. 756 of 2005, Mzuzu MC (Unreported).
14For example, in approximately 93 percent of the cases that I reviewed, the divorce
sought was granted.
15Judge Kumange in the case of Zindawa AB v Zindawa E, Civil Appeal Case No. 27
of 2002, HC, Lilongwe District Registry (Unreported).
16From a court observation that I made, it was noted that within less than an hour a
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This may partly explain the high percentage of cases ending in divorce. This
position is striking. According to Section 22 (1) of the Malawi Constitution,
the institution of the family is entitled to the protection by society and the
State. This, therefore, means that courts have a duty to protect the families
and should not be seen as front-runners in breaking them. The fact that
they seem not to discuss the issues thoroughly is, in my opinion, a failure
on their part to fulfill their constitutional duty of protecting the family. It,
is however, noted that such an exercise would conflict with the right not to
force them into marriage if the intention of the parties is to divorce.
7.2.2 Recognition of customary marriages
In Chapter 6 it was noted that Section 22 (5) of the Malawi Constitution
alters the procedures to be followed to validate a customary marriage.17 This
section recognises marriages in which the usual formalities aimed at validat-
ing a customary marriage are not followed. It was further noted that this
section does not state when a marriage by repute or permanent cohabitation
could validly be recognised. By default courts are left to decide what is fit for
each case. The result is inconsistencies in the protection afforded to women.
In this subsection, therefore, an attempt is made to show how courts are cur-
rently reconciling the customary rules of lobola and chinkhoswe and Section
22 (5) of the Malawi Constitution in relation to a customary marriage.
magistrate had dissolved four marriages.
17See section 6.2.5 in Chapter 6.
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An analysis of cases decided at the Blantyre, Lilongwe, and Mzuzu MC
reveals that courts have not been consistent in their adjudication of unions
which had not been preceded by lobola or chinkhoswe.18 In a number of
cases courts, especially in regions which are predominantly matrilineal and
also where a court in a patrilineal region is handling a case in which matri-
lineal customary law is applicable, have consistently held a marriage to exist
even where chinkhoswe had not taken place. Courts have gone further, and
made orders with regard to property and children of the marriage as if a valid
customary marriage existed. For example, in Violet Mwale v Harold Mwale19
a wife wanted to divorce her husband on the grounds of adultery and cruelty.
The wife and the husband came from a matrilineal customary system. The
marriage was not preceded by chinkhoswe. The court in granting the order
sought noted that there was no marriage under customary law. However, us-
ing Section 22 (5) of the Malawi Constitution ‘there was no express provision
to stop the court from assuming that marriage existed’.
Another example is Tafere Mafusa v Exton Mtemankwawa20 where a wife
wanted to divorce her husband because he had a girlfriend. She came from a
patrilineal customary marriage system and the man from a matrilineal one.
Their union had neither been preceded by lobola nor chinkhoswe ceremony.
According to customary law there was no valid marriage. The husband did
18I conducted research at these courts in April and May 2006.
19Civil Cause No. 470 of 2005, Lilongwe MC (Unreported).
20Civil Case No. 136 of 2006, Mzuzu MC (Unreported).
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not contest the case. The Court made a pronouncement dissolving the mar-
riage. The Court stated that, although this marriage had not been preceded
by chinkhoswe or lobola negotiations, the parties had lived together for one
year and had a child, and that therefore, it was a marriage according to Sec-
tion 22 (5) of the Malawi Constitution. The Court went further and made
orders with regard to property and the child.
Thus, in the case of Tafere we see that the Court regarded a one year
period as enough to recognise that a marriage existed under Section 22 (5)
of the Malawi Constitution. On the other hand, in Violet the court did not
even know the period as to how long the parties had been together and yet
the court recognised the existence of a marriage.
Similarly, in Thokozile Kalanjira v Darton Kalanjira,21 the complainant
petitioned for divorce on the ground that the defendant was guilty of bad
behaviour. The Court stated that, although there was no ankhoswe, the
parties had lived together for five years and had children, and that therefore a
marriage existed. Similar approaches are also observed in the cases of Gracian
Villi v Halliet Mphundi22; and Tamala Chunda v Wanangwa Mwaulwali.23
The above cases, it is submitted, demonstrate the significance of the role
courts play in protecting women’s rights. Strict application of formalities for
a valid marriage may leave many women and children, who live in unions
21See n 13 above.
22Civil Case No. 126 of 2006, Mzuzu MC (Unreported).
23Civil Case No. 127 of 2006, Mzuzu MC (Unreported).
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that are not recognised as valid marriages at customary law, unprotected.
By applying Section 22 (5) of the Malawi Constitution which, among oth-
ers, recognises marriages by repute or permanent cohabitation, courts are
indirectly protecting the rights of women and children.
However, we see that there is no prescribed period for which parties must
live together before they could be declared to be married. Each court decides
according to what it thinks is right. This position, unfortunately, does not
offer uniformity in the protection offered to women. If enacted the Bill, as
discussed in Chapter 6, will provide a solution to these inconsistencies.24
On the other hand, on the protection of customary family laws and the right
to culture, two issues can be deduced from the courts’ jurisprudence. First,
24Section 14 of the Bill lays down the requirements for recognising marriages by repute
permanent cohabitation. It provides that:
’A marriage by repute or permanent cohabitation shall only be recognised
under this Act if there is evidence of- mutual consent; and capacity to enter
into marriage as provided under this Act. Before making a finding that a
marriage by repute or permanent cohabitation exists, a court shall consider-
the length of the relationship; the fact of cohabitation; the existence of a
conjugal relationship; the degree of financial dependence or interdependence
and any agreements for financial support between the parties; ownership, use
and acquisition of property; the degree of mutual commitment to a shared
life; whether the parties mutually care for and support children; the reputa-
tion of the parties and the public display of aspects of their shared relation;
and any other factors that the court considers fit.’
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courts are ignoring customary rules of lobola and chinkhoswe, that validates
customary marriages in patrilineal and matrilineal marriages, respectively.
This automatically renders the institution of lobola and chinkhoswe outdated.
This position, unfortunately, is not what the majority of the people who
follow this customary rule would like to see. The discussion in Chapter 4
has indicated that the MHRC had revealed that the institution of lobola
still receives a lot of support. Therefore, we see that courts’ judgments are
detached from what the peoples value. This position, it is submitted, has
negative implications for the protection of the rights of women and children.
If enacted, however, the Bill as discussed in Chapter 6, seems to recognise
these institutions. It would, therefore, be interesting to see how courts are
going to marry the requirements of Section 27 of the Bill and marriages by
repute or permanent cohabitation. The question that can be posed is: is
replacing of a customary marriage with marriage by repute or permanent
cohabitation the way to go in reconciling cultural rights and women’s rights?
It is submitted that development of customary family laws that go against
the enjoyment of women’s rights is the way to go and not replacing with a
different system of marriage.
Secondly, it is noted that courts are recognising a marriage as valid which
would not have been valid under customary family laws. They do this by
replacing customary marriages with marriages by repute or permanent co-
habitation. Such a position does not take into account the fact that marriages
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by custom are equally recognised under the same constitutional provision.25
Section 22 (5) of the Malawi Constitution provides:
‘Sub-sections (3) and (4) shall apply to all marriages at law, cus-
tom and marriages by repute or permanent cohabitation’.
From the foregoing provision we see that the Malawi Constitution recog-
nises that marriages by custom are equal to any other marriage, whether at
law or marriages by repute or permanent cohabitation. The assumption that
can be made from this constitutional provision is that the drafters of the
Constitution did not intend that one form of marriage should replace any
other. Moreover, as has been noted in Chapter 1 footnote 13, most Malaw-
ians marry according to customary laws. Therefore, it is my submission that
by replacing customary marriages with marriages by repute or permanent
cohabitation, courts not only fail to provide an adequate response to women
who wish to live in accordance with their cultural rights, but also lack a
constitutional justification to make such response a good part of a well de-
signed constitutional approach that has taken into account the fact that the
majority of Malawian women live according to customary family laws.
On the other hand, in Mzuzu, where most cases were from predominantly
patrilineal customary, courts tended to invalidate marriages that did not
follow customary family law procedures. For example, in the case of Florence
25Section 22 (5) of the Malawi Constitution.
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Mwale v Gervazio Phiri26 the parties had been living together for nine years,
since 1993. Their relationship was not formalised according to patrilineal
marriage rules. Thus, according to patrilineal marriage rules there was no
marriage. The parties had children born out of this relationship. In 2004
the wife brought an action to divorce her husband. The Court dismissed
the action. The Court stated that it cannot preside over a marriage that is
not valid in law, since there was no proof that lobola had been negotiated.
In dismissing the action, the Court did not make any orders with regard to
the children born out of this marriage. Similarly, in Charity Msuku v Lloyd
Phiri27 the Court dismissed the case because it reasoned that if no lobola
had been paid, there was no marriage. Furthermore, in Joshua Kumwenda v
Angela Kachali28 where the facts were almost similar to those of the above
cases, the Court, after dismissing the action, ordered that the man should
maintain the children, failing which the wife was advised to bring affiliation
proceedings.
Unlike in courts that are in predominantly matrilineal societies, in patrilin-
eal societies courts are protective of cultural rights, especially where parties
are from patrilineal system, without recognising the effect of such protection
on women’s rights. Thus, it can be argued that these courts fail to protect
women because they dwell on the formality of observing the lobola custom
26Civil Cause No. 4 of 2004, Mzuzu MC (Unreported).
27Civil Cause No. 117 of 2004, Mzuzu MC (Unreported).
28Civil Cause No. 34 of 2004, Mzuzu MC (Unreported).
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at the expense of children’s and women’s rights. Such decisions also fail to
recognise the social reality that, in urban areas, a woman living together with
a man in the same house is socially recognised as a spouse notwithstanding
the absence of lobola.29 It is, however, important to note that the Bill,30if
enacted, will rectify the harshness of such decisions on the rights of women
and children. The institution of formalities for a marriage will no longer
regulate the rights and obligations of the parties to a marriage.31
It is, however, suggested that, as a way forward, courts, instead of dis-
missing cases where formalities were not followed, should order that parties
must first formalise their union and then come back to court to seek the relief
sought.32 This would, however, not be an unfamiliar practice in respect of
patrilineal customary law marriages. Men are supposed to pay lobola before
they are given the right to bury their wives, where lobola was not paid during
the lifetime of the deceased wife.33
Also, in recognising the social reality in cities, where parties live together
29See also Chimango LJ Women without “Ankhoswe” in Malawi: A discussion of a le-
gal position of women who enter into informal marital relations’ (Unpublished) (Undated)
who expressed similar sentiments with respect to the institution of chinkhoswe in matri-
lineal systems.
30As discussed in Chapter 6.
31See Section 49 of the Bill.
32Of course the practicality of this suggestion takes into account the fact that the parties
are at the point of divorce and would therefore not be willing to formalise such a union.
33My own experience.
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for a long time without formalising the union, courts should invalidate such
a union only when consent of either party to the marriage is lacking. This
approach would be in line with the constitutional principle that requires that
no one should be forced into a marriage.34
In conclusion, we see that courts are divided. Some courts seem to be re-
lying on constitutional provisions that protect children’s and women’s rights
and avoid strict application of customary family laws. Other courts apply
strict customary family laws that do not provide protection to women and
children involved in such relationships.
It is also interesting to note that where parties are from matrilineal custom-
ary marriage system, courts whether in predominantly patrilineal or matri-
lineal regions tend to recognise a marriage as valid even though such a union
was not preceded by chinkhoswe. Thus, we see that women’s and children’s
rights seem to be better protected by courts if women are from matrilineal
customary systems. If enacted, the Bill will address this anomaly because,
among other issues, it lays down guidelines that a court may consider to vali-
date a marriage under Section 22 (5) of the Malawi Constitution, specifically
marriages by repute or permanent cohabitation.
34See Section 22 (4) of the Malawi Constitution.
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7.2.3 Custody of children
Section 24 (1) (iii) of the Malawi Constitution provides that women have the
same rights as men in civil law, including the right:
‘... to acquire and retain custody, guardianship and care of chil-
dren and to have an equal right in the making of decisions that
affect their upbringing’.
Children are also entitled to the right to ‘know, and to be raised by, their
parents.’35
These provisions have significant implications for African customary family
laws relating to custody of children. As noted in Chapter 4, in patrilineal
societies children ‘belong’ to the family of the male spouse, unless lobola
was not negotiated. In matrilineal societies children ‘belong’ to the female
spouse’s family.36 Section 24 (1) (iii) of the Malawi Constitution alters these
customary rules in that they give both spouses equal rights to custody over
their children irrespective of whether they were married under customary
laws or not.
However, the above constitutional provision does not necessarily mean that
spouses have the right to joint custody over children. All it guarantees is the
equal opportunity of both spouses to contend for custody. Thus, the actual
35Section 23 (3) of the Malawi Constitution.
36Chakhumbira v Chakhumbira Civil Appeal Case No. 39 of 1979, NTAC (Unreported).
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decision to grant custody to one spouse or both will depend on various factors
including, the best interests of the child. In respect of customary marriages,
African customary family laws constitutes a relevant consideration in this
regard. In this part an attempt is made to show how courts are currently
addressing the issue.
An examination of the cases dealing with custody of children after dissolu-
tion of a customary marriage, displayed a bias against applying or considering
African customary laws in custody proceedings. Of the 150 cases that dealt
with the issue of custody of children following dissolution of a customary
marriage, 134 mentioned that their decisions were based on the principle of
the best interests of the child. For example, in Mercy Nyirenda v Lusungu
Mwenda,37 on the issue of custody of the children, the magistrate stated that:
‘according to the Tumbuka custom [patrilineal], where lobola has
not been paid, the custody of the child goes to the mother. How-
ever, in line with the Constitution, the issue of custody has to be
decided in the best interests of the child’.
For that reason, custody of the child went to the father. The decision taken
by the Court to award custody of the child to the father where lobola had not
been negotiated was a departure from the customary rule that, where lobola
has not been negotiated, custody of the child goes to the mother and her
37Civil Cause No. 118 of 2003, Mzuzu MC (Unreported).
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family. Similarly, in Patricia Banda v Andrew Banda38 where parties before
the Court were from Nsanje that follows the patrilineal system of marriage,
custody of the child after this marriage was dissolved was granted to the
mother and not the father as would have been required by the patrilineal
customary law. The Court reasoned that because the child was still young,
its best interests would be properly looked after by the mother. Again, in
Khetase Kapila v Haris Skilter Kapila39 where the marriage was governed
under the patrilineal customary laws, in granting custody of children to the
mother the Court said that:
‘In some customary rules, issues of custody of children are deter-
mined by a particular culture. For instance Nkamanga v Phiri
1966-68 African Law Series Malawi, 106. The one at fault loses
custody of the child. But the rule is subject to the best interest
of the child principle.’
With the above reasoning, the Court granted custody to the mother despite
the fact that the mother40 was at fault for the dissolution of the marriage.
Furthermore, in Frimley Fulukiya v Beatrice Fulukiya41 the marriage was con-
tracted according to matrilineal customary family laws. When this marriage
was dissolved, the Court granted custody of the first child (10 years) to the
38Civil Cause No. 321 of 2004, Blantyre MC (Unreported).
39Civil Cause No. 32 of 2002, Lilongwe MC (Unreported).
40The wife committed adultery and was therefore at fault.
41Civil Cause No. 87 of 2004, Blantyre MC (Unreported).
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father and the second child (2 years) to the mother. The Court reasoned
that custody of the 2 year old child was granted to the mother because the
child was still very young and therefore her welfare would best be looked
after by the mother. Otherwise, the Court felt that if both children were
of old age, custody of both children was to be granted to the father. The
decision taken by the Court to grant custody of one child to the father was a
departure from the matrilineal customary rule that custody of children goes
to the mother and her family. Similarly, in Cathy Assani v Andrew John,42
where the marriage was contracted according to matrilineal customary family
marriage system, the Court granted custody of children to the father and not
the mother. In invoking the best interests of the child principle, the Court
reasoned that the father was in the position to properly look after them. The
matrilineal customary family rules were ignored as a guiding principle. Its
application in this case, it should be noted, would have resulted in custody
being awarded to the wife (mother).
In addition to the above cases, a departure from the strict customary rules
in favour of the best interests of the child principle was observed in issues
of maintenance of children. In Francis Phiri v Cecilia Phiri43, for exam-
ple, where the marriage was contracted according to matrilineal customary
marriage laws, on the issue of custody of the child after divorce, the Court
granted it to the mother but ordered that the father maintain the child until
42Civil Cause No. 21 of 2003, Zomba MC (Unreported).
43Civil Cause No. 483 of 2005, Lilongwe MC (Unreported).
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that child reaches 18 years of age. It should be observed that in granting
custody of the child to the mother, the Court followed the matrilineal cus-
tomary rule that children belong to the wife and her family. However, as a
departure to this customary rule, we see that the Court further ordered that
the father maintain the child until the child reaches majority age, which is
18 years. The duty to maintain the child under strict matrilineal customary
laws, as discussed in Chapter 4, lay in the hands of the brother to the wife
(maternal uncle) and not a husband. This rule was well elaborated in the
case of Aisha Jawadu v Edward Jawadu44 where the Court, in deciding who
should have custody of children after the marriage was dissolved, said:
‘In matrilineal customary law society, children remain with the
mother or maternal uncle upon dissolution of the marriage. This
is regardless of whose fault it was for the breakdown of the mar-
riage. This is because the children take the lineage of their
mother, unlike in the patrilineal set up where they take the lineage
of the father. The father in matrilineal society has no customary
obligation to maintain his children after divorce since they do
not belong to him at custom. But due to change of life stlye of
Malawian society and economic focus, courts have developed the
principle that the welfare of the child is paramount, see, for ex-
ample, Margaret Kafele v Kamowa 1968-70 African Law Reports,
Malawi Series, 146.’ [Emphasis added]
44Civil Cause No. 361 of 2005, Lilongwe MC (Unreported).
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In this case, the Court granted custody of children to the mother but or-
dered the father to maintain the child based on the best interests of the child
principle. Similar instances where courts have granted custody to mothers
but ordered that fathers maintain children after divorce of a matrilineal cus-
tomary marriage were observed in the cases of Jenifa Nthukwa v Rodney
Chapinda,45 Keturia Phiri v George Phiri,46 Jessie Namvenya v Fred Kaphy-
ola,47, and Edna Chigoni v Blessings Matiya.48
The decisions of the courts in the above cases need some comment. First,
one cannot but question and wonder how the whole decision of what is in the
best interests of the child was arrived at. The cases reviewed show that there
is no proper inquiry to find out whether the husband or the wife would best
be given custody of the child. This position brings us to the question that
has been frequently asked: what are the factors that a court must consider
in determining what would be in the best interests of the child, and apply in
a given case?
This problem has been there even under the common law rule of the best
interests of the child. In the Malawian case of Kamcaca v Nkhota49, Bolton
J, in considering what is in the best interest of the child, stated:
45Civil Cause No. 36 of 2005, Lilongwe MC (Unreported).
46Civil Cause No. 261 of 2005, Lilongwe MC (Unreported).
47Civil Cause No. 19 of 2002, Mzuzu MC (Unreported).
48Civil Cause No. 275 of 2004, Blantyre MC (Unreported).
491968 MLR 529.
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‘When there is a dispute about custody each party may be able
to advance reasons why an order should be made in his or her
favour and in Rhodesia at any rate, as I have just emphasised, it
has been held that the welfare of children is paramount’.
In Laureen Pereira Kamangira v Jones B Kamangira50 Chombo J said that:
‘in considering what is in the best interests of a child, the courts
must examine all issues surrounding the custody of the child be-
fore deciding which party must have custody’.
In all these cases there is no guideline given as to what would constitute
‘all issues surrounding the custody of a child’. This, as pointed out above,
presents difficulties in the application of the best interests of the child prin-
ciple to specific cases.
However, in South Africa some development has taken place with regard
to factors to be taken into account in assessing how best the child’s interests
may be determined. These are outlined in Mc Call v Mc Call.51 This case
involved a custody and access dispute. Some of the listed factors include:
1. the love, affection and emotional ties which exist between a parent and
a child and the parent’s compatibility with that child;
50Civil Cause No. 266 of 2004 HC, Lilongwe District Registry (Unreported).
511994 (3) SA 201 (C).
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2. the capabilities, character and temperament of the parent and the im-
pact thereon on the child’s needs and desires;
3. the ability of the parent to communicate with the child and the parent’s
insight into, understanding of and sensitivity to the child’s feelings;
4. the ability of the parent to provide for the educational well-being and
security of the child, both religious and secular;
5. the capability of the parent to give the guidance the child requires;
6. the mental and physical health and moral fitness of the parent;
7. the child’s preference, if the court is satisfied that, in a particular cir-
cumstances, the child’s preference should be taken into consideration;
8. the desirability or otherwise of applying the doctrine of same sex match-
ing.
It would, therefore, mean that courts in South Africa should use, among
others, the listed factors in varying weightings as the basis in the decision-
making matrix when the welfare of children is at issue. In view of the fact
that Malawi courts may be compelled to use comparable foreign case law,52
the above factors would equally apply, when assessing what would be in the
best interests of the child.
52Section 11 (2) (c) of the Malawi Constitution.
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It should, however, be noted that these factors are, in my opinion, not
exhaustive of factors that a court may consider. A court may consider other
factors that would ensure that the decision reached is in the best interests
of the child. For example, the age of the child. In addition to this, it
should also be noted that not all the factors listed above can apply in each
and every case. Depending on the social background of the parties before
a court, some of these factors may not be applicable. In most customary
marriages, for example, factors such as communication with a child would
not be determinative. Communication, in my opinion, may in some cases
mislead the courts and result in them making orders that are not in the best
interests of the child. Children under customary laws are educated/trained
not to freely communicate with their parents.53 Lastly, some factors, such as
the capacity of the parent to give the guidance the child requires, are difficult
to prove. How would a court solicit evidence to show that a parent is capable
of giving a child the guidance required, or not?
Second, it was generally observed that in the Mzuzu MC, which is located
in a predominantly patrilineal region, the decisions of whom to give custody
of the child was inclined towards fathers.54 Similarly, in the Lilongwe and
Blantyre MC, which are located in predominantly matrilineal societies, the
53Through my own experience as an African child, a child who is shy and not freely
giving his/her opinions in the presence of older people is regarded as a respectful child.
This position is not the same with westernised children.
54For example, approximately 80 percent of the cases that dealt with custody of children,
custody of children was granted to fathers.
359
 
 
 
 
decisions inclined towards mothers.55 This position, as also noted by Ben-
nett,56 brings us to the conclusion that the influence of cultural beliefs- that
the best interests of the child will, in most cases, influence the courts to
grant custody of the child to fathers in patrilineal systems and to mothers
in matrilineal systems- cannot be ruled out. It is thus submitted that the
fact that courts mention the best interests of the child does not mean that
in principle cases are indeed decided according to it.
In summary, we see that some courts are indirectly protecting cultural
rights rather than women’s rights. They use the best interests of the child
principle as a shield to conceal their actual belief as to who should have
custody of the child. This position, unfortunately, does not benefit women,
especially in patrilineal systems, under whose customary family laws they
have no right to custody of children after divorce.57
It should also be noted that, apart from the cases reviewed, most magis-
trates and judges interviewed58 stated that, when faced with custody issues,
they do not consider customary laws and cultural values that are discrimi-
natory to women. One magistrate59 said:
55For example, approximately 80 percent of the cases that dealt with custody of children,
custody of children was granted to mothers.
56Bennett TW ‘The Compatibility of African Customary Law and Human Rights’ (1991)
Acta Juridica 18 at 24.
57See the discussion in Chapter 4.
58That is eleven out of 15 magistrates and four out of five judges.
59Interview with a First Grade Magistrate in Mzuzu MC on 5 May 2006.
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‘... custody of children in my judgments is mostly based on the
best interests of the child principle which is not based on custom-
ary laws that dictates that only husbands, where lobola was paid,
should be awarded custody.’
However, the practice on the ground does not reflect this rhetoric. The
fact that there is no proper assessment made by the MC before making a
custody order leaves a lot to be desired.
7.2.4 Property after divorce
Section 24 (1) (b) of the Malawi constitution, as discussed in Chapter 4, is
to the effect that on the dissolution of a marriage, women and men would
have the same property rights. This provision, it is submitted, has significant
implications for African customary laws relating to distribution of property
after divorce of a customary marriage.
In this regard it was noted that most MC make orders for the sharing of
matrimonial property by the spouses after divorce. These orders are being
made without any consideration of who owns what. For example, in Tafere
Mafusa v Exton Mtemankhwawa,60 the magistrate, after asking what prop-
erty the divorcing couple had, went on to make distribution orders without
paying any regard to the issue of who owns what. This practice is commend-
60See n 20 above.
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able for two reasons. First, most women make non-monetary contributions
towards acquiring property for the “house”.61 Such decisions, it is assumed,
take cognisance of the harsh reality that women face.
Secondly, such decisions provide protection to women beyond what the
Malawi Constitution is offering, since they are not subject to the constitu-
tional requirement of proving ownership.62 Looked at from another angle,
since customary rules that apply in relation to distribution of property after
divorce are not considered in such judgments, it is doubtful whether they can
have an impact in this regard.
On the other hand, the response of the HC in the protection of women’s
property rights is rather different. The HC are uphelding the rule that was
laid down in Malinki v Malinki and Gomani63 in which it was stated that
‘where the husband bought a house without the wife’s direct or indirect
contribution the wife could not be given a share of it.’
61White S et al Dispossessing the widow: Gender based violence in Malawi (2002) 34.
62Section 24 (1) (b) of the Malawi Constitution states that: ‘on dissolution of marriage
women are entitled to a fair disposition of property that is held jointly with a husband’
(Emphasis added).
631978-80 MLR 441.
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7.3 Examination of the role of HC in practice
It should be recalled that the HC is vested with original jurisdiction to review
any law for conformity with the Malawi Constitution.64 In view of the fact
that customary family laws that are seen to offend the Malawi Constitution,
are to be reviewed by the HC, it is only proper to examine the role that the
HC has played since the advent of the Malawi Constitution.
It is, however, important to note that in Malawi since the advent of the Bill
of Rights the cases reviewed reveal that no fierce challenges to how custom-
ary family laws impact on women’s rights have been launched in the HC of
Malawi. This position should, however, be contrasted to that in South Africa
where a number of applicants have asked the court in various cases to declare
certain rules of customary family laws to be in conflict with the liberating
spirit of the South African Constitution.65 However, the following discussion
64Section 108 (2) of the Malawi Constitution provides: ‘The High Court shall have
original jurisdiction to review any law, and any action or decision of the government, for
conformity with this Constitution · · ·’
65See, for example, Bhe and others v Magistrate Khayelitsha and others, Shibi v Sithole
and others, South African Human Rights Commission and Another v President of the
Republic of South Africa and Another, 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC); 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC), in
which the Court was faced with African women challenging the patriarchal construction
of customary laws that favoured the inheritance rights of men over women. The Court
ruled that the constitution guaranteed equal rights to women and was premised upon the
principle of non-discrimination, including on the basis of sex. The rule of male primogen-
iture was thus declared unconstitutional as it contravened the right to equality.
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will focus on how the operation and application of African customary family
laws has been handled by the HC of Malawi thus far.
7.3.1 Recognition of customary marriages
In the preceding section it was noted that most MC are invoking Section 22
(5) of the Malawi Constitution to validate a marriage that would otherwise
not have been valid under customary laws. The position taken by the HC is,
however, different. The HC seems to attach a lot of value to the customary
law requirements for validating a marriage. In Getrude Gondwe v Matias
Gondwe,66 for example, the appellant had fallen in love with the respondent.
The respondent proposed marriage and the issue of marriage advocates was
initiated. This, however, did not materialise as the respondent father was
not happy with the relationship. Whilst the negotiations were still under
way the appellant moved in with the respondent. The two had a child. Later
on the respondent fell ill and was hospitalised. Upon being discharged the
respondent went to live with his parents. This brought about misunderstand-
ings, with the result that the appellant issued summons for dissolution of the
marriage. In uphelding the lower court’s finding that there was no marriage
at custom, Judge Twea said:
‘I agree that there was no marriage at custom and in my view
the union would not, on the facts, be viewed as a marriage by
66Civil Appeal Case No. 26 of 2002, HC, Principal Registry (Unreported).
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cohabitation or repute. The union was less than two years old and
there were marriage negotiations going on, although not fruitful.
The parties were minors and in need of parental consent. I find
that the finding that this was mere friendship, notwithstanding
the birth of the child, correct’.
The position adopted by the HC in this case is striking for several reasons.
First, we see that there is a difference in approach between the MC and the
HC. In the MC, where parties have cohabited for less than two years without
formalising such a union, courts have been quick to use Section 22 (5) of
the Malawi Constitution, and have regarded such a union as a marriage by
repute or permanent cohabitation.
Secondly, the above decision seems to place too much reliance on the cus-
tomary rules of validating a customary marriage. This position has been
so expressed by the Judge’s words: ‘that because the negotiations had not
been fruitful there was no marriage’. Thirdly, the Judge observed that the
parties were minors and, therefore, needed parental consent in line with the
constitutional provision that requires that there should be parental consent
to the marriage of minors.67 However, it should be stressed that whatever
the Malawi Constitution now provides, under customary family laws con-
sent of the guardian is a requirement whether the marriage is taking place
67Section 22 (7) of the Malawi Constitution.
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between minors or not.68 The position adopted by the Judge points to the
fact that, in reconciling the right to equality and customary laws, the Court
simply ignored constitutional provisions aimed at protecting women’s rights
and follow customary family laws that may not always protect the rights of
women.
7.3.2 Custody of children
Just like the position in most MC, as discussed above, cases involving custody
of children in the HC are largely decided by the principle that the welfare
of the child is the paramount consideration,69 a principle which has no basis
for application in relation to customary marriages, as stated in Chapter 4.
Almost all cases that have been decided by the HC pay no regard to the
customary rules for the affiliation of children after divorce. In Susan Chabuka
v Thokozani Manyika Banda, for example,70 the parties before the Court had
been, before the marriage was dissolved, married under Tonga customary
laws, which is a patrilineal system. The case before the Court was about
custody of their child. According to patrilineal customary laws, the man was
68See the discussion in Chapter 4.
69For example, Joseph C Sibande v Edward Mushani and Janet Mushani, Matrimo-
nial Cause No. 134 of 2004, HC, Mzuzu District Registry (Unreported); Lauren Pereira
Kamangira v Jones B Kamangira, Civil Cause No. 266 of 2004, HC, Lilongwe District
Registry (Unreported).
70Matrimonial Cause No. 1 of 2000, HC, Principal Registry (Unreported).
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entitled to custody of the child. However, in granting custody of the child to
the mother, Judge Chipeta71 said:
‘· · · it is quite clear from these authorities that regardless of the
type of marriage from which issue is born, when the marriage
breaks and it comes to the question of considering which parent
should have custody of the child, the welfare of the child takes
priority’.
However, an exception to this observation is to be found in Willie Malilo
v Maltina Malilo.72 In this case the husband and wife had been, before the
marriage was dissolved, married according to matrilineal customary laws.
The husband complained to the Court that he had not been given custody
of the children born out of this relationship. In upholding the customary
rule that in matrilineal marriages a child is affiliated to the mother, Judge
Kumange73 held that:
‘Inherently children born under matrilineal society are deemed
to be for the wife. If there is departure to that practice, then
there must be proof of the prevailing custom through testimony
in court’.
71As above, 4.
72Civil Appeal Case No. 8 of 1997, HC, Lilongwe District Registry (Unreported).
73As above.
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It should, however, be noted that the principle of the welfare of the child has
been articulated in a number of cases, essentially in the following terms74:
‘Whether a parent will have custody or not is determined on
whether it is in the children’s best interests to stay with one or
the other parent. So that if upon careful consideration of the
totality of the facts of the case the children’s custody should be
awarded to the father such will the conclusion be’.
As noted in Chapter 4, the Malawi Constitution does not have the best
interests of the child principle. However, it may be argued that the above
formulation of the welfare of the child principle follows the common law as
enunciated in the cases of Ndasowa v Ndasowa,75 and by Judge Chombo in
Lauren Pereira Kamangira v Jones B Kamangira76
It should also be noted that there are several factors that the HC takes
into consideration in determining the welfare of the child. This process is to
be contrasted to that of the MC which simply mention the principle without
examining relevant factors. The most common factors that the HC consider
are the age of the child and the physical availability of a parent to the child.
74See, for example, Joseph C Sibande v Edward Mushani and Janet Mushani (n 55). See
also Lauren Pereira Kamangira v Jones B Kamangira (n 39).
75Civil Cause No. 657 of 1979, NTAC (Unreported).
76See n 39 above.
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Age of the child
Judges often repeat in their judgments that the law says that young children
are better looked after by their mother. For example, in Joseph C Sibande v
Edward Mushani and Janet Mushani77 the plaintiff and the second defendant
were still husband and wife.78 They had been married under the customary
laws of Tumbuka/Ngoni, which is essentially a patrilineal customary law. The
plaintiff and the second defendant quarreled. This made them to separate.
The wife went to live in the Chitipa district with their children. The husband
remained in the Mzuzu city where he was working. The plaintiff brought an
action seeking an order that he be granted custody of the two children.
From the facts of the case it was apparent that the plaintiff had a better
job than the second defendant. This, therefore, meant that he was financially
better off than the wife. The plaintiff was also living in an urban area, which
might have been better than where the second defendant was living, in the
sense that he was close to better health care and educational facilities than
in Chitipa district. However, in granting custody of the child to the second
defendant, the mother, Judge Chikopa 79 stated that:
‘The children are nine and five years old. The law says young
77See n 55 above.
78The first defendant was the father of the second defendant.
79Judge Chikopa in Joseph C Sibande v Edward Mushani and Janet Mushani, (as above)
9.
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children are better looked after by their mother. That they should
be so looked after unless the facts are such that it would not be
in the best interests of the children to so order’.
Physical availability of the parties
The physical availability of a parent to children at home is considered a factor
in allocating custody of the children. In Lauren Pereira Kamangira v Jones
B Kamangira,80 in awarding custody of the child to the mother, the plaintiff,
Judge Chombo81 said this:
‘In considering what is in the best interests of a child, the courts
must examine all issues surrounding the custody of the child be-
fore deciding which party must have custody of the child. In the
case before me, evidence has been given that the defendant’s duty
necessitates his spending time out of home and that the child is
mostly left in the care of a house servant’.
Similar reasoning was also observed in the case of Joseph C Sibande v Edward
Mushani and Janet Mushani82 where Judge Chikopa, in refusing to grant
custody of the child to the father, said:
80See n 39 above.
81As above, 5.
82Joseph C Sibande v Edward Mushani and Janet Mushani (n 55).
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‘· · · the father is a working father. He is mostly likely, and by his
own admission, to spend the better part of the day at work. He
said he would employ help to look after the children. Should
we allow outside help to look after these children when their
mother is alive ready and willing and says she is able to look
after them?’83
In summary, we see that HC generally discuss factors to be considered be-
fore awarding custody orders. However, just like the MC, they also do not
take customary laws on board when the best interests of the child is being
examined.
7.4 Challenges of application of African cus-
tomary family laws by courts in Malawi
There are many theoretical and practical problems that courts in Malawi face,
arising from the application of customary laws in a constitutional framework.
Key among these is the fact that the Malawi Constitution contains language
favourable to both cultural rights and women’s rights, without indicating
which of these is to prevail in the event of a clash. The specific problems
identified in this study are: that the application of African customary family
laws has been hampered by a lack of knowledge of African customary laws,
83As above, 9.
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traditionalist arguments and how to resolve the conflicts between customary
laws and women’s rights. These obstacles, unfortunately, define the extent to
which the Bill of Rights in Malawi will have an impact on African customary
family laws, and, ultimately, the enjoyment of women’s rights.
I now discuss these obstacles.
7.4.1 Lack of knowledge of customary family laws
During the interviews most judicial officers stated that they lacked knowl-
edge of African customary family laws.84 As previously noted in Chapter 1,
in Malawi there are two classes of magistrates that preside in the SC: viz
lay magistrates and professional magistrates. Lay magistrates are mostly
chiefs who were presiding in TCs applying customary laws. These chiefs are
not formally trained but presumed to be schooled in customary law through
pupillage in the life and work of rural societies.85 However, this does not
meet the needs of modern democratic Malawi. This group of magistrates,
however, may be better equipped with customary family rules. On the other
hand, professional magistrates receive their academic education at the Law
Faculty, University of Malawi. They do not usually receive any instruction
84This was so expressed by 95 percent of the magistrates and judges interviewed.
85See Mzunda M ‘Criminal Law in Internal Conflict of Laws in Malawi’ (1985) Journal
of African Law 129 at 146.
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on customary laws, as this subject is rarely taught in the Faculty.86 Sim-
ilarly, the HC is presided over by professional judges. Most of them have
been trained at the University of Malawi. Just like the professional magis-
trates, they may not have received any instruction in the substantive rules
of customary family laws.
In addition to the above, it can be argued that in Malawi the problems
faced by the British judges in colonial Malawi have not disappeared. While
all of the Malawian judiciary is manned by magistrates and judges who are
originally from Malawi, a magistrate or a judge often does not come from a
particular locality whose customary law he/she has to deal with. For exam-
ple, in the Mzuzu HC the two judges are both from the matrilineal systems,
and yet Mzuzu, as noted in Chapter 1, is predominantly patrilineal. This
position, unfortunately, does not render them good arbiters on customary
family laws in which they are not conversant.
Apart from this ethnic question, there is, arguably, an enormous educa-
tional and cultural gap between a judge with a Western education and the
ordinary families with whom he/she may have to deal. Thus, in Malawi the
judicial system may have moved from a problem of race and ethnicity to one
of class.
Considering that the majority of Malawians marry according to customary
law, educating judicial officers in this branch of the law is an urgent neces-
86My own experience having gone through the same school.
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sity, if we were to see courts protecting the rights of women. In addition,
prescribing customary law as one of the core modules for students at the Law
Faculty, University of Malawi, is another important necessity.
7.4.2 Determining what law to apply
During the interviews with magistrates and some judges, most of them said
that they replace customary rules with common law whenever they envis-
age a conflict between customary law and a constitutional provision aimed
at protecting women’s and children’s rights. They reasoned that the com-
mon law has been tried and tested over the years. It has less human rights
violation effects on women’s rights than customary laws. This position is
regrettable. It is not compatible with the HC’s constitutional mandate as
far as the development of customary laws is concerned. It is also doubtful
whether applying a different system of law to parties to whom that law is not
generally applicable can serve to protect the rights of women. What is ideal,
it is suggested, is for courts to examine a particular customary rule that is
seen to be in conflict with women’s rights, and to develop it so that it is in
line with the constitutional values.
However, through examining of the courts’ practice on the ground, the
study has revealed that they do replace customary laws with constitutional
provisions for the protection of children’s and women’s rights whenever there
is a conflict between customary law and women’s rights. For example, as
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earlier discussed,87 the customary rules of lobola and chinkhoswe are being
replaced by Section 22 (5) that recognises a marriage by repute or permanent
cohabitation. This is a positive development. Customary laws that discrim-
inate against women are being ignored in favour of constitutional provisions
that are aimed at the protection of women’s and children’s rights. However,
the question that one can ask is: is replacing customary law the way to
proceed in reconciling the right to culture and women’s rights?
Furthermore, some magistrates related that they had encountered prob-
lems in dealing with two competing customs. The challenge that they face
is: whose custom carries the day?88 The sentiments expressed by Judge B
further elaborate on the matter. He noted:
‘The challenge on the application of customary laws in modern
Malawi is not so much on recognition, but, identifying what in our
context is the customary law to apply considering the diversity of
customs. Over the years customary law is changing. The problem
with courts is to establish where custom is today or how far do
we go back or come to the present day before we dilute the whole
issue of custom. Even if you consider to apply living customary
law, it also has its problems because you get different views on
customary laws as there are always people moving in and out of
87See section 7.2.3
88Interviews by some magistrates conducted at the Lilongwe District MC on 16 May
2006.
375
 
 
 
 
the cities’.89
7.4.3 Proof of customary family laws
Courts generally encounter difficulties in finding expert witnesses to prove a
particular customary law. This was also expressed during the interviews as
one of the challenge that magistrates and judges face .
In addition to the above, the other problem that courts face is the issue of
precedents. There are generally not enough court cases dealing with custom-
ary marriages coming from the HC. Such cases would have been helpful in
providing direction to the MC who are on a daily basis handling customary
marriage cases.
7.4.4 Examples provided by foreign case law
Pursuant to Section 11 (2) (c) of the Malawi Constitution, courts in Malawi
may consider foreign case law as well as international law when interpreting
the rights set forth in the Bill of Rights. Thus, Malawi courts may look
to their neighbours for guidance. The Tanzanian case of Ephraim v Pas-
tory90 and the Botswana case of Attorney General v Unity Dow91illustrate
89Judge B of the Lilongwe HC on 18 May, 2006.
90Ephraim v Pastory, [1990] LRC 757.
91Attorney General v Unity Dow, (1992) BLR 119 CA 72; [1991] LRC 574.
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that other African states have successfully used international law in resolv-
ing the conflict between cultural rights and women’s rights.92 For example,
in Ephraim v Pastory, Holaria Pastory, the first respondent, inherited some
clan land from her father by will. Finding that she was getting old and senile
and had no one to take care of her, she sold the clan land on 24th August
1988 to the second respondent, Gervazi Kaizelenge. This second respondent
was a stranger and not a clan member. On 25th August 1988 the appellant,
Bernardo Ephraim, filed a suit in the Kashasha primary court praying for a
declaration that the sale of the clan land by his aunt was void, as a female un-
der Haya customary laws has no power to sell clan land. In interpreting the
anti-discrimination provisions of the Constitution, the HC invoked Tanza-
nia’s ratification of major international human rights instruments, including
CEDAW, to support a modification of customary inheritance rules so that
‘males and females now have equal rights to inherit and sell clan land.’93
Similarly, Unity Dow was an attorney, married to a foreigner and had three
children. She challenged the 1984 Citizenship Act. This Act stated that
92See also Byrnes A ‘The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
against Women’ in Wolfgang B, Kisaakye EM and Oberleitner G (eds) Human Rights
of Women: international instruments and African experiences (2002) 120 at 146; Banda
F Women, Law and Human Rights: An African Perspective (2005) 48; and Butegwa F
‘Using the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights to Secure Women’s Access to
Land in Africa’ in Cook RJ (ed) Human Rights of Women: National and International
Perspectives (1994) 495 at 498.
93As above.
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children of a woman married to a foreigner were not entitled to citizenship,
while children of a man married to a foreigner were entitled to citizenship.
Dow contended that the Citizenship Act violated both the Constitution and
international law, including CEDAW which Botswana had subscribed to.
The Court cited CEDAW which, in its opinion, invalidated the law concerned
as unconstitutional. The government had then granted citizenship to Dow’s
children and others in similar circumstances. The HC of Botswana used
the 1981 ACHPR, among other international instruments, to find that the
provision of the 1984 Botswana Citizenship Act which discriminated against
women in the conferral of citizenship was ultra vires the Constitution.94
From the above cases, we see that Malawian courts are not alone in en-
countering the problems in trying to eliminate discrimination against women
based on customary laws. At the same time, we see that principles of human
rights as shown in Pastory and Unity Dow cases provide a basis for negat-
ing retrogressive traditions and customs that are adverse to the position of
women in society and in their enjoyment of human rights.95 Therefore, edu-
cation, both judges and magistrates, in Malawi on how they would interpret
human rights provisions generally, and women’s rights in particular, is of
utmost importance.
94As above.
95Beyani C ‘Toward a More Effective Guarantee of Women’s Rights in the African Hu-
man Rights System’ in Cook RJ (ed) Human Rights of Women: National and International
Perspectives (1994) 285 at 297.
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7.5 Conclusion
This Chapter is now concluded with a summary of the application of custom-
ary family laws by the courts in Malawi. The Chapter has demonstrated that
reconciling African customary family laws and women’s rights has been ham-
pered by courts’ restrictive approach in interpreting human rights generally,
and women’s rights in particular. These obstacles, unfortunately, define the
extent to which courts will be able to reconcile women’s rights and customary
laws. With good institutional improvements and legal education on custom-
ary family laws courts will be in a better position to reconcile customary laws
with women’s rights. An important instrument for courts to utilise in order
to resolve conflicts between customary laws and women’s rights, under the
Malawi Constitution, is to actively apply and develop customary family laws
in line with the values of both the Malawi Constitution and the international
standards for the protection of women’s rights .
Overall, since the majority of people in Malawi are married by customary
family laws, emphasis on its development is extremely important.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and observations
8.1 Introduction
This thesis set out to examine the impact of the Bill of Rights on African
customary family laws in Malawi, focusing on the rights of women married
under customary family laws. In this final Chapter I draw certain basic con-
clusions from the previous discussion. It should, however, be noted that the
purpose of this final Chapter is not to provide a summary of all the ques-
tions that have been examined. The aim here is to set out, in a nutshell, the
impact of the Bill of Rights on African customary family laws, as discussed
in the preceding chapters. It should be noted, too, that certain concluding
remarks on the historical overview of African customary laws, and on the
Bill of Rights and its application to customary laws, have already been made
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at the end of Chapters 2 and 5, respectively.
Overall, an examination of the impact of the Bill of Rights on customary
family laws in Malawi shows that the Bill of Rights has had a strong impact
on customary family laws that are discriminatory against women in Malawi.
This has been reflected in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Law reformers and courts in
Malawi are generally to be commended for this state of affairs. They have,
on a positive note, descended into the arena of conflicts between customary
laws and women’s rights in the areas of marriage, custody of children after
divorce, maintenance of spouses after divorce, and inheritance. However, the
effectiveness of their intervention will be measured by the extent to which the
implementation of the new laws benefits women in practice. This thesis has
attempted to identify the method of the reform of customary laws, replacing
it with a fundamental right, as one of the likely major sources of imple-
mentation problems, together with the related issue of the socio-economic
limitations presented in Chapter 5.
Furthermore, this thesis has hopefully brought to scrutiny a dimension of
the uncritical superficial approach of the courts to customary family laws.1
This has been argued to have a serious bearing on the extent to which
women living under customary family laws may enjoy their human rights
under the Malawi Constitution and international human rights instruments
that Malawi has ratified. It has been argued that if the Bill of Rights is to
have a meaningful impact on women married under customary family laws in
1See the discussion in Chapter 7.
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Malawi, it is important that its application to African customary family laws
by the courts needs to be accommodating of local cultures. Mere replace-
ment of a cultural practice with a constitutional provision is not a solution
to solving the conflict.
Having said that, however, the specific findings presented in the preceding
chapters are now summarised.2 First I will discuss the impact of the Bill
of Rights on the courts and their application of African customary family
laws; then the obstacles sorrounding the court system in the application of
customary laws; to be followed by a conclusion regarding the impact of the
Bill of Rights on African customary family laws as demonstrated by law
reform in Malawi. The last part deals with obstacles to implementation of
the proposed laws.
2Clearly the discussion of the issues in question is not conclusive, but it is hoped that
it will act as a starting point for future research into the impact of the Bill of Rights
on African customary family laws in Malawi and their impact in transforming the lives
of women married under customary family laws in line with principles of equality and
non-discrimination as discussed in Chapter 3.
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8.2 Impact of the Bill of Rights on courts
and their application of African custom-
ary family laws
The impact of the Bill of Rights on the application of African customary
family laws by the courts, particularly highlighted in Chapter 7, has several
manifestations. In these concluding remarks I will only mention three. First,
the granting of custody of children to their divorced parents based on the
best interests of the child principle; secondly, the development of African
customary laws whereby the courts have given a new rationale to a remedy
of equal distribution of property after divorce; and thirdly, where courts
have expanded the idea of customary marriages to include instances where
the formal requirements for a customary marriage have not been met, but
where, through repute or permanent cohabitation, the couple is considered
to be married in the eyes of law.
8.2.1 Custody of children
In Chapter 7 it has been shown that the HC are generally awarding custody
of children after divorce of a customary marriage according to the principle
of the best interests of the child. While the MC generally mention the best
interests of the child, some seem to mention it and apply it to specific cases,
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whilst in other cases they mention it but their decisions are not based on
it. However, the fact that the HC and some of the MC award custody of
children according to the best interests of the child is a departure from the
customary family rules.
As discussed in Chapter 4, in matrilineal customary family laws children
born out of the marriage are attached to the clan of the female spouse. On the
other hand, in patrilineal customary family laws provided lobola obligations
have been complied with, children born of a married woman are affiliated
to her husband. The issue of custody of the children upon the dissolution
of marriage is also dependent on whether lobola has been paid or not. The
implication is that even if the child’s best interests would better be achieved
if custody is granted to the mother, custody of the child has to be granted
to the father because of lobola.
The practice of the HC and some of the MC has been to disregard these
rules in favour of the best interests of the child principle. However, it has
been observed that the influence of customary laws in determining who must
be awarded custody of the child has, undoubtedly, considerable influence on
the way in which the general principles of the best interests of the child are
applied in specific cases.3
3For instance, in a custody dispute, if both parents of an older child owned equally
adequate homes, the tendency would be to follow tradition and, therefore, favour the
mother’s home. In my opinion, such tendencies should not constitute rules. Each case
should still be judged on its own merits. They might, however, prove to be decisive if all
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In addition to the above, magistrates’ and judges’ perception of the best
interests of the child principle is also influenced by their social position and
their cultural and religious backgrounds.
8.2.2 Property after divorce
The attitude of the MC towards distribution of property after divorce has
been to order equal distribution irrespective of who owns what. This is a
departure from the customary family rules as discussed in Chapter 4.
However, the position adopted by some HC judges is rather disappointing.
The practice of the Court has been to distribute property after divorce on
the basis of proof of ownership. This position, as argued in this thesis, has
not been very helpful for the protection of women’s right to property, espe-
cially women married under customary family laws. Most women indirectly
contribute to the property of the house, although that may be difficult to
prove.
8.2.3 Recognition of marriages
In Chapter 7 it has been noted that most of the MC, especially those that
are in predominantly matrilineal societies, recognise as valid customary mar-
riages in which the essential requirements for the validity of a customary
other considerations were more or less equal.
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marriage have not been met. Section 22 (5) of the Malawi Constitution is
used to justify the recognition of such marriages. This is a departure from
the customary family laws. As noted in Chapter 4, all customary marriage
laws recognise as essential to the validity of the marriage compliance with
the following: the parties must have attained the age of puberty; consent of
the parents of a woman must have been given to the marriage; in patrilin-
eal societies lobola must have been paid by a man to the woman’s parents
or other relatives who are her guardians; in matrilineal systems, there must
have been a chinkhoswe; the woman must not have been married.
The practice of most of the MC that are in predominantly matrilineal
societies has been to disregard these customary family laws. There are of
course some inconsistencies on the number of years. Some courts would hold
that a marriage is valid after the couple have stayed together, and have had
children, even for less than two years. Others would not recognise a similar
marriage even if the parties have stayed together for more than five years.
On the other hand, most MC that are in predominantly patrilineal so-
cieties, and HC decisions have not recognised a customary marriage if the
customary requirements have not been fulfilled by the parties.
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8.3 Challenges faced by courts
The application of the Bill of Rights to the customary marriage laws of
Malawi by the courts is, in some cases, impeded by practices or values which
enjoy cultural legitimacy but are incompatible with women’s rights. The
nature of the court system, as noted in Chapter 2, also impedes women’s
enjoyment of their human rights. I now draw conclusions as regards the
nature of the court system, and their cultural legitimacy, and show how
these impede women’s enjoyment of their human rights.
8.3.1 Nature of court system
After 1994, the jurisprudence revealed an enduring inconsistency by courts in
the application of customary family laws.4 Problems related to determination
of customary family laws, dealing with its changing position in relation to
social life, and defining customary law in the face of the Bill of Rights. This
position leads formal courts to be poor arbiters in matters of customary
family laws.5
Further, the legal system in Malawi, just like many other African countries
that were colonised by Britain, is based on the English common law. This
position, as discussed in Chapter 7, lead to court’s reliance on the English
4See the discussion in Chapter 7.
5See the discussion in Chapter 7.
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common law as a yardstick. Arguably, this position diminishes the courts
ability to make any meaningful inquiry on matters of African customary
family laws and its applicability in resolving the conflict between African
customary family laws and women’s rights.6
In addition, most poor people, who live in rural areas, still go to the chiefs’
courts for their justice needs7 and yet these courts are not part of the formal
court system. The different forums by which judicial powers are exercised
point to the inadequacy of court networks.8 Though scarcity of resources
and poor infrastructural conditions can be blamed for this state of affairs,
the more plausible reason is that the majority of rural Malawian women
still prefer to resolve their problems locally, and with the help of African
customary family laws. There is no doubt, therefore, that the abolition of
the TCs in Malawi after 1994 should have been preceded by the creation
of other forms of traditional judicial forums capable of dealing with local
and customary law related disputes.9 As noted by Juma,10 in Malawi, it
can equally be argued that as far as the application of the Bill of Rights
6Juma L ‘Reconciling African customary law and human rights in Kenya: Making a
case for institutional reformation and revitalization of customary adjudication processes’
(2002) St Thomas Law Review 459 at 506.
7WLSA In search of justice: women and the administration of justice in Malawi (2000)
22-23; and Kanyongolo FE Malawi: Justice Sector and the Rule of Law (2006) 21.
8Juma (n 6).
9As above.
10As above, with respect to Kenya.
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to African customary family laws is concerned, the benefit of such judicial
forums would be that human rights discourse would be undertaken at village
level. In addition, claims of violations of women’s rights would be adjudicated
through mediation, arbitration and other forms of customary procedures that
are familiar to the people which, arguably, would mean more compliance.11
8.3.2 Cultural legitimacy
In Chapter 7 we saw that Malawian courts have generally respected cultural
rights, but have done so on the basis of individual rights and equality. This
is contrary to the emphasis on group rights in customary laws as discussed
in Chapter 3. However, it is important to note that as courts continue
to develop Malawi’s constitutional jurisprudence, they should also consider
the impact of their decisions on local customs and culture, and should be
mindful that those, too, are important rights. In so doing courts can work
with law reformers to help develop customary family laws in accordance with
developing principles of equality and non-discrimination.
Furthermore, in order to ensure that principles of human rights remain
firmly rooted in Malawi, local cultures need to adopt and incorporate consti-
tutional norms with their own understandings and values.12 Simply ignoring
the application of customary family laws can lead to people resorting to in-
11As above.
12As above, 502.
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formal people’s law, and the courts’ official decisions becoming mere paper
law. This would, obviously, be catastrophic in terms of Malawi’s attempts to
implement constitutional principles which respect the principles of equality
and non-discrimination and protect women’s rights.
In that respect the thesis has demonstrated that the promotion of the Bill
of Rights and universal standards respecting women’s rights by the courts are
legitimate goals. However, the implementation of the Bill of Rights respecting
women’s rights within customary family laws in Malawi will, in some cases,
be impeded by practices or values which enjoy cultural legitimacy but are
incompatible with women’s rights. Among others, these values are reflected
in the stereotypical nature of some of the judgments made by judicial officers.
For example, in a custody dispute before a court, instead of awarding
guardianship of a child to a father, which would be in the best interests of
the child, custody of a child has been awarded to a mother just because
the customary family rules requires thus. Another example relates to the
distribution of intestate deceased estates. Judicial officers, who are called
upon to do so, simply endorse the customary rule available without due
regard to the promotion of women’s rights.13
It is, therefore, suggested that the incorporation of women’s rights values
into customary values should be accomplished by recognising what those
differing systems have to offer to each other with regard to the protection of
13Interview by Assistant Registrar of the HC in Mzuzu on 6 May 2006.
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human rights.14
8.4 Impact of the Bill of Rights on law re-
form of African customary family laws in
Malawi
In Chapters 2, 5 and 6 of this thesis, it has been observed that the Malawi
Constitution clearly recognises the applicability of African customary laws.
However, it also recognises that some African customary practices are dis-
criminatory against women.15 It thus obligates the state to adopt legislation
that eliminates or criminalises such practices. This is not an easy task for
law makers as they are also obligated to ensure that the right to culture
is protected. Furthermore, what constitutes a discriminatory practice may
depend on the context.
Having said that, the question remains: what has been the impact of the
Bill of Rights on law reform of African customary laws? To answer this
question two things have been particularly highlighted in this thesis. First,
14For a full discussion of the cultural legitimacy, see An-Na’im AA ‘State Responsibility
under the International Human Rights Law to change Religious and Customary Laws’ in
Cook RJ (ed) Human rights of women: National and International Perspectives (1994)
167. See also Juma (n 6) 462.
15Section 20 (2) of the Malawi Constitution.
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changes and developments that are being made to African customary family
laws reflect pursuing goals of national gender equality and the adaptation
to constitutional and international standards aimed at protecting women’s
rights. Secondly, changes made to customary marriage laws pay little regard
to customary laws and cultural dictates. In general, it has been observed
that most customary family laws that are at variance with women’s rights,
have been replaced by provisions that are in total disregard of customary
family laws. This approach, arguably, will going to affect the implementa-
tion of these reformed laws as they lack cultural legitimacy. Agreeing with
Himonga16 and Malefane,17 such a position negates the precise content of
what customary family laws are. The foreseeable result would be a disjunct
between law and people. This position, unfortunately, creates more problems
than it solves. It renders the position of women with regard to their rights
uncertain. This unfortunately reduces such law reform initiatives to mere
paper law.
16Himonga C ‘The advancement of African womens rights in the first decade of democ-
racy in South Africa: The reform of the customary law of marriage and succession’ (2005)
Acta Juridica 82 at 97.
17Malefane P ‘South African Customary law at Crossroads: What is our Customary law
of Marriage?’ (2005) Walter Sisulu University Journal 7 at 16.
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8.4.1 Proposals to reform customary marriages and in-
heritance laws
Recent proposals to reform the law on marriage and inheritance, discussed
in Chapter 6, have attempted to address discriminatory customary family
laws against women to a certain extent. However, the inherent difficulty
of regulating private relations may diminish the value of this. In spite of
this, the importance of these proposed laws in providing the theoretical legal
framework within which customary marriages and customary inheritance are
to operate is acknowledged.
The evaluation of the Bill and DEPA, as discussed in Chapter 6, reflects
that most provisions will be well received by the majority of women married
under customary family laws. In particular, provisions directed at laying
down guidelines for the recognition of marriages by repute or permanent
cohabitation appear to address many of the disadvantages that women are
facing. If enacted, this provision will go a long way to addressing the right
to property, right to maintenance, and right to custody of children, among
others.
However, this thesis has also pointed out some areas which require further
consideration. Examples include the retroactive application of the Bill. The
Bill should apply to all marriages whether contracted before or after it comes
into force. The Bill must also clarify the legal position of parties to existing
polygamous unions and include protective measures in favour of women who
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are parties to these unions.
8.5 Obstacles to implementation of proposed
laws
One of the most probable obstacles to implementation of these proposed laws
is low awareness of their existence, which is compounded by high illiteracy
levels among most women Malawi, as discussed in Chapter 5.18 This po-
sition, obviously, calls for the need to have programmes that target public
awareness of these new laws that, as discussed, would have an impact on
women’s lives. Obviously, such programmes must take into account social
and economic factors inhibiting accessibility of legislation by women, for ex-
ample, disparities in educational levels. This may be undertaken through
various means, including community based organisations.19
An observation is also made that legal mechanisms may have a limited
impact on private relationships, especially since implementation is difficult
to monitor and enforce. Consequently the change in the law may not have
the desired benefits for women married under customary family laws. This
becomes increasingly apparent when considered in the light of socio-economic
18These proposed laws have not been passed into law yet which could also be the cause
of its low awareness.
19Juma (n 6).
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limitations, as discussed in Chapter 5. This position, however, needs to be
examined, both in the light of Malawi’s obligation to eliminate sex based
discrimination in accordance with the provisions of CEDAW and the Malawi
Constitution, and against the demands placed on women by socio-economic
limitations in this context.20
8.6 Conclusion
This study has argued that, by including the right to culture as well as the
protection of women’s rights within its Bill of Rights, the Malawi Constitu-
tion stands firmly in the justification of any issue regarding the protection
of women’s rights within customary family marriage systems. The extent to
which this has been reflected in practice has been assessed in the light of
women’s rights law reforms and the courts’ adjudication of customary family
law issues. The central argument that has been advanced is that, in rec-
onciling customary family laws with women’s rights, courts and law reform-
ers need to look closely at customary family laws that are discriminatory to
women, and develop them so that they are compatible with the constitutional
principles of equality and non-discrimination. In ignoring the application of
customary family laws in favour of a constitutional provision that is aimed at
the protection of women’s rights, courts and law reformers are failing to ad-
20See the discussion in Chapter 5 on the possible socio-economic limitations placed on
women to enjoy their human rights.
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equately protect the rights of women married under customary family laws.
Furthermore, it has been argued that ignoring the application of customary
family laws not only fails to represent an adequate response to women who
wish to live by their cultural rights, it also lacks the constitutional justifi-
cation that makes it a good part of a well designed constitutional approach
that has taken into account the fact that the majority of Malawian women
live according to customary family laws.
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Appendix 1: Map of Malawi
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire for
Magistrates and Judges
• In your own view, what are customary family laws?
• Who are the custodians of customary family laws?
• What are the different types of customary marriages available in Malawi?
• Is there conflicts between the different customary marriages that are
available in Malawi?
• How do they resolve such a conflict?
• How is a customary law proved in court?
• What are the common disputes that come before the courts regarding
customary family marriages?
• According to customary family laws, what is your general knowledge
regarding property relations during and after marriage; custodianship
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of children after marriage?
• Are you aware of the Bill of Rights in the constitution?
• What is the Bill of Rights?
• Are marriages under customary family laws protected by this Bill of
Rights?
• Is there any relationship between the marriages under customary law
and the Bill of Rights?
• What are common conflict areas between customary family laws and
the Bill of Rights?
• In case of conflict between a customary family rule and the rights con-
tained in the Bill of Rights, how do you resolve it?
• What is the approach of courts in developing this branch of customary
law so that it is in line with the Bill of Rights?
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Appendix 3: Interviews with
Magistrates and Judges
My study of magistrates and judges applying customary family laws within
a constitutional order in Malawi has provided an opportunity to analyse the
consequences of legal pluralism in terms of co-existing international, national
and local customs and values from the judicial officers’ perspectives. In the
course of my fieldwork among the magistrates and judges in all the three MC
and HC visited, I gradually became aware of the multiple problems facing
the judicial officers, engaged in applying customary family laws in a consti-
tutional framework. At the same time I gained insight into the wide variety
of normative imperatives to which different magistrates and judges were sus-
ceptible as regards the choice of law to be made in a given circumstance. The
following interviews illustrate the complex realities that the Bill of Rights no-
tions, such as section 20 of the Malawi Constitution on the right to equality,
impinge upon.
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• Judge 1.
[Q] What factors lead you to apply customary law in a given case
before you?
[A] It is a question of evidence in each case that has come before
me. In most cases one has to plead the custom with which he/she is
asserting that it is applicable to him/her. The duty of the court is to
be vigilant toward testing that customary law against the Bill of Rights
provision.
[Q] How would you deal with a conflict between customary family
laws and the Bill of Rights provision?
[A] Any customary law that is inconsistent with the fundamental
principles of the Malawi Constitution, for example, right to equality,
would be invalid. For example, the customary law of inheritance kuhaha
is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights because it affects the dignity,
health and life of the prayers in the family.
[Q] How would you balance the both of the conflicting rights in the
Bill of Rights?
[A] In balancing the two conflicting rights, the right to culture
and the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, consideration will be
made towards the question of whether a particular right violates the
fundamental principles of the Malawi Constitution or not.
[Q] My Lord, what are the problems that a court would face in
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applying customary law in a constitutional framework?
[A] Most judicial officers are not comfortable with customary law
in the sense that for so long this branch of law was entrusted with
the Traditional Courts that were manned by local chiefs. So even if
Judges would be well conversant with women’s rights issues, they may
not properly enforce them when it comes to applying it to customary
family laws.
• Judge 2.
[Q] My Lord, what court has jurisdiction over customary law cases?
[A] Prior to 1994, customary marriage cases were in the exclusive
domain of the Traditional Courts. After 1994, there was a gap as to
which court would be adjudicating over divorce matters under custom-
ary family laws. This gap came in because section 39(2) of the Courts
Act did not allow magistrates to adjudicate over divorce matters. This
anomaly, however, was resolved by an amendment to the Courts Act
of 2000 that gave MC additional jurisdiction.
[Q] As a judge, have you been faced with a challenge in which a
customary rule is being challenged for its unconstitutionality? If so,
what was your approach?
[A] Since the Malawi Constitution, no challenge has been instituted
in the HC of Malawi on a particular customary family law as being
inconsistent with a right in the Bill of Rights.
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[Q] How would you resolve a constitutional challenge between a
customary family rule and a right within the Bill of Rights?
[A] In resolving the conflict between a customary family rule and
a right in the Bill of Rights, facts on the ground will determine which
of the rights should prevail over the other.
[Q] What are the problems that a court may face in applying cus-
tomary law in a constitutional framework?
[A] Lack of knowledge on the customary family laws pose as a big
challenge on how best courts can be able to develop this branch of law
in a constitutional order.
• Judge 3
[Q] My Lord, what is the position of customary laws in Malawian
courts.
[A] Courts in Malawi have, on a general term, accepted that cus-
tomary law is part of the laws of Malawi. The challenge, therefore, is
not so much on the recognition but on identifying what customary law
to apply in a given case considering the diversity of the society.
[Q] How do you resolve conflicts between different customary laws?
[A] In the event that there is a conflict of different customary laws,
rules of fairness become difficult to apply. Courts are found in a sit-
uation where they have to decide according to what is realistic and
fair.
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[Q] My Lord, how do you resolve conflicts between a customary
rule and a right within the Bill of Rights?
[A] In the event that there is a conflict between a customary rule
and women’s rights, if the customary law is not offensive, I would be
inclined to recognise the application of customary law.
[Q] What are the problems of the application of customary family
laws in a constitutional order?
[A] Under customary law marriages, generally, a woman is taken
as a burden and not an equal contributor to the assets of the family.
This brings in the challenge of distributing the property of the said
marriage after divorce. When it comes to customary law, the issue
of precedence is a problem. Over the years customary laws have been
changing. So, the problem with the courts is to establish the customary
law of a particular given time. The questions that are asked are: how
far do we go back or come to the present scenario before we dilute the
custom? Living customary law presents its own problems because one
gets different views because of the inflows and outflows of people in
most communities.
• Magistrate 1
[Q] Since on a daily basis, your Worship, you handle cases that
require the application of customary law. How do you deal with con-
flicts that arise due to the application of customary family laws in a
constitutional order?
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[A] If faced with a conflict between customary laws and women’s
rights, I would apply common law instead of customary law because
it has been tried and tested that it does not infringe on women and
children’s rights.
[Q] What are the problems that you face as a court in the applica-
tion of customary family laws in a constitutional order?
[A] The problems that I normally face with the application of cus-
tomary laws are: there is no literature on customary laws; where there
are competing customs, whose custom must take the show; and lack of
expert witnesses in court.
[Q] What factors determine the application of customary family
law in court?
[A] Factors that determine what customary law to apply in a given
case is the type of marriage.
• Magistrate 2
[Q] How do you handle a conflict between a customary law and a
right within the Bill of Rights?
[A] Any customary law that is inconsistent with the constitution
would be invalidated. The danger that if all customary laws are de-
clared invalid, which would obviously mean the end of customary laws,
should not be an excuse for denying women of their rights. In most
cases I am pragmatic in that I practise judicial activism. I do state
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what the requirements of a particular customary law require me to
do. I then state a constitutional provision that gives me a justification
of ignoring a particular customary law and enforce the protection of
women’s rights.
• Magistrate 3
[Q] How do you deal with a conflict between customary laws and a
constitutional right?
[A] If there is any conflict between a constitutional right and cus-
tomary law, that necessitates me to hold the supremacy of the consti-
tution.
[Q] Do you think customary family laws stand a chance of being
developed so that they can be in line with the constitutional require-
ments?
[A] The problem with developing customary law is that I am not
fully conversant with customary law rules. As such, it is even difficult
to resolve the conflict, let alone thinking that this branch of law can be
developed. It is assumed that all customary laws are inconsistent with
the Bill of Rights and yet customary laws are dynamic.
• Magistrate 4
[Q] How do you handle conflicts between a customary law and a
right within the Bill of Rights?
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[A] Most judgments that I deliver disregard the dictates of custom-
ary laws that infringe on the rights of women and children, for example.
In my opinion, all customary laws that infringe on the rights of women
and children should be invalidated. In the case of an offending cus-
tomary law, the application of common law is preferred instead of a
customary law that would violate the rights of women.
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